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Abstract

Rather than with the success of Life S t u d i e s , the
failure of "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is where the
major shift in Robert Lowell's poetry occurred.

Yet,

while the rest of his work has received more critical
attention than that given any other poet of his genera
tion,

"The Mills" has been generally slighted.
The first two chapters of this study are devoted

to establishing the background to the poem Itself.

The

opening chapter provides an e x e g e s i s , with some a t t e n 
tion given to a few pertinent biographical details.

A

stanza-by-stanza reading of the poem exposes places
where the mythic method that Lowell employed collapses
into irreconcilable ambiguity.

But generally,

signifi

cant details in the p o e m are highlighted as part of an
extended paraphrase which is useful for later discussion.
The second chapter is devoted to a summary of the
critical reception which the poem received upon p u b l i c a 
tion in volume form plus a summary of later opinions as
they have appeared in books more generally devoted to
Lowell.

As a summary,

it completes the basis necessary

for the more specialized third and fourth c h a p t e r s .
iv

The third chapter Is a twofold treatment of n a r r a 
tion that seeks to explain why Lowell had to change his
style.

There are problems particular to this poem's

narrative,

also more general problems.

The realism of

literal events in Anne K a v a n a u g h 's revery relies upon
causality.

The significance of those events, however,

operates through allegory.

With the loss of a Christian

cosmology, Lowell's particular experience is that his
poetry loses the ability to signify allegorically.
er than vertical,

Rath

events become strictly horizontal.

A

change in poetics becomes necessary.
For the fourth chapter,

I have borrowed heavily

from Heidegger and Husserl because their concerns are
strikingly similar to Lowell's.

The chapter argues that

a sense of groundless process appears first in "The Mills,
then matures as a series of lyrics in Life S t u d i e s .
With Heidegger to round out why Lowell changed his
style, Husserl can be used to describe h o w such a poetics
operates.

Anne Kavanaugh's series of reveries and the

poet's description of physical and mythical detail create
a counterpoint which is basic to the poem's structure.
Her revery carries the poem d l a c hronlcally, and her d e 
scriptive detail
narrator)

(plus that provided by an omniscient

supplies a synchronic multiplicity that co m 

pounds the poem's meaning.

A similar process is carried

out more successfully by the series of lyrics In Life
Studies,

through which Lowell

(rather than using a p e r 

sona such as Anne Kavanaugh) posits past phases of h i m 
self which operate reflexively and in sequence to locate
a present-fleeting self.
Lacking a Christian cosmology, Lowell lost the a l 
legorical level of meaning.

His later poetry operates

as a mode of thought that brackets experience.

If not

unity of experience, his poetry still could create a
continuum of e v e n t s .

vi

Introduction

Since its appearance as the title p o e m in Robert
Lowell's third volume, most critics have maintained that
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is a remarkable but fatal
ly flawed poem.

Assuming that some failed poems can be

as important to the discussion of poetry as other poems
which are entirely successful,

I have undertaken an a n a 

lytical study of Lowell's longest poetic work and of the
shift it represents.

The poem is significant in itself,

but it is also important for reasons which are,
speaking, external to it.
effort,

strictly

It is Lowell's most ambitious

and it marks the major turning point in his c a 

reer; his rejection of Catholicism, his mental disburbances, and his abandonment of strict form appear during
or right after the poem's composition.

In fact there is

evidence for all three of these within the text of the
poem.
At present, Lowell's poetry has received more seri
ous critical attention than that of any other poet of
his generation,

yet "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" has

been generally ignored.
passing,

Critics who mention it do so in

classifying it a failure as they proceed to
1

other interests.
is a failure,

My first point is that, while the poem

it is an important one.

A significant

phase in Lowell's poetic development has been overlooked
by his c r i t i c s , and the more important the rest of his
career becomes the more glaring such a gap becomes.
But more importantly,
(1951)

"The Mills of the Kavanaughs"

is at the center of the poetic shift Lowell made

between his first phase, which reached maturity in Lord
Weary 's Castle

(1946),

and his second phase, announced

with the publication of Life Studies

(1959).

That is,

as much as the success of Life S t u d i e s , the failure of
"The Mills" represents the major change in Lowell's ca
reer.

And,

because he has had wide influence,

any r e a 

sons for such a change that can be detected within his
w o r k are pertinent to a more general discussion of poetry.
The way a poet perceives the world and the way he
writes operate in conjunction.

As 1 will discuss later,

Hugh Staples argues that "The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
contains "a complex of dualisms" which constitute a
"characteristic habit of mind" for Lowell.
these "dualisms"

(finally,

the other pessimistic;

"antagonisms")

One side of
is optimistic,

and their alternation is rem i n i s 

cent of Lowell's perceptions, his manic vacillation.
Within "The Mills" he seeks to mediate this split through
the use of a unifying myth,
however,

that of Persephone and P l u t o ;

contrary to Eliot's belief that myth can give
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unity to mo d e r n experience,

this center does not hold.

W hy such a "center cannot hold" constitutes my first i n 
quiry, and h o w this is overcome becomes ray second.
We often hear about a poet's vision, and just as
often w e hear about his voice.

1 believe that Lowell's

style contains both of these and in its larger faculty
amounts to a mode of apprehension which he uses to guage
experience.

If this is the case,

then the way he sees

the world is bound up in the way he w r i t e s ; and the way
he writes can be discussed in a larger context which r e 
veals patterns of thought,

patterns which out of their

closure at times provide disclosure but which at other
times preclude disclosure.

"The Mills of the Kavanaughs"

I

Robert Lowell's "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" is an
example of poetry operating for the self as a locating
mode of thought.

As will be evident later, Life Studies

performs a similar function but does so in a radically
different manner.

One way of understanding the p r e d i c a 

ment faced by Lowell, when writing either "The Mills of
the Kavanaughs" or Life S t u d i e s , is to think of time as
a process that continually absents and presences the e x 
ternal world.
the self;

Such a world serves as an analogue for

therefore,

its presence or a b s e n c e - - f i n a l l y ,

its rotation between these two--effects an interior world,
that of the self.

For Lowell, poetry gauges such change

and by doing so generates unity of experience.
1 am interested in using Husserl and Heidegger to
treat poetry as a locating mode of thought that brackets
experience.

I want to show that due to problems with

causality in narration and with compound mythical a l l u 
sion Lowell abandoned his earlier mode for a series of
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lyrics, as in Life S t u d i e s . intended to create a continu
um of retentional modification that locates the self.
The locating process is active in "The Mills," but
Lowell's poetic mode at this stage in his career hampers
it.

Anne Kavanaugh's series of reveries and the poet's

description of both physical and mythical detail create
a counterpoint which is basic to the poem's structure.
Her revery carries the poem diach r o n i c a l l y , and the poet's
descriptive detail,

imagery, provides a synchronic m u l t i 

plicity which is intended to magnify the poem's meaning.
However, what actually happens is that the synchronic
multiplicity of images and mythical allusions trips over
itself,

is self-defeating.

Carried forward by narrative

(and backward), Anne's "dream vision" overlaps into what
Hugh B. Staples calls a "montage"1 but what is more n e a r 
ly a kaleidoscope,
What follows,

something which defies interpretation.
therefore,

is a reading of "The Mills"

which goes as far as the poem will allow.
are three versions,
tant.

Though there

only the first and second are impor

I have based my discussion upon the second, p e r 

manent version which appeared as the title poem in The
Mills of the Kavanaughs in 1951,
Appendix B.

and this is included in

The other Important version appeared as the

lead piece in The Kenyon R e v i e w , Winter,

1951, and is

included in Appendix A.
To give a brief paraphrase or summary of the poem's

action Is to run the danger of making it sound trite.
Nevertheless,

such a sunmary is necessary for the sake

of clarity during the longer treatment which f o l l o w s .
And,

I might add,

it is fair to say that some of the d e 

tails of Harry's and Anne's personal experience are
trite; not only in the sense that they seem all too fa
miliar but also because they fail to signify,

to point

beyond themselves.
A brief look at Jean Stafford's "An Influx of Poets"
and "A Country Love Story"

demonstrates the a u t o b i o 

graphical character of Lowell's poem.

And this fact

obviously reinforces the position that Lowell's writing
is a self-locating process.

The events that are covered

by both the stories and the poem amount to the dissolu
tion of a young couple's marriage.

The two have taken

up residence in an old house in the New England cou n t r y 
side, one that is near water.

The tensions that surface

between them are heightened by their isolation.
Stafford's stories the end brings divorce;
poem,

the end is more violent,

In

in Lowell's

bringing one and possibly

two s u i c i d e s .
The best brief summary of the action that takes
place in "The Mills" is given by Hugh Staples.

I quote

his summary because I cannot improve upon i t :
As the poem opens, Anne Kavanaugh sits in the
garden of her husband's estate, Kavanaugh (which

is the actual name of an old family mansion in
Damariscotta Mills, Maine).
She is playing a game
of solitaire.
She faces her husband s grave, which
has a flag on it, Indicating his naval service.
She meditates on the decay of the Kavanaugh f o r t u n e ,
and on the tradition which she and her late husband
have inherited.
She remembers their childhood, and
then falls off into a day-dream, which is intermit
tently interrupted by brief moments of return to
the waking world.
Psychologically right, these m o 
ments come near the beginning and end of her dream
(stanza 5, stanza 32).
From the end of stanza 2 to
the middle of stanza 33, however, the narrative is
a mixture of remembered incidents in her life and
a symbolic commentary, largely phrased in Ovidian
allusions, by which she endeavours to interpret
these e v e n t s . In terms of the outer framework of
the poem, the action is confined to her imagination.
The children splashing about in the pool, for e x 
ample, in stanzas 7 and following, are images of
herself and Harry Kavanaugh as children, not their
issue.
Indeed, part of the irony of the poem d e 
pends on the fact that the Kavanaugh line has b e 
come extinct with the death of her husband.
Her dream vision, although it has the overlap
ping quality of a m o n t a g e , ranges over four periods
of her life, which, in accordance with the basic
m y t h of Demeter and P e r s e p h o n e , are ordered in
terms of the four seasons.
First she casts her
mind back to the springtime of her life as she r e 
calls her first meeting with Harry while she is
picking flowers illicitly at Kavanaugh (stanza 4).
Childhood is a romp through the verdant countryside
(stanzas 6 and 7), but imperceptibly, spring becomes
su m m er as they frolic and struggle in the mlllstream
below the estate (stanzas 8-10).
Adolescence c o i n 
cides with harvest-time, and their sexual relat i o n 
ship, already prefigured in the swimming scene,
becomes actual in stanza II [sic]: 'The w o r l d hushed.
Dying in your a r m s , I heard / The mowers moving
through that goldeneared / Averaal ambush . . . *
Anne Is rescued from her indigent, shiftless and
alcoholic father, with his 'thirteen children and
his goat* by Harry's mother.
She comes to live at
Kavanaugh after her adoption, and her relationship
to Harry becomes in a sense incestuous.
In stanza
14, it is late spring again, and we learn that the
pair are to be married in July.
This marriage of
Cinderella to Prince Charming is as brief as it is
unhappy, and Anne is relieved to see her husband,
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an officer in the Naval R e s e r v e , sail with his ship
for the Pacific in the summer of 1941.
But he r e 
turns, mentally disturbed, after Pearl Harbor.
The
central part of the poem, stanzas 17-31, relates
the progress of his mania and the gradual suspicion
on AnneT s part that the failure of their marriage
is somehow her fault.
Harry's illness reaches a
pitch of horror when he tries to throttle his wife
on Christmas morning.
A paranoiac, he interprets
her apparent reference to another man during the
course of her nightmare as evidence of infidelity.
In a sense, he is right, but the tragic irony arises out of the fact that the man referred to is
himself Idealized.
Failing, however, in his m u r d e r 
ous intent, his aggression turns inward, and he
tries to kill himself by asphyxiation.
After this
episode, he is put under restraint at Kavanaugh,
but his mental condition continues to deteriorate
during the winter and spring, and he dies, p r e s u m 
ably by his own hand, as the rest of the town c e l e 
brates Independence D a y .
At this point (stanza 33) of her reverie, Anne
Kavanaugh comes back to full consciousness.
She
’rambles down the weedy path, past hill / A n d grave
yard to the ruined burlap mill' (which also serves
as a locale for 'The Holy Innocents' and 'New Year's
Day' in Lord Weary *s Castle).
The remaining five
stanzas record A n n e 'a thoughts as she gets into her
boat and rows down the millstream.
Her quest for
the meaning of her life is a coda that summarizes
the meaning of the poem.
It is a review of the
history of the Kavanaughs, her marriage ('Even in
August it was autumn') and her future ('Love, I
^
gave / Whatever brought me gladness to the grave').
The poem is preceded by two e p i g r a p h s , one taken
from Arnold's "Dover Beach" and the other from In the
American G r a i n , by Wil l i a m Carlos Williams.

Both express

disillusionment by their minimal views of human relat i o n 
ships and in particular of the possibilities for love
and morality.

Arnold's famous poem confronts the p o s s i 

bility of love without the "Sea of Faith," after it has
b e e n lost.

For him, religious faith as well as any kind

of faith, any coherent system that might give meaning
to the world,
Retreating,

is failing in one "long, withdrawing roar,

to the breath / Of the night-wind."

All that

is left is the possibility for human kindness in an u n 
intelligible and dangerously violent world.

The lines

that follow those which Lowell quotes state that the
w o r l d has "neither joy, nor love, nor light,
tude, nor peace, nor help for pain."

/ Nor c e r t i 

In its own way,

"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" sets about demonstrating
this opinion.
The quotation taken from Williams,

that "Morals are

the memory of success that no longer succeeds," suggests
the ethical wash Lowell may have found himself in once
having left the Catholic Church.

(And,

as I will d i s 

cuss later, Lowell was moving away from the Church while
writing "The Mills.")

Having lost his faith, he lacks

the theistic ground necessary either to posit or c o n s i s 
tently distinguish good and evil.

The Kavanaugh's C a t h o 

lic religion and the Kavanaugh fortune are specific
instances

"of success that no longer succeeds."

As the

paragraph that precedes the first stanza tells us, Harry'
is an old and prominent Catholic family in Maine,

and,

as Anne quickly reveals in the poem's opening stanzas,
it has become part of the bankrupt aristocracy.

Later

we learn of Red Kavanaugh's unscrupulous treatment of
the Abnakls Indians.

Thus the Kavanaugh "success" with
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money has ended with "Harding's taxes," and the integrity
of the Kavanaugh's religion is made suspect by the "skulls
of the Abnakis left / Like saurian footprints by the l u m 
ber lord."
The line from Williams also fits with the fact that
much of the poem "is a revery" within Anne's consci o u s 
ness of "her childhood and marriage."

That is, the good

and the bad characteristics of the Kavanaugh past as well
as those of Anne's marriage with Harry are approached via
memory.

Thus "the m emory of success that no longer s u c 

ceeds" is Anne's memory of her marriage and of the family
into which she not only married but into which she was
adopted as a child.
In the opening paragraph I described the absentingpresenclng function of time in the external world as
being an analogue for the self.
in relation to this.

Anne's revery functions

Her memory telescopes back and

forth from the present to the absent past.

The motive

for h e r search is "the memory of success that no longer
s u c c e e d s ," but her m ethod is grounded in the various
physical details of Kavanaugh surrounding her,

details

that carry significance because of past events.
Her somewhat romantic revery allows Anne to recall
and to associate time and place.

In particular,

a place

such as the mill pond at Kavanaugh enables her to r e 
present past events that once occurred there and to
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associate these with Instances taken from mythology and
the political past of her region.

Further, her revery

means that on one level past events still literally take
place in her consciousness,

and ours while we read.

The external world that by the nature of time a b 
sents and presences itself is recalled by an interior
world of revery that re-collects past events in an order
that is meaningful in light of the present.
cess brackets the self.

This p r o 

Anne locates herself by going

both beyond and short of her disastrous marriage.
process is a sort of temporal range finding,

The

and it func

tions to reconcile the dilemma contained in the quotation
taken from Williams.
In the prose section that precedes the opening s t a n 
za we are given a series of related d e t a i l s .
is both "afternoon" and "fall."

The time

The place is a garden

within a small village with a grave "At one end of" that
"garden."

The suggested outcome of the setting as well

as that of the time of year is the grave,

death.

That

this is Lowell's intention becomes explicit during the
course of the poem, which ends with Anne's saying "I
gave / Whatever brought me gladness to the grave."
However the strongest suggestion that the outcome
of Kavanaugh as manifested by Harry and Anne is death
is made by the presence of Persephone.

As part of the

setting given before the poem's opening, Lowell mentions
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"a marble statue of Persephone,

the goddess who become

[sic] a queen by becoming queen of the dead."

The s t a t 

ue Is by the mill pond, and this detail echoes part of
the myth of P e r s e p h o n e .

The pond is reminiscent of the

pool Ovid calls C y a n e .
The following are the central parts of Ovid's a c 
count of Persephone's abduction by Pluto and of the m a n 
n er in which Ceres regained her daughter.

Because I

will have reason to refer to the myth often,

I quote a

large part of Ovid's account:
'Not far from Henna's walls
There is a pool called P e r g u s , whose deep water
Hears the swans singing, even more than Cayster.
A wood surrounds the p o o l , and the green leaves
Keep off the sunlight, and the ground is cool,
And the ground is moist, with lovely flowers growing,
And the season is always spring; and in this grove
Proserpina was playing, gathering flowers,
Violets, or white lilies, and so many
The basket woul d not hold them all, but still
She was so eager--the other girls must never
Beat her at picking blossoms T So, in one moment,
Or almost one, she was seen, and loved, and taken
In Pluto's rush of love.
She called her mother,
Her comrades, but more often for her mother.
Where he had torn the garment from her shoulder,
The loosened flowers fell, and she, poor darling,
In simple innocence, grieved as much for them
As for her other loss.
Her ravager
Drove the car fiercely on, shook up the horses,
Calling each one by name, the reins, dark-dyed.
Sawing the necks and m a n e s . Through the deep l a k e s ,
Through the Palician pools, that reeked with sulphur,
That boiled where earth was cracked, beyond the city
Corinthian men once built between two harbors,
One large, one small, they rode.
'Between Cyane
And Arethusa lies a bay, its waters
Held in the land's embrace.
And here Cyane,
Who gave the pool its name, the one most famous
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Of all Sicilian nymphs, rose from the ripples
That circled at her waist.
She k n e w the goddess,
Daughter of Ceres, and she cried aloud:
"No farther shall you go!
Ceres shall have
No son against her w i l l ; Proserpina
Should have been asked, not taken.
If I may
Compare small acts with great ones, Anapis loved me,
And I became his bride, but at least he asked me,
He did not force or frighten me into wedlock."
She flung her arms widespread, as if her slimness
Could block that onrush, but the son of Saturn,
Burning with terrible a n g e r , whipped the h o r s e s ,
Whirled, with his strong right arm, the royal sceptre,
Smote the pool open to its very d e p t h s ,
And the earth opened, and the chariot plunged
Through the n e w crater down to Hell.
'Cyane
Grieved for both violations, girl and fountain,
And in her silent spirit kept the wound
Incurable, and, all in tears, she melted,
Dissolving, queen no longer, of those waters.
Her limbs were seen to soften, and her bones
Became more flexible, and the nails' hardness
Was gone: the slenderest parts went first, the hair,
The fingers, legs, and feet: it is no great distance
From slimness to cool water.
Back and shoulders,
The breasts, the sides, were watery streams, and water
Went through her veins, not blood, till there was nothing
For anyone to hold.
'And Ceres, meantime,
Was looking for her daughter, in every land,
On every sea, . . .
'It would take too long
To tell what lands the goddess wandered over,
What seas she crossed, and all in disappointment.
So she came back to Sicily, and searching still
Came to C y a n e . Were the nymph not w a t e r ,
She would have told her everything; she tried to.
But had no lips, no mouth, no tongue to speak with,
Still, she had evidence to give: the girdle
Proserpina wore, lay floating on the surface
Where it had fallen when they went down.
And Ceres
Saw i t , and only then appeared to fathom
Her daughter's fate, and beat her breast in sorrow,
And tore her hair.
Where is she?
She does not know,
Still does not know, arid caTls the lands ungrateful,
Unworthy of her gifts; above all others
Sicily is to blame, for there she found
The evidence of her loss.
She cursed the land,
Breaking the ploughs that turned the earth, and killing
Cattle and m e n in anger, making fields
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Lie sterile, blighting seed and crop: the land
Had a good name, but you would never know it
To see it now, corn withering in the blade,
Excessive sun, excessive rain, and stars
And winds both evil, and the greedy birds
Eating the planted seeds, thistle and darnel
And crab-grass taking over.
'Then Arethusa,
Daughter of A l p h e u s , from the Elean pool
She lived in, rose, pushed back the dripping hair
That fell across her forehead, saying:
0 mother
Of the girl sought over the whole wide world, 0 mother
Of fruit and harvest, cease the endless labor.
Do not be angry at the loyal earth. . . .
the solid earth had opened
A way for me, I went through deepest darkness,
Rose here at last, and saw the stars again,
But in my voyage underground, I saw
Proserpina, with these very eyes 1 saw her,
Sorrowful, to be sure, and still half-frightened,
And still a queen, the greatest of the world
Of d a r k n e s s , and an e m p r e s s , the proud consort
Of the proud ruler of the world of darkness."
Ceres was like a woman turned to stone,
And then a woman r a v i n g , but her frenzy
Dwindled, at last, to anguish, and she drove
Her chariot to Heaven, pleading . . . "I have come,
Great Jove, to speak as suppliant for a daughter,
Your blood and mine. . . .
And Jove a n s w e r e d :
"She is our daughter truly, yours and mine,
A common bond, a common care.
But let us
Be willing to face the f a c t s : this was not done
Through wickedness, but love. . . .
Still, if you must
Break up this marriage, let Proserpina come
To the upper world again, on one condition:
She must, in the world below, have eaten nothing,
Tasted no food--so have the Fates enacted."
And Ceres, as he ended, was determined
To have her daughter back, but the Fates forbade it.
She had been hungry, wandering in the gardens,
Poor simple child, and plucked from the leaning bough
A pomegranate, the crimson fruit, and peeled it,
With the inside coating of the pale rind showing,
And eaten seven of the s e e d s . . . .
But Jupiter, holding the balance even
Between the husband and the grieving mother,
Divides the year in half, so that the goddess
May be with both and neither; and her bearing
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Is changed, her sorrow alternates with sunlight,
The cloud and shadow vanishing.5
Lowell's poem not only begins with a pool reminis
cent of Cyane,

it ends with Anne, having gathered lilies

as Persephone did,

rowing across the pond.

that she and her Pluto,

Harry,

She thinks

"row together";

then she

remembers the scene from Ovid that recounts Pluto w h i p 
ping his horses through the opened pool,
the line I have already quoted:
me gladness to the grave."

and closes with

"I gave / Whatever brought

The intention throughout is

that the Persephone myth be central to the poem's meaning,
Lowell's underworld motif is treated as mental in
stability in Jean Stafford's "A Country Love Story" and
"An Influx of Poets."

In "The Mills" the cyclical nature

of the Persephone myth seems to parallel the cyclical
nature of Lowell's illness as far as we can understand
it.

However,

over against such light-dark motifs there

are also Instances of fixed order,

the presence of which

is vital for purposes of contrast and,

finally, meaning.

Preceding the first stanza, Lowell mentions not only the
garden where Anne is sitting but the Bible

(of which she

makes an "opponent" in her game of s o l i t a i r e ) , the fact
that Harry was a naval officer,

and the fact that "The

Kavanaughs are a Catholic family."
sents a fixed order.

Each of these repre

Harry's madness and Pluto's a b d u c 

tion occur despite such order.

The dramatic significance

16

of Che abductIon-madness motif, which suggests a sort
of psychological underworld,

is dependent upon the firm

establishment of a healthy, waking upperworld;

therefore,

Lowell begins with a setting that contains not only the
means of access to the underworld,

the grave and the

mill pond with Persephone beside it, but one that also
contains the outward symbols of order for a living, u p 
per w o r l d .
As I believe will become clear during the reading
of the poem which follows,

the upper world of order does

not receive enough emphasis to provide a sufficient c o n 
text for the poem's general departure from that world.
There is a binary relation between Lowell's upper world
and his lower world.

For example,

Hugh Staples identi

fies a "series of antagonisms" which he lists as "spring
and fall,

summer and winter,

ity and sterility,
wealth and poverty,
life and d e a t h .

light and darkness,

growth and decay,

fertil

sanity and madness,

love and hate--summing these up-This list provides particular instances

of Lowell's binary world.

One part of each of these

takes its meaning from the other.

A problem of meaning

will arise,

(or, half)

therefore,

if one part

to the exclusion of its counterpart.

is stressed

Lowell's o v e r 

emphasis upon the second half of each of these threatens
the context within which his poem, more generally, would
have meaning.

Nevertheless,

the notion of a God-ordained,
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orderly world is basic to the poem's context,

even when

that world is seen as negated.
Mythical allusion Is another basis for the poem's
context,

and,

in addition to the above problem,

it is

often employed excessively, with a similar loss of b a l 
ance occurring as a result.

The specific situation of

Anne and Harry Kavanaugh is intended to take meaning
from its implied opposite,

a normative and ordered world,

as well as from an external, mythological construct.
And this often works.

When it does not work, however,

it fails as a result of unbalanced emphasis.
The third element basic to the poem's problematical
context is the supposed historical background of the
Kavanaughs.

The acquisition of what at one time was a p 

parently excessive wealth was achieved at the sacrifice
of a near extinct tribe of Maine Indians.

Harry's a n c e s 

tor, Red Kavanaugh, built a fortune on land taken from
the A b n a k i s , and inscribed on his signet ring,
we flourish."

"Cut down

While this originally applied to the

Kavanaugh timber fortune,

it takes an ironical meaning

with Anne and Harry who are childless,
it fits the Persephone myth.
also fails, however,

and more generally

Where this third element

is again in terms of uneven treatment.

Parts of the Kavanaugh past fit neatly and significantly
with the Kavanaugh p r e s e n t ; others dangle as inexplicable
details.
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II

In the opening line of "The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
we are presented with the Douay Bible, which has been
placed on a garden chair.
the poem,

During the notes which precede

Lowell has mentioned the presence of a Bible,

that the Kavanaughs are a Catholic family, and that they
"came to Maine in the 17th century."

This cluster of

details creates part of the background against which
Anne and Harry stand.
The Douay Bible was printed in its entirety at Douai
in 1609-10 by Catholic English exiles.^

Later in that

same century the Catholic Kavanaughs immigrated to A m e r i 
ca.

The wilderness they experienced must have been like

moving,

to reverse W. H. Auden*s phrase,

to a wild vineyard.
to a new garden,

from a formal

Their moving to America brought them

and from the start the reader is prepared

to encounter some new manifestation of The Fall,
discovered in the Kavanaughs*

this time

family history.

The particular nature of that fall is first indicated
in the following two-and-one-half lines.
is playing solitaire,

and she is wearing a sealskin toque

and a pair of blue jeans.
form of a 16th century,
and women,

The lady, Anne,

The toque, being a modified

small, plumed hat, worn by men

is reminiscent of another century, much as the

rest of Kavanaugh seems left over from another century.
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The Incongruity between past and present is suggested by
the incongruity of A n n e ’s clothing;

the blue-jeans she

wears are not suitable for a member of the Kavanaugh
line.

They are suitable, however,

ly, which was very poor.

to her original fami

The toque,

as hats often do,

might be taken to symbolize her office or position,

but

the blue-jeans contradict this position.
In addition to her contradictory dress, which in
the larger context of the poem's entirety suggests a
fundamental confusion in A n n e ’s position,
solitaire,

and "The Douay Bible

...

she is playing

Is S o l , her dummy."

Solitaire suggests solitary, which is part of Anne's
position;
herself,

it also suggests that she is gambling with
which,

she later muses,

"Is love of self."

This leads us to a third Implication,
solipsist,

that Anne is a

and this is vitally bound up with what she

suspects was her failure in her marriage.

A fourth im

plication results from what can only be handled as a
cluster of details.

It is the suggestion that S o l , her

opponent in solltarie, may also be Sol the Roman sun
god who shares a relation with Hellos and Apollo.

(In

particular, Apollo appears later in the peom in an a l 
lusion to Daphne.)

Sol also suggests wis d o m as it is

an abbreviated name for King Solomon,

and it is with

this final understanding that Anne later says " 1Sol /
If you will help me,

I will win the w o r l d . ’"

A competing
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correlation is Apollo's association with prophecy.
Sol as Solomon or as Apollo

(it would be characteristic

of Lowell at this point to say both)
heightened knowledge,

Thus,

is a source of

and Anne sees his knowledge as

the means for control, or power, over "the world."
But "The Douay Bible

...

Is S o l , her dummy."

Thus in her solipsism, Anne ironically asks S o l , Bible
yet dummy-o p p o n e n t , to help her by his greater knowledge
(that of Solomon, Apollo,
Tradition)

and the Catholic Christian

to "win the world."

She is asking to be r e 

stored to the world, yet she is also asking someone who
does not exist but rather who is posited by herself as
a sort of temporary alter ego.
tion, Anne addresses herself.

In her complete isola
Playing solitaire,

can win the world because she is the world.
of the Bible in a garden,

therefore,

she

The presence

is ironical.

The

various implications of it as "S o l , her dummy" point to
h er intellectual pride and self-love,

the opposite of

what a Bible's presence would normally mean.
Consistent with the Kavanaugh garden's relation to
that first garden,

the serpent is figuratively present:

There's a sort of path
Or rut of weeds that serpents down a hill
And graveyard to a ruined burlap mill;
That the path is "a sort of path" means that it is not a
very good path in the sense that it is not clear or
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certain.

Also,

in common,

"sort" suggests class, having something

thus this path "serpents down" in direction

past a "graveyard to a ruined burlap mill."
suggested,

Descent is

and the ma n n e r of descent may be discovered

by the "rut of weeds" that characterizes the path.
erally,

Lit

the rut is a grooved track one follows; however,

indiscriminate copulation is also suggested by an a l t e r 
nate meaning for rut and by the fact that weeds, which
are a sign of disuse yet are also indiscriminate,
growing along the rut.
ruin and death,

The rut,

therefore,

are

leads to

as the "graveyard" and "ruined

. . .

mill" insinuate.
Lowell is developing a modern locus for original
sin.

In Roman Catholicism original sin causes the loss

of sanctifying grace.

As I will discuss later, Martin

Heidegger would call this the god's absence.

But w i t h 

in L o w e l l ’s terms, at the time he wrote "The Mills of
the Kavanaughs," I think that the loss of grace as a r e 
sult of original sin means the loss of God's love,

and

grace is instrumental in man's taking right action.
That is, the metaphysical loss results in a moral loss.
Beside the "ruined burlap mill" and the mill pond
there is "a maternal nineteenth century / Italian statue
of Persephone."

Part of Anne's failure,

she suspects,

i 8 that she and Harry did not restore life to Kavanaugh.
They raised neither the family fortunes nor the next
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generation.

The Ironical presence of a "maternal"

Persephone is an early hint as to Anne's particular
situation, her marriage to death.
to the absence of grace,

Related to this and

the statue "beckons to a mob

of Bacchanals / To plunge like dogs or athletes through
the falls."

In a sense,

the absence of one god evokes

the presence of another, more primitive god.
intends for those who "plunge like dogs

Persephone

. . . through

the falls" to "fetch her the stone garland she will
hurl."

Whether as decoration, as poetry or as the prize

for heraldry--the garland ie stone;

immediately after

this Anne kneels at her husband's gravestone and folds
his flag, his bit of heraldry.

Persephone will hurl a

stone garland and Anne kneels at a grave because the
present god's nature is vitally bound up with death:
"This is the throne
They must have willed us.
Harry, not a thing
Was missing: we were children of a king."
At the end of the first stanza we know that Anne's
marriage is in some way a marriage with death,
with Pluto outright.

if not

In addition, we also know that

Kavanaugh has been the scene of some private re-enactment
of the first fall from grace,

and that in the wake of

the Christian God's withdrawn favor a pagan god has s u r 
faced.

It appears that,

in her revery, Anne sees Harry

as Hades and herself as Persephone.
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Experiencing the absence of the Christian God, Anne
directs her affections toward the logical antipode,
it is incorporated in classical mythology.
the absence of her lover,

as

Experiencing

she does the same thing.

In

both cases the process is one of giving to that which is
absent the sentiments which naturally should be directed
toward something present and capable of perception.
his essay,

In

"Aesthetic Poetry," Walter Pater identifies

a similar process:
Into this kingdom of reverie, and with it into a
paradise of ambitious refinements, the earthly love
enters, and becomes a prolonged somnambulism.
Of
religion it learns the art of directing towards an
unseen object sentiments whose natural direction
is towards objects of sense.
Hence a love defined
by the absence of the beloved, choosing to be w i t h 
out hope, protesting against all lower usesgof
love, barren, extravagant [sic] antinomian.
Anne's revery,
(for Anne,

and Lowell's,

generates Its own w orld

solipsism and for Lowell,

the poem).

In the

absence of apparent physical and spiritual life, Anne
opts for physical and spiritual death.

The p o e m p a r t i c i 

pates not only in the tradition of the absent or lost
lover but in one of the absent or lost god as well.
Pater points out,

As

this absence allows the substitution

of "reverie" directed towards "an unseen object."
"reverie" is compensatory,

Such

but it ultimately identifies

a basic antinomy in Lowell's understanding.

The "series

of antagonisms" that Staples identifies comprises a list
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of particular instances of t h i s .

As Staples s u m m a r i z e s ,

the antimony is finally between "life and death."

Thus

as long as we are in Anne's consciousness, her revery,
death Is suspended but insninent due to her preoccupation
For such a condition,

Persephone is the natural embo d i 

ment, half living and half dying.
As 1 outlined earlier,

three basic stanchions in

the poem are the assumption of a God-ordained order, and
therefore context,

the assumption of a mythical context,

and that of a historical context.
establishes the first of these and,
duces the Persephone myth.

The opening stanza
in addition,

intro

The second stanza develops

the historical context, while the third turns back to
myth.

In general,

the entire poem is carried out via

the interaction of all three contexts.

Each is intended

to comment upon the other such that the text moves f o r 
w a r d by a process of continuous contrast and reflection.
This takes place within a floating omniscient point of
view,

one which occupies Anne K a v a n a u g h 's consciousness

for _ predominant part of the poem.
The potential for meaning with this method is tre
mendous;
cally,

its danger is equally great, however.

Specifi

Lowell has difficulties maintaining distinctions

between text and context.

And his greatest problem a-

rlses with excessive mythical allusion.
lap to the point of obscuring each other.

His myths o v e r 
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Anocher aspect of this problem, which is evident
even in the second stanza of the poem,

is that Lowell's

history is so detailed it overlaps itself, obscuring
some of what was its intended significance.

For example,

Anne has already begun addressing Harry in the first
stanza.

By the second she is recounting the family

fortunes to him,

though,

if he hears, he should know

the story better than she could ever know it as it was
his family first.

This is obviously a device,

recounting is intended for the reader.

and her

But with co n 

tinued use it becomes self-defeating.
However,
Kavanaughs*

the second stanza does flesh out the

family history.

Their dramatic fall from

political and economic prominence is demonstrated by
the contrast existing between Anne's reference to
"Cousin Franklin Pierce" and her description of Harry's
mother,

"typing

to redeem" the Kavanaugh "mills / From

Harding's taxes."
deemed morally,

The fact that Kavanaugh must be r e 

as well as economically,

gradually s u r 

faces during the course of Anne's revery.
In fact Anne actually begins her revery at this
point by remembering her trespass on Kavanaugh land to
gather flowers.

Having established family prominence

and family guilt in the second stanza, Lowell moves
further into Anne's consciousness in the third stanza,
and, as Staples points out, he relates the scene of
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Anne's trespass to that in Ovid's account of Proserpina's
abduction by Pluto.

g

Ovid's description follows:

and in this grove
Proserpina was playing, gathering flowers
Violets, or whi te lilies, and so many
The basket would not hold them all, but still
She was so eager--the other girls must never
Beat her at picking blossoms:
So, in one moment,
Or almost one, she was seen, and loved, and taken
In Pluto's rush of love.
She called her mother,
Her comrades, but more often for her mother.
Where he had torn the garment from her shoulder,
The loosened flowers fell, and she, poor darling,
In simple innocence, grieved as much for them
As for her other loss.^O
Anne's account follows:
Once I trespassed--picking flowers
For keepsakes of my Journey, once I bent
Above your well, where lawn and battlement
Were trembling, yet without a flaw to mar
Their sweet surrender.
Ripples seemed to star
My face, the rocks, the bottom of the well;
My heart, pursued by all its plunder, fell,
And I was tossing petals from my lair
Of copper leaves above your mother's chair.
Staples was the first to note that stanza eight repeats
Persephone's

(or, Proserpina's)

abduction;

stanza eleven

deals with her return to earth, and stanza seventeen r e 
counts "Pluto's assertion of his right to reclaim his
bride at the end of the growing season.
The fact that the third stanza is related to Ovid's
account reinforces the sense of foreboding already g e n e r 
ated by the poem.

The failure of Anne's life with Harry

is implied; her self-love,

seen in the reflexive "bottom

of the well," is aB barren as the "copper leaves."
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The fourth stanza begins with the reflection of the
Persephone statue, and those of the Bacchanals,
the mill pond.

seen in

Married to the dead, Anne says that Harry

was '"a fool'" to leave '"the Navy when disgrace / Still
w a nted zeal to look h i m in the face."'

It is also at

this point that she states that "gambling with herself /
Is love of self."

As she acknowledges her narcissism,

she briefly surfaces from it and "feels" Harry's "fingers"
on "her neck."

At the same time, however,

she d e m o n 

strates her relation to the dead.
By association, A n n e ’s thought turns to Daphne who,
while fleeing,

felt Apollo's breath on her neck.

Her

introversion during her marriage was a flight from Harry,
and she is reminded of Daphne's similar flight from
Apollo.

Both undergo a metamorphosis.

But while Daphne

becomes the laurel, Anne's change is to become queen of
the dead.

There is also a certain amount of ambiguity

in Anne, as in Daphne, who "yet, perhaps,
admire / Beneath Apollo."

saw nothing to

That is, what they flee,

they

desire in part.
Much of the poem's progress is carried out by a sort
of synesthesia within Anne's consciousness.

Also, Lowell

often takes the poem out of Anne's consciousness and e s 
tablishes the objective existence of her surroundings
only to plunge back into her mind for another series of
associations,

some more synesthetlc than others.

As Is

becoming evident,
sive association.

the poem's foremost problem Is e x c e s 
Or, rather,

the poem's meaning often

cannot be as fully and as dramatically realized as It
should be because there is more free play (or, asso c i a 
tion) within the text than the poem's context can r e c o n 
cile.

I quote the fifth stanza which demonstrates this

problem:
The l e a v e s , sun*s y e l l o w , l i s t e n . L o v e , they f a l l .
She hears her husband, and she tries to call
Him, then remembers.
Burning stubble roars
About the garden.
Columns fill the life
Insurance calendar on which she s c o r e s .
The lady laughs.
She shakes her parasol.
The table rattles, and she chews her pearled,
Once telescopic pencil, till its knife
Snaps open.
"Sol," she whispers, laughing, "Sol
If you will help m e , I will w i n the world."
Her husband's thumbnail scratches on her comb.
A boy is pointing at the sun.
He cries:
0 d a n d e l i o n , wish my w i s h , be t r u e ,
And blows the callow pollen- Tn her e y e s .
"Harry," she whispers, "we are far from home-A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue."
In the space of sixteen lines she hears falling
leaves, her husband and the "Burning stubble."

Ironi

cally, Anne keeps score on a "life / Insurance calendar"
then "She shakes her parasol
and chews her

. . . [the pun Intentional]

. . . pencil" while "The table rattles"

and a "knife / Snaps open."
hear H a r r y ’s "thumbnail

...

Next she whispers,
on her comb."

and we

The r e i n 

troduction of Harry causes Anne to recollect h i m a s a
boy.

Reintroduced, he proceeds to point "at the sun"

and blows a "dandelion

...

in her eyes."

The stanza
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concludes with Anne whispering again,

this time that

she and Harry are "A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue."
Almost comically, Lowell is trying to do too much
too quickly.

Details such as the fact that the "pencil"

is "telescopic" or that the "garden" is surrounded by
"Burning stubble" that "roars" require our attention.
However,

these become lost in a crowd of others,

w a i t ing to be interpreted.

all

The problem is that such

multiplicity denies meaning because the context is o v e r 
loaded with details which it must reconcile.
The "Burning stubble" can be associated with the
Kavanaugh motto,

"Cut down we flourish," and with Pluto's

entrance to the underworld.
ing.

But association is not m e a n 

The "pencil" was "Once telescopic."

Is this a

particularity with no significance beyond itself?

Or is

it in some way suggestive of lost distance or perspective?
Other than because Anne "chews" on it, why does the p e n 
cil's "knife / Snap[

] open"?

With the knife's opening Anne asks "S o l " to help
her "win the world."

Immediately, Harry is there to

run his thumbnail along a comb, creating his own sort
of diatonic s c a l e .

Sol i s , among other t h i n g s , the

fifth note in a diatonic scale.

Is Anne's address to

"S o l " reinforced by her doing so in the fifth stanza of
the poem?

Later,

Harry's numbering process for c a t e 

gorizing birds is referred to,

"'What's the twenty-eight,

/
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the twenty-eight--0 wait."*
gain say ironically?)

This occurs

(should we a-

in stanza twenty-eight.

In sum,

all too often we are given much fact but no finding.
What can and should be said about the fifth stanza
is that as Daphne's "laurel branches" drop "from the
blue" in the previous stanza, here Harry and Anne "are
far from home-- / A boy and girl a-Maying in the blue."
This is part of Anne's revery, yet it is also Anne's
and Harry's condition.

Each is lost "in the blue" in

two senses: Anne is lost and changed as Daphne was, yet
while she flees through the world she also wishes to
"win the world";

Harry,

in death, pursues Anne much as

Apollo pursued Daphne and as Pluto abducted Persephone,
but at the same time he is also a lost little boy.

It

is this twofold existence that causes their marriage to
fail.

In particular, Anne dreams of making love with

Harry as a little boy, and Harry cannot relent his own
dark pursuit when he hears her talking in her sleep and
thinks she is dreaming of another man.
In the third stanza Anne wanders into Kavanaugh to
pick flowers.

Her action repeats P e r s e p h o n e s ' straying

into a "grove" to gather the narcissus.
narcissism reinforces this.
Introduces Ceres, or Demeter,

As a further link, Lowell
in the sixth stanza.

is mother to Persephone, or Proserpina.
daughter,

And Anne's

she made the earth barren,

Ceres

Upon losing her

as was within her

power because she was Goddess of the c o m ,
Thus,

of agriculture

the failure of Kavanaugh m a y be seen as a curse

placed upon it by Ceres due to the loss of her daughter,
Anne's marriage to Harry,
Persephone's statue beckons to "a mob of Bacchanals.
These followers of Bacchus or Dionysus suggest his p r e s 
ence and remind us of his early association with C e r e s .
Unlike many of the gods,
mortals.

these two were friends of the

One was related to corn,

or grain,

and the

other to the vine,

two basic fruits of the earth that

are needed daily.

In addition, both represent assurance

against death:
and Dionysus

Persephone's cyclic renewal is familiar;

is associated with resurrection and there

fore with belief in the life of the soul after death.
Anne fits as Persephone for several reasons;
ever,

one reason is that she combines two myths.

how
She is

brought into the Kavanaugh family as a result of her
father's excessive appetite and his Indigence.
parallels the myth of Erysichthon,

This

in which Erysichthon

offends Ceres and she curses h i m with famine.

He offends

Ceres by cutting down a tree (much as Red Kavanaugh cut
down many trees)

that is in a grove sacred to her.

Ceres

plagues him by ordering Famine to plant hunger in E r y 
sichthon.

In order to buy food, he sells his daughter

into slavery;

however she prays to Poseidon who saves

her by changing her back when the danger has passed.
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Erysichthon,
sephone,

as does Harry,

finally kills himself.

Per

as does Erysichthon*s daughter, goes through m e t a 

morphoses In order to provide food.

That Is, Erysichthon

represents Anne's relation to the masculine world of Harry,
her father, and Red Kavanaugh.
Anne,

Erysichthon's daughter,

as

enriches Anne's role as a Persephone to the dying

Kavanaughs.

Anne's purpose is one of redemption;

her u-

nlque significance within Lowell's terms is that she fails
at this.

That guilt which is incurred by violating a

grove sacred to Ceres,

or that which is incurred by v i o 

lating the new Eden of America,

cannot be expiated.

During the course of the sixth stanza Anne iden t i 
fies another part of her predicament:
How can I see
Things as they are, my Love, while April steals
Through bog and c h a l k - p i t , till these boulders bear
Pe r s e p h o n e - - i l l u s o r y , perhaps,
Yet her renewal, no illusion, for this air
Is orgied, Harry, and your setter yaps
About the goddess, while it nips her heels.
The seventh stanza opens:
The setter worries through the coils of brush
And streaming bramble, and the children rush
Hurrahing, where no marsh or scrubby field
Or sorry clump of virgin pine will yield. . . .
Jerome Mazzaro has suggested that "The setter worries
through the colls of brush" may be a reference to the
12
Uroborus,
a symbol for time.

This seems appropriate,

particularly in light of what precedes.

Anne articulates

33

one of her basic problems,
she says,

"How can 1 see / Things as they are."

have already suggested,
cern,

that she Is time-locked, when
As I 1

such a concern was Lowell's c o n 

and poetry was his solution;

It was his mode for

seeing "Things as they are" in a world of time and p r o 
cess.

For Anne,

the Persephone myth gauges time and

process and explains her peculiar situation,

a situation

in which she is married to a dead m a n and married into
a dying family, more generally, married to death.
In her role as Persephone, Anne is also supposed to
generate r e n e w a l , something which would give unity to
her life in the sense that it would mitigate her being
time-locked.

But in this capacity she fails.

s a y s , "the children rush
field

. . . will yield."

extinct

As she

. . . where no marsh or scrubby
They fail to catch "the half-

. . . bird" they chase,

and it "sails beyond

b e y o n d ."
That i s , Anne falls to redeem the Kavanaugh line
in a world where time has come to be understood not in
terms of the resurrection but rather that of the U r o b o r u s ,
the serpent that is circular because it eats its tail.
She cannot "see / Things as they are" because time, no
longer grounded in historical fact,
point of v i e w adrift.

sets any particular

It is just such a predicament

which makes a phenomenological approach to experience
valuable.

Anne's revery, or Lowell's poem, recollects
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the past sequentially and by doing so becomes a selflocating mode of thought.

Anne's revery is, therefore,

a modality intended to generate unity of e x p e r i e n c e .
As Staples maintains,

the eighth stanza "recapitu

lates Persephone's abduction by Pluto in the pool of
Cyane."

13

In a sense,

Lowell broadens the focus at

moments, much as a movie camera might do,

in an attempt

to locate the particular in its larger context.
point,

By this

the Christian context has been lost; what remains

are snatches of history and classical mythology.

If

Anne can see herself as another Persephone then her
experience,

though a failure,

were an aberration,

is not aberrant.

she could not locate it.

If it
Being able

to locate her experience means that in some way she (or,
Lowell)

is able to stand outside a particular situation

and to that extent not be totally subject to it.
Ovid blends the stories of Cyane and Arethusa with
that of Persephone,

as the lines I quoted from his

Metamorphoses demonstrate.

In stanzas eight, nine,

and

ten Lowell intermixes these three stories and adds a
fourth,

that of Narcissus and Echo.

summarizes,

As Staples rightly

Lowell is trying "to pack as much meaning

into every line" as possible.
is that the myths overlap,
Lowell achieves confusion.

14

What actually happens

and rather than concentration
In the next stanza Lowell

alludes to the story of Paolo and Francesca,
anything further compounds the confusion.

and if

Lowell shifts A n n e ’s revery by Introducing various
external facts such as the millpond or the knife attached
to a "telescopic pencil."

Another means by which he

shifts her attention is by using seasons.
this o u t , but he confuses certain details.

Staples points
He places

Anne's and Harry's "first meeting" in stanza four,
while

. . . [Anne]

is picking flowers illicitly at

K av a n a u g h ,

In fact, their meeting occurs in stanza

three; and,

it may be inaccurate to say that they meet

in the first place.

If they do meet,

in either stanza,

they do so strictly in terms of an allusion to Persephone'
abduction by Pluto.
With the mention of "April," spring is introduced
in the sixth stanza.
Anne's youth.

The season parallels Harry's and

Stanza nine carries them into summer,

by stanza eleven they are in autumn.
lusion is the most basic method,

Thus,

and

though a l 

the progression of sea

sons is used as a governing principle for Anne's and
Harry's romantic progress.
Still within spring, stanza eight begins the p r o 
cess of combining the myths of Persephone,
and Narcissus and Echo.

Cyane, Arethusa

Persephone's absence from the

upper world after her abduction corresponds with the pro
gression of seasons into summer in stanzas nine and ten.
Stanza nine includes the reference to Dante's Paolo and
Francesca (the

lovers who let passion overrule r e a s o n ) ,
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and the next stanza alludes to the myth of Narcissus
and Echo.

Taken as a whole,

the three stanzas unite

Anne and Harry not In spring but in s u m m e r , and in the
process of doing so they suggest several flaws that c o n 
tribute to the m a r r i a g e ’s failure.

Narcissism and lust

cause Anne and Harry to be ignorant of each other;

the

suggestion seems strong that their marriage is a mutual
abduction,

resulting in no more than the wind-borne

passion of Paolo and Francesca.
During the course of the eleventh stanza, Harry and
Anne make love in Autumn.

Anne seems "to hear / The

harvesters," her union with Harry being a harvest, not
regeneration.

"The mowers moving through that golden

eared / Avernal ambush" not only refers to laglo A v e r n u s ,
a lake near Possuoli,

Italy, reputed to lead to the

underworld because of its stench, but "ambush" also s u g 
gests that they are trapped.

Part of their being trapped

results from the guilt of the Kavanaugh fortune; Red
Kavanaugh's abuse of the land is one reason for "Persephone's
deferred / Renewal of the earth."
trap, however,

Another part of their

is that regeneration is "deferred" by their

lust or passion of which George Santyana says of Paolo
and Francesca that Dante means if you abandon yourself
altogether to love and to nothing more than love, you
already are in Hell.***

Whether one views Anne's relation

w i t h her dead husband as a sort of life-In-Hell or as
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Just a bad marriage,

the circumstances that contribute

to her predicament are concrete in terms of the poem:
That is, family guilt plus lust and narcissism result
not in regeneration of Kavanaugh but instead cause its
degeneration.
Stanzas twelve and thirteen trace Anne's life from
her origin as one me m b e r of a poor family with thirteen
children to her adoption by Harry's mother and the very
different life she led at Kavanaugh.
live as "Brother and sister!";

Anne and Harry

for them,

as children,

the woods seem haunted by A b n a k i s , while Harry's home
is dominated by his ancestry.

Though their relationship

is that of brother and sister initially,

later they are

to m a r r y .
We are given the history of Anne's origin from a
destitute family of thirteen children, whose father
kept a goat and "a second woman twenty farms up the
road," to her adoption by Mrs. Kavanaugh, who "charged
. . . [her] board and lodging to the town,"

This last

line suggests that Mrs. Kavanaugh's motive for taking
A n n e was to ease the family financial plight.
less,

Never t h e 

stanza thirteen does state that Anne and Harry are

"Brother and sister!" which means that,
their love is " I n c e s t u o u s .

"in a sense,"

If it is incest,

it is

primarily the result of Mrs. Kavanaugh*s expediency d e 
signed to retain her family;

incest is consistent with
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this motive to the extent that It too can be motivated
by a desire for retention of the self through those
closest to being the self.
Added guilt Is contained In references to the
"Abnakis" Indians and to Red Kavanaugh in the following
two stanzas,

"who burned and buried child / And squaw

. . . A pine-tree shilling a scalp."

One may see Mrs.

Kavanaugh's bringing Anne home as another attempt to
maintain a guilt-ridden name and property,

and the e v e n 

tual result of this is a marriage that Inherits guilt
but which,

because of its incestuous nature,

piate it.

Also,

cannot e x 

I think that it is fair to add that

Anne's and Harry's narcissism is a type of incest of
spirit and that this finds its physical counterpart in
their brother-sister relationship.
Staples argues that "Your mother came and signed
my papers
town"
cest),

. . . And charged my board and lodging to the

(stanza 12) means adoption (and,

therefore,

though this may be going too far.

it is Lowell's fault.

in

If so, however,

He is trying to make Mrs.

Kavanaugh's

action mean two things which cannot coexist: At one point
we are told that Anne is taken In for financial reasons,
and at another,

that she is adopted, which would mean

that the town no longer paid Mrs. Kavanaugh for Anne's
room and board.

There are several motives that can make

Mrs. Kavanaugh's action understandable and believable,
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but we are given too little too quickly to make this
part of the poem consistent and therefore completely
realistic.

Finally,

if her adoption is for expediency,

then can we really be convinced that Anne and Harry are
"Brother and sister!" with all of the serious overtones
to this w h i c h Lowell wishes us to accept?
The Persephone motif, more consistent than the i n 
cest theme,
man

continues in stanza fourteen with "the w o o d s 

[Red Kavanaugh]

left a track / Straight as an arrow

to the blacksmith's shack / Where 1 was born."
only keeps the underworld relation in mind

This not

("blacks m i t h " ) ;

it further relates Anne's origin with the Kavanaugh tradi
tion.

It is late spring and a month before their marriage

and Harry swears that their "marriage

. . . [will] renew

the cleft / Forests and skulls" of the Abnakis.
family motto,

The

"Cut down we flourish," again suggests the

Persephone motif,

that winter

(or,

death)

seen by her

going underground will always be displaced by the renewal
of her return,

spring.

The particularity of the use of

the myth in this poem, however,

seems in part to be that

their marriage occurs in the summer
spring,

( J u l y ) , not in the

and that the season of renewal has already passed

for them.
This idea continues.

In stanza fifteen the dead

Indians chant their "Miserere."

As if that is not enough,

the opening line of stanza sixteen shouts the point with
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(this time obvious)
drowning!"

one more allusion:

In addition,

"Marriage by

the inappropriateness of the

timing of their marriage is also suggested by Anne's
being a "Cinderella at their Mass" whose bridesmaids
are dressed in "red," not only the lust of Francesca,
b u t the fire of Hades.

Reminiscent of her gazing into

the well in stanza three,

she says,

is m y shadow in the g l a s s . ’"

"'Prince Charming

Then she shifts from

revery back to the c a r d s , "The lady stacks her c a r d s .
She laughs and scores," remembering H a r r y ’s statement
that "God knows why!" he married her.
One flaw in the Persephone motif may be simply the
added association with Daphne.
16) echoes

Cinderella

(In stanza

the change that Daphne underwent to escape

Apollo, who,
of his love.

like

Paolo, did not have rational control

Taking revenge upon Apollo,

Cupid said,

"Thine arrows may strike all things else, Apollo,
mine shall strike thee."

18

Thus, beyond rational control,

Harry says of his marriage to Anne,
But Anne,
and,

like Narcissus,

but

"'God knows w h y ! ’"

loves the reflection of herself,

like Daphne and Persephone,

she wishes to withhold

herself.
The "shadow in the glass" is finally a solipslstlc
shadow, and the omniscient shift from Anne's revery to
a description of her continuing to play solitaire r e i n 
forces this.

Incidentally,

her playing is not objective
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(as It would be) but is In fact subjective;

she does not

shuffle but "stacks her cards," and this of course d e 
termines the order in which they will come o u t .

The

consequences of this are suggested by the fact that she
sees a shadow where her reflection should be.
But beyond being radically subjective,
ter of Anne Kavanaugh is not consistent:
being a cluster of Persephone,
Narcissus

the char a c 

She moves from

Daphne, Francesca,

(with which one might go along)

and

to having the

opposite characteristics of Apollo (with whom Harry was
previously associated)

in her attempts to win the world

and to circumvent possibility by stacking the deck of
cards.

Is this to be read as just one more metamorphosis

in Anne's character or one metamorphosis too many?

Once

again Lowell's dense method seems to be trying to do too
m u c h too quickly.
The following stanza is a further shift backward in
time to Anne and Harry climbing the "snake-trail" of the
mountain where a "Widow's Walk" is "balanced on a drop"
and where "Demeter's daughter first reviewed the dead."
Anne remembers one motive for her marriage,
she'd come to little good,
pirit hell."

"hearing how

/ She took a husband to d i s 

This echoes the Persephone theme and in

particular m a y allude to Pluto's rape of Persephone, only
this time it is in the context of the colloquial and the
moral:

"she'd come to little good."

Harry has returned
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to commit suicide and,
of the dead.

as Pluto,

to lead her to a world

Anne's situation is soon to literally r e 

quire a "Widow's Walk."

Their marriage i£ "balanced on

a d r o p ."
The following stanzas trace Harry's mental dissolu
tion and paranoia,

his violence and his eventual death,

either by suicide or as a result of an earlier attempt
at suicide.

Lowell does not make clear which.

nineteen suggests Harry's interest in suicide,
from dishonor on a sword."

Stanza
"falling

At the same time Anne says

that she "thought her kindness had restored him."
stanza twenty it is Christmas,

In

and she says ironically

(in light of both Harry's condition and the remark that
Anne would "come to little good"),

"'Harry's mine for

good'" while he stumbles to onomatopoetically stir a
"stoup of gliig."

The mention of "a silver dollar" echoes

Red K a v a n a u g h 1s guilt and the mention of the gas ovenstove establishes the setting for Harry's attempted sui
cide, a setting that reappears,

along with other details,

in "Her Dead Brother."
In the following stanza,

twenty-one, Anne and Harry

have gone to bed, and Harry has drugged himself,
he flinches wh en she touches him.

though

Anne sleeps and dreams

of their childhood at the " m i l l - f a l l ," which was the
locus for their re-enactment of the original fall from
grace.

Harry ideally defends Anne from Medusa and then
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says,

M,I will have to yield / Y o u to the dragon,

you fall asleep*" in stanza twenty-two.
she "slept"

if

She dreams that

(which means that she i£ "yield[ed]" to the

dragon or to Medusa, which the "snowplow" with its "eyeheadlights" and "thirty gangling feet of angled lights"
suggests).
Beginning in stanza twenty-one, however,

there is

a fusion of two events in the story of Perseus which is
made possible because of Lowell's use of dream.

By let

ting Anne's subconscious carry events at this point
Lowell is afforded even greater latitude than usual.
Specifically,

the "snowplow" represents first Medusa

and second Harry's automobile.

In addition,

Harry has

said that he "will have to yield" Anne "to the dragon,"
which plays off the scene in which Perseus saves Andromeda
from a great snake.

Part of Lowell's associational m e t h 

od f o l l o w s :
Then I slept.
I found
That I was stalking in my moccasing
Below the mill-fall, where our cave begins
To shake its head, a green Medusa, crowned
With juniper.
A dragon writhed around
A knob above you, and its triple tails
Fanned at your f a c e . Furlongs of glaucous scales
Wallowed to splatter the reproachful hound
Eyes of the gorgon on the monstrous targe,
Plated with hatraoered-down tobacco t i n s ,
You pushed and parried at the water's charge.
Your blue and orange broadsword lopped its fins
A n d roaring . . . I was back in bed.
Anne's dream continues,

and, as I have already pointed

out,

she believes Harry has threatened to "yield" her

if she,

in her dream,

falls asleep.

Stanza twenty-three contains the main action in the
poem, what has been called "one ancient bedroom joke."
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Anne dreams that she is making love with Harry as a boy
but warns that the mature Harry is "driving back."

The

"snowplow" that she saw while falling asleep is now her
husband's car.

She wakes and Harry is asking "'who, who,

who?'" and hitting her.
on

She remembers the "green shoots

. . . [his] signet ring,"

In stanza twenty-four, he

ironically mocks her saying,

"'Anne,

/ You want yourself,'

which suggests that her solipsism has the effect of n a r 
cissism.

The effect that the event has upon Harry is to

bring about his mental disintegration.

Her dream has

revealed a sort of Medusa and leaves Harry,

if not stone,

at least transfixed by his breakdown.
Anne's logical response is to say,
not accountable for dreams.'"
such a reply,

"'Harry,

we're

Yet, although she makes

she suspects she does have responsibility

for Harry's disintegration,
of one sort or another.

and it results from dreaming

A look at Jean Stafford's "A

Country Love Story" adds credence to the idea that Anne
robs Harry of his identity by having an imaginary lover,
a sort of demon lover.
is denied by this.
and the real.

The reality of their marriage

Anne will not reconcile the ideal

Her failure is that she does not mediate

between two p o l a r i t i e s , what she believes should be
(Harry as a boy) and what she actually experiences,

a

very imperfect man.
Anne's failure has destructive consequences,
they appear in stanza twenty-five.

Harry attempts s u i 

cide by cutting either his wrists or his throat,
and by turning on the "oven jets."
Anne's inability to help Harry,
suggests Persephone's

and

or both

In stanza twenty-six

"'I must have fainted,"'

inability to keep Pluto from c o n 

ducting her to the underworld through A v e r n u s .
says that where she "sank" the water "stank."

Anne
Avernus

is reputed to be the way to Hades because of its stench.
Having fainted at the sight of Harry, Anne dreams
that they are in a "dory" and that Harry is using a
"pitchfork" to catch "crabs."

The crab is the fourth

sign of the zodiac, which includes the months of June
and July; Anne and Harry were married in July.
"pitchfork" suggests

The

(as does "trident") Neptune;

also brings Satan to mind.

it

The "eel-grass" seems to be

an allusion to the serpent and to Medusa; both,

1 assume

are sexual symbols intended to relate guilt and time,
much as in stanza seven "the setter worries through the
colls of brush" is a likely reference to the U r o b o r u s .
But these allusions are identical to the action in
Anne's dream, which is a Journey with Harry to death.
As mentioned before,

the river stinks much as Avernus
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is supposed to stink, opening a way

to Hades.

In stanza

twenty-seven the water is yellow and appears to boil.
At the same time the Mdry-flies" snap past Anne's ears
and seem to say "Wish m y , wish m y , w i s h ," which returns
us to Harry as a little boy with a dandelion.

"Those

dead-horse waters" suggest Pergus and C y a n e , through
which Pluto drove his horse drawn chariot.

Perhaps the

fact that the water in Anne's dream boils and is yellow
identifies it with Ovid's description of P l u t o ’s driving
his horses and car "fiercely.
lakes

. . .

Through

. . . deep

. . . that reeked with sulphur" and "That boiled,"

since the yellow water might be full of sulphur which is
yellow.

The water is literally yellow with "summer's

drought," the time of year in which their childless m a r 
riage took place.

In fact,

the child that does exist is

Anne's memory of Harry as a boy who said,

"wish m y w i s h ,

be true" in the fifth stanza, which runs to the next with
Anne saying,

"'we are far from home-- / A boy and girl

a-Maying in the blue / " O f March or
Anne's dream is a journey with
attempted suicide,

Into a region of

April.'"
Harry, who has

just

the dead.

con

The

cluding lines of stanza twenty-seven depict this, and
the very last ones are those (though slightly altered)
which ended the earlier version of the poem as it appeared
in The Kenyon Review in 1951:
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I gasped.
My mouth
Was open, and I seemed to mime your hound*s
Terrified panting; and our trinming ship
Was shipping water . . . I was staring at
Our drifting oars.
The moon was floating--flat
As the old world of maps.
I though, 'I'll stay.
H a r r y , ' 1 whispered, 'hurry, I will pray
So truly; hurry!
God, you must, you must
Hurry, for Death, carousing like a king
On nothing but his lands, will take your ring
To bind me, and possess me to the dust.'
Despite this dream, Harry continues to live,

"To

baby-smile into the brutal gray / Daylight" as she puts
it in stanza t w e n t y - e i g h t .

He no longer recognizes the

birds he "once memorized / By numbers."

Their "kinds"

are "numbers, numbers!" and (as mentioned earlier) he
asks too cleverly,
twenty-eight,
number.

"'What's the twenty-eight,

/ The

the twenty-eight'" in a stanza of the same

Lowell certainly did this consciously, but it

is neither ironical nor h u m o r o u s .
antic on his part;

It appears somewhat

but its net effect is to appear

contrived.
Harry continues to decline.

In stanza twenty-nine,

Anne s a y s , "To the ungarnished ruin of your mind / Came
the persona of the murderous Saul."

Harry cries '"Where

is m y harper?*" then sucks his "thumb for joy" or "When
the phantasmagoria" leaves, weeps "For their return."
Of this Anne feels it is as if she had "never lived

. . .

never, never anything," and she feels "the stump and
green shoots at

. . . ther]

throat."

That is, she has

failed to restore life to Kavanaugh.

If they are part
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of a royal line, as "Saul" and "children of a king" (in
the first stanza)
that line.

suggest,

they are the last members of

Their marriage has not continued life but

destroyed it.

"Cut down we f l o u r i s h ," which was on the

ring that Anne felt when Harry hit her, can only be u n d e r 
stood in a doubly ironical sense.

By it Red Kavanaugh

meant cutting down trees and Indians would bring p r o s p e r 
ity.

By it, now, Anne means that she is to enter Hades,

that her part in the Kavanaugh history is only the c u t 
ting down, not the flourishing.
This segment is followed in the next stanza by a n 
other revery of their marriage in which she says,
life / Is like a horn of plenty gone to grass.
Who is t h i s , and who is t h i s . . . .

boundary of all that exists,

. . .

his k i s s , / The

consummation of the silvered gla s s . ' "
of Harry is part of her solipsism;

"'My

Her idealization

because she is the

she may have as many Harrys

as she can create from one moment to the next.

Opposed

to this is the interjection of what is apparently Harry's
fragmentary conversation with his "m a l e - a t t e n d a n t ,"
saying that Anne had taken h i m "for the other guy," which
serves to return the action to the literal situation,
Harry's deterioration.
The following stanza describes a child dressed as
an Indian who tells Anne that Harry is dead.

In the

earlier version there actually is an Indian, which

49

suggests that the Abnakis have outlasted Red Kavanaugh*s
line.

The month Is July,

the same time of year in which

Anne and Harry were married.
freedom.*'
say,

It is also MThe month of

His body sitting up in bed,

Harry seems to

'"You must bury me / As if you gloried in my liber

ty. *"

The stanza concludes with,

"How will she disown /

The leisured condescension of his frown / That still r e 
fuses."

The implied answer is that she will never "dis

own" i t .
Stanza thirty-two has Anne again playing solitaire
and saying,

’" B u t

it's so dull

. . . This a u t u m n . ’"

She

also says,

"I am just a girl,

/ Just one man's not the

f l e e t ’s."

However, her "wits" are somewhat "overseas."

She builds "a card-house" which is meant to be Kavanaugh.
The cards are described as Kavanaughs or "effigies / Of
kings and queens" which she shuffles "so badly that she
always wins," as "She dreams her luck has brought her
husband home."

Addressing him she says that "The a p 

plause" is for him,

"Gods of ancient Rome / Rise from

the mill-pond on their marble knees."
In the next stanza she continues meditating upon
these gods,

"their eyes,

nothing "will hinder."

/ Stars of a recognition" that
The nature of this recognition

is suggested by the following lines:
now . . . they have found
Me their Persephone, gone under ground
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Into mys e l f to supplicate the throne
And horn of Hades to restore that stone,
Imperial garland, once the living flower,
Now stone--Harvest, my mother's, only dower
To the dark monarch, and the futile dead
In Hades, where I lost my maidenhead.
Hell,

or Hades,

is "myself" for Anne Kavanaugh.

dition is similar to Milton's Satan who says,
Hell."

Her c o n 

"myself am

A journey "underground” to the dead is simply a

journey into her finite self, which like Satan's mind
"is its own place," capable of success only by "shuffling
. . . b a d l y ."
The concluding stanzas serve as a "coda," as Staples
points out.
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Anne reviews the Kavanaugh history of

fortune and guilt while rowing down the mill stream.
Lowell likens the scene she recollects to something from
Fragonard,

supposedly sensual,

fluid,

and spontaneous.

Perhaps Lowell had Fragonard's Bathers in mind;

a few

lines later he mentions Harry's mother bathing,

her stock

ings and skirts a polite version of the Fragonard scene.
Also,

there may be an intended parallel existing between

the Kavanaugh's having outlived their era and Fragonard
having outlived his, being reduced to poverty during the
Napoleonic reign.
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Anne rows and gathers lilies, much as Persephone
gathered lilies.
to Harry,

In the thirty-seventh stanza she says

'"I think we row together,

Jumps from my weaker stroke.*"

for the stern /

That is, Anne,

like
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Persephone,

Is with her Hades and on the water that opens

to the underworld.

In support of this I quote the view

of Kavanaugh she describes while looking back from her
boat:
and down the cove
Our house Is floating, and the windows burn
As If Its underpinnings fed the stove.
Then there is a definite shift from the temporal world
in which Anne is rowing to an a-temporal one in which
H a r r y ’s mother is still present,

typing to redeem the

mills:
Her window's open; look, she waits for us,
And types, until the clattering tin bell
Upon her room-large table tolls for us.
Listen, your m o t h e r ’s asking, is it w e l l ?
Yes, very well.
He died outside the church
Like Harry Tudor.
Now we near the sluice
And burial ground above the burlap mill;
I see you swing a string of yellow perch
About your head to fan off gnats that mill
And wail, as your disheartened shadow tries
The buried bedstead, where your body lies-Time out of mind--a failing stand of spruce.
Stephen Yenser argues that Anne commits suicide at
the conclusion of the poem.

While,

as "Time out of m i n d ”

suggests, her consciousness certainly does move into a
realm of the dead (indeed it has been,

through revery,

close to that realm during most of the p o e m ) , there is
no evidence of suicide or that Anne actually dies in
either version of the poem.

Yenser is pressing a tenor

unjustifiably beyond its vehicle.

The last three lines
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of the poem state that as "the virgin
because her blood was warm" so,

. . . gave herself

"for no other reason,"

Anne Kavanaugh "gave / Whatever brought
ness to the grave."

. . . t^er] g l a d 

This does not mean she committed

suicide so much as that she married d e a t h .

Giving what

gave her "gladness" is not synonymous with giving her
life, or taking it.

In fact "Whatever brought

. . . [her]

gladness" can be only part of her life as obviously her
life experienced both gladness and unhappiness.
did not commit suicide,
Persephone.

and Anne is being likened to

Both do, however,

have to give themselves

over to death for half of a cycle.
To summarize,

Persephone

But that is not suicide.

the poem is an example of the method

of mythical allusion.

Its weaknesses are occasional o b 

scurity caused by different myths getting in the way of
each other,

and for Lowell history and ethical systems

function as myths.

In addition,

the poem suffers from

excessive density, which puts too much meaning into too
little action.

Nevertheless,

the Persephone motif is c o n 

sistently maintained throughout the poem as a mediation
between living and dying and as a thematic buoy about
which the poem's action circles.
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III

The consistency in Lowell's use of the Persephone
myth is a good angle from which to regard the two si g 
nificant versions of the poem.
peared,

as I have mentioned,

The earliest version a p 

in The Kenyon R e v i e w .

Before publication as the title poem in Lowell's third
volume,

"The Mills" underwent somewhat limited but s i g 

nificant revision.

The third version, which is merely

the last five stanzas of the second version,

appears in

Lowell's Selected Poems but is of no importance to this
discussion.
What is of importance,

however,

is the question of

consistency in the Persephone myth as motif,

as it a p 

pears in the permanent version of the poem.

Lowell

gives a particular emphasis to the myth and maintains
it consistently throughout the poem.

But the consisten

cy of that emphasis is satisfactory only if we regard
the myth-motif internally, which the preceding exegesis
sought to do.
Regarded externally,

the poem actually employs only

half of the Persephone cycle.
the Kavanaughs" is a long,

That is, "The Mills of

detailed, meditative walk

from late summer through autumn that ends with the a p 
proach of complete dormancy.

Persephone's return to

the upper world does not occur.

From the poem's beginning
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Anne and Harry are depicted as failing to bring new life
to Kavanaugh and the Kavanaugh l i n e .
h o w could they?

If Harry i£ H a d e s ,

But the larger aspect of this is simply

that Lowell slights half of the significance of Persephone
(renewal)

in order to dramatically stress the other half

(death), though neither half can have complete meaning
without its counterpart.

Anne is not Persephone.

She

is merely associated with one half of Persephone's nature.
Restated,

the renewing character of Persephone is

suppressed in order to give emphasis to her relation to
death, and in the process of doing this Lowell does achieve dramatic mean ing within the poem.

Persephone,

as

the wife of H a d e s , does serve as the buoy or point of
reference amid a drama of irony and paradox.
External to this, however,

is the rest of Persephone's

significance existing in the completed myth and operating
in the average reader's mind.

Though,

as revised,

"The

Mills" seems to satisfy requirements for dramatic meaning,
its earlier version demonstrates that Lowell was originally
conscious of external pressures.
I have in mind his use of Catholic references.
particular.

In

Saint Patrick and the Virgin Mary appear in

the earlier "Mills," but they are removed from the second
version.

In the first version of the poem the Catholic

allusions do not work as they were intended but create
confusion in the manner I have already described,

Lowell's
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crying to do Coo much In coo little space.

That Is, on

one level, his Intention to have such allusions was sound
as they rounded out the poem's meaning,
use of Persephone.

In particular Its

On another level, however, Lowell

perceived the confusion that was actually created, and
his removal of unnecessary allusions had an equally sound
intention.
The essential point is that the presence of a tradi
tional, religious understanding of events rounds out that
part of Persephone that is otherwise missing.
via Christ

(or, Persephone)

Renewal

is a necessary ingredient

for the significance of and meaning in Anne's lack of r e 
newal.
poem,

The absence of this completing element in the
I will argue later,

in Lowell's cosmos,

is vitally related to a break

in particular his departure from

the C h u r c h .

IV

In conclusion,

I would like to comment briefly upon

the poem's two versions.
already mentioned,

Aside from deletions I have

the other change of real significance

is the addition of the second version's concluding stanza.
It contains some of the best writing in the poem.

It

also demonstrates Lowell's movement away from a Christian
framework within which to depict,

if not explain, events.
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The earlier version is useful not only because its p r e s 
ence alongside the second version helps to demonstrate
Lowell's departure from Catholicism but because in some
ways it reveals Lowell's original intentions and, by
doing so, clarifies the permanent version in places where
it is m u r k y .
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" appeared as the lead
piece in Winter Issue, 1951, of The Kenyon R e v i e w ,
the final version,

there is a prose introduction p r e 

ceding the first stanza.
ever,

As in

Unlike the final version,

how

the quotations from Matthew Arnold and W. C.

Williams are not present.

Also, between the first and

second prose introductions there are four significant
differences, which should be pointed out.

In the e a r l 

ier introduction we are given three details not present
later: At the end of the garden in which Anne is sitting
"there is a stone bedstead";
himself";

Anne's husband "has killed

and he was "the last" of the Kavanaugh "line."

The later version includes an explanatory sentence as
to who the Abnakis Indians were,

which is missing in

The Kenyon Review version.
Anne's and Harry's situation is more fixed in the
earlier introduction and the earlier poem.

One reason

for this is that the dramatic tension in the p o e m stems
largely from the fact that Harry, a Catholic,
suicide.

In the later version,

consnitted

the Catholic context
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has been greatly restricted,
less dramatically guilty.

and, as a result, Harry Is

Lowell compensates for this,

however, by giving emphasis to the guilt Inherited from
Red Kavanaugh*s treatment of the Abnakis Indians.

This

shift represents one instance in what can be generalized
as Lowell's departure from the Church and entrance Into
secular humanism.
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2
A Critical Reception

Robert Lowell is a significant subject for any dis
cussion of poetry written over the past thirty-five years
simply because his career has become a benchmark for the
poetry of his generation.

No other poet of his era has

received the critical attention that has come to Lowell,
and, despite the many changes that occur in his work, he
seems always to have had an enthusiastic audience in a t 
tendance.

That is, he has been favorably received on a

very broad basis, which makes his work important to any
study of poetry since World War II.
In many ways Lowell is a public poet, and the broad
acclaim that he has received is in part due to his use
of public themes.
private.

But before it is public, his work is

It is vitally bound up with a sense of dis l o c a 

tion, and on this primary level his writing serves as a
modality for locating the self, for bracketing experience.
Much as the cartographer's map, his poetry is intended
to fix the self to an identifiable locus; one that is
seemingly spatial because of Imagery but that In fact is
predominately temporal.

Early and late in his career,
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Lowell has led the way at points of change in poetry
(particularly into confessional m o d e s ) , and a considera
tion of what he departed from as well as what he arrived
at will help Identify fundamental concerns for poetry at
the present.

If poetry has taken some peculiar turns

since World War II, Lowell's career will not only place
these turns but will shed light on h o w they came about
as he was often leading the way.
Critics give many reasons for the dramatic change
which occurred between The Mills of the Kavanaughs
anc* Life Studies

(1959).

from the Catholic Church.

(1951)

One reason is Lowell's departure
Patrick Cosgrave says of the

title poem in The Mills of the Kavanaughs that it " repre
sents an important stage of Lowell's farewell to Ca t h o l i 
cism, and of his search for an alternative system or
systems."*-

Irvin Ehrenpries discusses this move as it

surfaces in "Beyond the Alps," the opening poem in Life
S t u d i e s . and says that basically the poem depicts "a
train journey from the city of priests to the city of
2
artists, Rome to Paris."
Lowell's divorce from Jean
Stafford may also be related to his break with Rome s i m 
ply because within the Church it was unacceptable.

And

there are other events in Lowell's life which critics
suggest may have contributed to his poetic shift: Mental
A

disturbances,
McCarthy,

§

an interest in psychology,

and (of all things)

the cold war,

the election of a Republican
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to the White House^ are some of the reasons given.
the exception of the last of these,

With

all m a y have played

a role to some extent in Lowell's shift.

In any event,

the fact that so many reasons have been offered demon
strates the seriousness with which the shift has been
taken.
But for change to be significant it must be plotted
w i t h reference to an original state.

For Lowell,

that

state reached its height in The Mills of the Kavanaughs
and particularly in the title poem.

Hugh B. Staples,

in

the course of summarizing the first twenty years of
Lowell's career, has identified The Mills of the Kavanaughs
as the last instance of Lowell's early phase:
But from a later perspective, it is easier to
view The Mills of the Kavanaughs as a crisis
in Lowell's career.
It represents the conti n u a 
tion and intensification of the experiments in
an Impersonal approach towards experience a l 
ready begun in Lord W e a r y 's Ca s t l e --experiments
in an objective narrative mode that remain u l 
timately lyrical and subjective.
It marks,
furthermore, the end of a style, first begun
in Land of U n l i k e n e s s . perfected in Lord W e a r y 's
C a s t l e , and ended i n t h e pyrotechnics of The
Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s .
Staples goes on to say that due to "the obscurity of its
narrative,

the intricacy of its symbolic structure and

the complexity of its theme:

"The Mills of the Kavanaughs"

has never received "the attention it deserves."**
though he made this remark in 1961,
today.

And

it Is still applicable

Despite a burst of interest in Lowell around 1970,

most critics have either skipped over "The Mills" a l 
together or have stressed the second half of Lowell's
career, that dating from 1959 forward.
But Lowell has said that "All your poems are in a
sense one poem."^

This being the case,

tried to do with his early,

then what he

formal approach was continued

by his second phase, but with radically different m a c h i n 
ery.

I think that Lowell's most basic concern is with

locating the self in a dislocating world.

How he does

this is accessible to us through his poetry; and as we
have shared Lowell's dislocating world, his attempts to
gauge it are of significance to us all,
partially fail.

even when they

If, as I said earlier, Lowell was lead

ing the way when poetic turns were taken,then h o w he
made those turns is of importance.
to dead-end streets,

If some of them led

a study of them is still important

if for no other reason than their future avoidance.
Reviewing The Mills of the Kavanaughs for Furioso
in 1951,

Dudley Fitts says of the title poem that "It

is a serious and beautiful poem; yet
flawed."

. . . gravely

He finds its form "over-demanding," with many

of its passages false dramatically,

its facts "hurled"

at the reader when many details are u n n e c e s s a r y .
Fitts,

For

the most remarkable aspect is that "out of a

great deal of imperfectly assimilated history and one
ancient bedroom joke" Lowell was able to make of the
a

p o e m "so moving a story."
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Wil l i a m Arrowsmith's review is the most technical
treatment of Lowell's method to appear when the book
came out.

Writing for The Hudson R e v i e w , Arrowsmith

argues that Lowell takes methods used to sustain long
poems and compresses them to short poems with the e x 
plosive results of Lord W e a r y 1s C a s t l e .

However,

for

Arrowsmith there is a "monotony of violence" in "The
Mills" which results from the methods he outlines below:
What Lowell had done [prior to "The Mills"]
was to take almost every device by which,
normally, long poetry is protected from
monotony--the e n j a m b e m e n t , the substitutions,
the b r e a t h - s w e e p , clause-piling and rhyme
roughening--and compress them within a shorter
f r a m e .*
Within "shorter" poems his method "worked; magnificently
so."

But within a larger frame Lowell was seeking to

"expand" his "compressed lyric--at the same c o m p r e s s i o n ."
Arrowsmith argues that this method has "boomeranged"
on Lowell,

that the result is "a monotonous poem" c o n 

taining "magnificent poetry."

F u n d a m e n t a l l y , he sees

it as falling in terms of its narrative.

In particular,

the absence of "strophlc and antlstrophic balance" causes
the lines to slam together.

As he says,

"economy and a

sense of balance in big poetry might have suggested a
tonal contrast between end-stopped couplets and enjambed
v e r s e s ."
Anne's revery, which covers her past and is addressed
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to H a r r y , serves as the poem's "tenor/' and Arrowsmith
adds that this is meant to b e "supported" by the Persephone
myth.

Yet he finds that Lowell's overly suggestive use

of myth blurs the poem's meaning rather than clarifying
it.

Speaking of Persephone and Hades, he says that "The

danger of eschatologies is their very richness."
ing this problem,

"Lowell

Ignor

. . . packs his symbols so that

his simplicities assume a complexity which wrecks them."
Arrowsmith rightly concludes that in narrative and dramatic
poetry "symbols have to be given a different kind of life
than in lyric poetry" because they must sustain "motives,
completions and pace."

Lowell's expansion of the "com

pressed lyric--at the same compression" fails at t h i s .
I have quoted Arrowsmith at length because I think
that he,

along with Jarrell, has been the most incisive

reviewer to tackle "The Mills."
nique and content

For him,

"in both t e c h 

long Lowell looks just like short Lowell.

And Lowell's Inability to modulate at this point suggests
why later when he did change he did so in such an extreme
manner;

it was his inability to evolve a n e w style out

of his earlier one that caused him to drop it altogether
in favor of something radically different.
It is interesting to note that Randall Jarrell has
employed the same term to typify "The Mills" that William
Arrowsmith uses: What is "monotony of violence" for
Arrowsmith is "monotonous violence" for Jarrell.

Also,
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he is quick to mention the poem's failure as Ma narratlve poem,"

12

much as Arrowsmith points out Lowell's

failure to modify his symbols to narrative n e e d s .

Thus

for both reviewers there is a significant shortcoming
as far as the believabllity of the poem is concerned,
and 1 think this failure is grounded in a sense of
realism as causality.

We are convinced of an event i n 

sofar as we can determine a process which has brought
about that event.

Lowell's inability to modify lyrical

symbols to narrative needs is in effect a failure to
provide a context

(or background)

that has enough r e a 

sons in it to convince us of the reality of the action
that takes place.
ment,

To return to Dudley Fitts for a m o 

the fact that he terms the central event in the

poem a "bedroom joke" demonstrates that he is not serious
ly convinced of the reality of the event.

Similarly,

Jarrell says of Harry and Anne that he does not think
"many readers will think them real."

He continues:

the husband of the heroine never seems so, and
the heroine is first of all a sort of symbiotic
state of the poet.
(You feel, "Yes, Robert
Lowell would act like this if he were a "girl";
but whoever saw a girl like Robert L o w e l l ? ) 1 3
For Jarrell,
narrative.

Lowell's is primarily a failure with

He does not create "the live half-accidental

half-providential rightness that some of his best poetry
seems to h a v e . " ^

Again,

a shortcoming in terms of
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realism,

though colored by Jarrell's particular w a y of

seeing things.

Near the end of his review, Jarrell says

that Lowell has forced the poem,

that "He is a poet of

both Will and Imagination, but his Will is always seizing
his Imagination by the shoulders and saying
to w o r k ! '11^

. . . 'get

Thus rather than letting the poem's meaning

surface through setting and action, which would provide
sufficient causes for belief,

Lowell has too often super

imposed significance.
Arrowsmith and Jarrell argue that the poem's main
p r o b lem is bound up In Lowell's confused method.
as they go they are correct.

However,

As far

I hope it will b e 

come clear later that the mixed modes employed by Lowell
are as much a confusion of perception as they are a fail
ure in craftsmanship.

The lyrical mode of perception is

one that operates outside causality, while the narrative
mode must use causality to make events believable,
ingly real and therefore significant.
confusion in "The Mills," therefore,

seem

Part of Lowell's
is in terms of

method, but the other part is in terms of perception.
Too often Lowell the lyric poet,
reason,

standing outside strict

sought to be Lowell the public poet whose thought

should be rational,

and in particular causal.

Two other responses to The Mills of the Kavanaughs
that appeared upon publication are brief enough to be
quickly s u m m a r i z e d .

William Carlos Williams, writing
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for The N e w York Times Book R e v i e w , describes MThe Mills"
in terms of "An unwonted sense of tragedy coupled with
a formal fixation of the line."

Otherwise, he is seem*

ingly positive about the book yet so allusive the reader
is left feeling u n e a s y . D a v i d

D a i c h e s , writing for

The Yale R e v i e w , is equally brief in his treatment but
pointed enough to register a complaint similar to
Arrowsmith's and J a r r e l l ’s.

He finds "an odd mixture of

casualness and hysteria" throughout the book,

saying

"the poems" are "studies in the instability of memory
and desire."

In addition, Daiches finds that rather

than having this confusion restricted to his p o e t r y ’s
theme, Lowell has been unable to separate subject from
craft.

Lacking "full control" he lets "his talents run

wild."^

As I suggested above,

identified by Arrowsmith,

L o w e l l ’s confused method,

Jarrell and Daiches,

In turn

becomes his confused perception.
To return to Hugh Staples,

the critical "consensus"

from 1951 to the present Is basically "a great talent,
but not a great book of poems,"
plies to the title poem.
poem,

18

and of course this a p 

During his discussion of the

Staples cites the remark made by Dudley Fitts,

w h i c h I have already quoted,
position."

as being "a middle critical

Yet while Staples agrees that the p o e m is

at once remarkable and "gravely flawed," he singles out
the character of Anne Kavanaugh as moving and memorable,
even reminiscent "of Greek tragedy."

19
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Perhaps at this point It is worth returning to
Lowell's process of locating a dislocated self through
poetry.

Staples correctly ends his discussion of "The

Mills" by singling out Anne Kavanaugh;

the poem's action

is primarily filtered through her consciousness as it
spans her childhood and maturity.

The poem's central

m o t i f is Anne's likeness to Persephone in her role as
wife to a dying line.
bracketing of Anne's

That is,

the poem's action is a

life carried out within her co n 

sciousness that seeks to locate her in the midst of a
confused,

dying and therefore dislocating world.

But, as Jarrell says,

"the heroine is first of all

a sort of symbiotic state of the poet."
the first chapter of this study,

(As noted in

there are striking

similarities between events in "The Mills" and events
in Lowell's life.)

In his discussion of the poem,

Staples concludes that "The final meaning of the poem"
is not "in the series of dualisms with which Anne
contends,

and of which she is a part";

. . .

the meaning re-

sides "in her ultimate acceptance of them."
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Thus

insofar as it at least tangentlally locates a dislocated
Robert Lowell,

the poem seeks to integrate contemporary

and historical conditions with personal experience in an
intellectual climate of dualism.

Much of Lowell's l ocat

ing process depends upon the acceptance of certain d u a l 
isms which seem fundamental to his understanding.
to his t e m p e r a m e n t .

Indeed

Lowell's basic dualism Is "life and death," and by
1951 this Is confronted In a world without religion where
death Is magnified.
Is very modern:
from.

Rather than Promethean,

his task

There are no longer any Gods to steal

As Is evident from a comparison between the early

version of "The Mills," published in The Kenyon R e v i e w ,
and the later version which appeared as a title poem,
Lowell was moving away from Catholicism while rewriting
the poem.
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As Staples first noted,

the earlier "version

contains numerous allusions to the Virgin Mary and to
St. Patrick.
sion."

. . .

Generally,

Catholicism

These are omitted in the later v e r 
"there is a theme of opposition to

. . . that goes beyond mere indifference."
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Anne Kavanaugh comes late in "the fall of a noble house."
In her acceptance of death she says she "gave / Whatever
brought" her "gladness to the grave."
once more,

To quote Staples

the poem concludes not on a note of Christian

consolation but on one of "stoic resignation."
In a more recent discussion,

23

Stephen Yenser agrees

w i t h Arrowsmlth that the mythologies employed in "The
Mills" "do not c o h e r e . H o w e v e r ,

for Yenser this is

in part a result of Lowell's tendency to yoke "contraries"
also he emphasizes the poem's on-goingness,
plication of analogy."

its "multi

In a p o e m such as "At the Altar,"

"The Lord and Lucifer are inexplicably one figure, who
solicitously rocks the baby's carriage and sadistically
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roasts the soul upon a spit."

26

However,

In "The Mills"

opposites do not remain static: On the one hand,

Lowell's

attempt at continuous modification of mythologies r e 
sults in their lack of coherence;

on the other,

"This

multiplication of analogy" consistently produces the
poem's "rich texture and complicated point of view," as
"Lowell's chief means of analysis is multiplication of
analogy."

27

There is nothing n e w in this except the a t 

tempt to have analogies revealed in sequence so that
they are in a process of continuous modification.
result, as I will demonstrate later,

The

is often eidetic

variation resulting from a poetry that is in many ways
phenomenological.
Speaking of this analogical method as it develops,
Yenser says Lowell begins "to see his poems in the same
way that he sees his symbols, and he is starting to o r g a n 
ize those poems into a narrative sequence that is itself
2ft
symbolic."
Life Studies is the first instance of this
as described here, but the basic process of continually
modifying myths and symbols had already been attempted
in "The Mills," with narrative used to govern the m o v e 
ment.

There are roughly two strategies for achieving

continuous modification of "contraries."
seen in "The Mills";

One may be

the other is a series of lyrics

w h i c h take up a subject from different points of view.
Yenser actually touches on both in his third chapter,
titled "The Logic of Contradiction":

In a world that Is fundamentally a m b i v a l e n t ,
to have but one point of view Is perhaps to
falsify; It Is perhaps to b e c o m e , In Stevens's
words, a "lunatic of one Idea."
People, I n 
stitutions, and even the gods, at least in
the perspective framed by mortals, are complex
and self-contradictory, Lowell implies, and
therefore only a certain ambivalence can keep
one from o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g .*9
Just as Staples finds "The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
ends on no more than a note of "stoic resignation," the
avoidance of "oversimplifying," for which Yenser opts,
is at best a minimal goal.

For the later Lowell, however

truth is no longer apodictic because he finds that the
"world

...

is fundamentally ambivalent."
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Knowing

this helps to explain his shift from intricate use of
symbol and myth within long,

self-qualifying poems,

such

as those in Lord W e a r y 1s C a s t l e , to use of a series of
seemingly casual lyrics which are nevertheless carefully
arranged, as in Life S t u d i e s .

In a sense,

is the fulcrum underneath this shift,

"The Mills"

for after this

transitional poem Lowell exchanges one modality for a n 
other, one mode of thought for another,

as he seems in

creasingly convinced of the world's "ambivalence."
It is in this context that I earlier said that
Lowell's mixed modes are as much a confusion of p e r c e p 
tion as they are the failure of craftsmanship that
Arrowsmlth a r g u e s .

I think it is fair to say that in a

w o r l d that has become relative and therefore "ambivalent,
in a world no longer grounded in a metaphysical system

73

such as that provided by Congregationalism or Catholicism,
the "rich texture and complicated point of view" that
Yenser speaks of are all that are left.

And in a world

such as this, phenomenology offers a particularly inter
esting approach to a poetry n o w concerned with generating
some formal structure for phenomena.
merely phenomena,
and,

secondly,

For where there are

the self is first of all dislocated

responsible for whatever locating takes

place.
Discussing the similarities between L o w e l l ’s third
book and the two preceding ones, Yenser notes an important
difference,
himself,

"Lowell's Increased tendency to contradict

to get the process of thought rather than its

product into the poetry."
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In an "ambivalent" world

"process" appears to have more potential as a way of
understanding because it contains ambivalence to the e x 
tent that it continues moving from one point to another,
whether the points contradict or agree.

As Staples noted,

"stoic resignation" is possible; however,
not.

Instead of any notion of truth,

statement is

all attention is

given to the mind's dialectical working from one moment
to another in an attempt to establish pattern.
says a little later,

As Yenser

"it Is not so much that the poems

[in The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s 1 come to ambiguous c o n 
clusions as it is that they consist of the Interaction,
the transactions of conflicting thoughts."

Lowell no
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longer pursues "the unity of things" but Instead focuses
o n "the struggle" that is necessary to realize "unity."
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It is easier to see the process carried out in Anne
(Cavanaugh*s m i n d as being a transition within L o w e l l ’s
process as a poet if w e remember not only his retreat
from Catholicism but also his shift from unifying co n t r a r 
ies to analyzing d i s t i n c t i o n s .

Yenser makes this point

by linking how Lowell sees to what he sees:
In terms of religious belief, the difference
is that between one which accepts paradox in
the name of a faith and one which calls a faith
into question because it is paradoxical; in
terms of poetic method, the difference is that
between one which synthesizes or unites c o n 
traries and one which analyzes or insists upon
d i s t i n c t i o n s .33
The basic paradox in the poem is contained in the Kavanaugh
motto,

"Cut down, we flourish," which in fact is the Winslow
*5

motto, Lowell's maternal family.

/

Persephone's alternating

between being above ground and below ground fits with t h i s ,
and Yenser argues that it is "an intuitive recognition of
the paradox that

’To die is life,'" but a "secular

rather than sectarian" one.

For him,

. . .

the paradox is

"ogygian."35
O g y g i u s , a Boetlan king, was the son of either Poseidon
or of the soil, and the p o e m works both ways:

First,

if

Anne conmlts suicide by drowning and if her death can be
taken as somehow positive because she "accepts" it (Indeed,
causes it according to Yenser)

then the Poseidon reference
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can be associated in a minimal way with the poem's action.
Second, certainly Ogygius as son of the soil works because
the Kavanaugh wealth was based upon a timber empire.

But

insofar as the poem is^ "secular," its insistence upon d i s 
tinctions calls not "faith" but meaning "into question."
The poem resists interpretation because its "contraries,"
"dualisms," and loose analogies cannot be correlated in
a larger intellectual context.
Yenser's approach to the p o e m leads h i m into some
peculiar observations that derive from the poem's i ncon
sistent use of myth.

For example, he believes the poem's

closing lines m e a n that Anne was not abducted but that
she gave herself to death (committed s u i c i d e ) , which is
clearly outside the Persephone myth.

Rather than finding

this an inconsistency between myth and action in the poem,
he says it is a "view of the Persephone myth" that is
"unprecedented."
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In the name of analyzing distinctions,

Yenser overlooks the poem's failure in its most basic
purpose,

its final meaning.

is a "view of the
be integrated?

Or, put another way,

if it

. . . myth," w h y is it one that cannot

Yenser recognizes that "analogies p r o 

liferate to reinforce, obscure,
in stanza after stanza,"
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and nullify one another

but in his enthusiasm for

"contraries" he occasionally makes distinctions where
there is no framework within which things can afterwards
signify.
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Patrick Cosgrave's discussion of "The Mills" and of
Lowell's writing in general serves as a counterbalance
to Yenser*s views.

For Cosgrave,

there is "a complex

system of reference" in Lowell as evidenced by his use
of analogy,

but there is an "absence of a complex system

of value" within which meaning can operate.

Thus,

"the

consequences of Lowell's attempt to fill the vacuum of
of m eaning left by his failure to penetrate the meaning
of his own analogies" is related to his failure to deal
properly with historical experience.
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Elsewhere,

Cosgrave says Lowell's real failure is "in his judgement
of New England history."

He uses "the same technique of

judgement that he condemns in his a n c e s t o r s .

The

following is a more particular statement:
First, the vacuum is filled by the willful v i o 
lence of Lowell's judgement on his own time.
Ultimately--and despite reservations of fond
ness and admiration for different men and
periods--all human experience in history is
condemned.
Secondly, condemnation as such is
not the poet's ambition: that ambition is to
find value, to discover the unblemished Adam.
But, thirdly, the method adopted--and the a t 
tempt to provide an over-mastering analogy
for historical episodes and the kaleidoscopic
jumbling of persons and periods is a method as
well as an achievement--is ultimately destructive.
Perhaps the best way to contrast Yenser and Cosgrave
is in this manner;

Cosgrave would have meaning and value

which require static points of reference in a culture,
thus poetry should discover the order beneath apparent
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disorder;

on the other hand, Yenser is willing to accept

a poetry which "analyzes or insists upon d i s t i n c t i o n s ,"
and he does not press for their final resolution but,
rather,

leaves meaning suspended by process.

In their differences,
a poetic minimalist.

Y e n s e r 1s pluralism makes him

Cosgrave, however,

distinguishes

"method" and "achievement," and his doing so allows him
to regard Lowell's poetic mode of thought without being
inundated by the p o e t r y ’s moment-to-moment dialectic.
That is, Cosgrave has an objective distance from Lowell
which Yenser l a c k s , and this enables him to be more o p 
timistic about poetry in general,

though more reserved

about Lowell in particular.
As a method,

Lowell's "over-mastering analogy for

historical episodes and

. . . kaleidoscopic jumbling of

persons and periods" cannot be separated from the truth
claims which his poetry ultimately makes.

As Yenser

correctly suggests, how Lowell sees is vitally bound up
with what he sees.

And one way to test the accuracy of

what he sees is to look at his methods, his modes of
thought.

As Cosgrave says,

deliberately

early Lowell "uses form

. . . for refining and moulding his e x p e r i 

ence," though "Eight years later" form is "abandoned for
the informality of Life S t u d i e s ."
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However, beneath

the ordering function of form for experience and art
there is the issue of authority.

Lowell often makes

public statements based upon his judgment, and this r e 
quires an appeal to authority.
gaining authority was by form,

Part of his early way of
thus he set form over

against the "kaleidoscopic jumbling" mentioned above.
Yet the real source of authority for Lowell could
not reside in form alone,
its presence.

The source was external to his art,

grounded in religion.
from form,

though form could reinforce

Speaking of Lowell's move away

Cosgrave is quick to point out the concurrent

move away from religion,

and his observations on the

inadequacy of that religion in the first place are worth
quoting:
It was also about this point [his writing
"Thanksgiving's Over," the last poem in The
Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s I that Lowell abandoned
religion as the source of an independent s y s 
tem of moral reference and evaluation to put
against quotidian experience in his verse.
The trouble with his religious structure was,
of course, precisely its failure to provide
h i m with--or his failure to find in it--ar
wide and flexible system of values.
His t h e o l 
ogy (his N e w England theology) was always very
Puritanical; it was also inhuman.
The message
was that it was wrong to go on as we were going,
but no suggestion was offered that to do d i f 
ferently would make us happier, even in afterlife.
Cosgrave continues by pointing out that there is "no range
of sin and error in Lowell's catechism."
serves "the ultimate condemnation."

Any failure d e 

Judging "nature from

conduct" and finding "all conduct sinful," he concludes
that "all nature" is "repellent," and arrives at what Yvor
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Winters wo uld call ,fM a u l e ,s C u r s e . O n c e

again, how

Lowell perceives, what mode he uses, vitally affects what
he p e r c e i v e s .
In line with this, Cosgrave says that much of Life
Studies is simply thin and does not "merit analysis."
Abandoning his earlier formal mode grounded in an imper
fectly understood religion,

Lowell turned to "limited

poems" based upon "the doctrine of the significance of
the object

. . . derived from" a pluralistic emphasis

on "personality" and the "dissolution of sensibility,"
which ultimately dislodges the ability to d i s c r i m i n a t e . ^
Lacking their opposite,

Lowell's contraries become self-

defeating in their "hundred visions and revisions."
Lowell's analogies often fail to be analogous in any
serious way because the larger religious context that
gave them meaning before has been abandoned with no r e 
placement near its equal.

In Cosgrave's view,

good and

evil are set adrift in a failed "system of values.
Lowell's excessively harsh treatment of his father for
what were finally minor failures is one dramatic example
of his own failure to employ a realistic set of values.
In many ways Cosgrave's reservations about "The
Mills" are consistent with those already registered by
Arrowsmith,

Jarrell and others.

ticular use of time in the poem,

While noting the p a r 
that it "combines d e 

scription of the present and reverie about the p a s t , " ^
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he concludes that "the borders between the two are mixed
and overlapping."

That is, as a linguistic mode that

deals with experience,
breaks down.

and therefore with time,

the poem

A n d this results from Lowell's misuse of

methods that were successful in shorter poems;

as

Arrowsmith has said, Lowell sought to "expand" his "com
pressed lyric--at the same c o m p r e s s i o n ."

The following

excerpt from Cosgrave*s discussion clarifies the methods
Lowell used and (excepting problems with casuality) makes
clear why his narrative structure had to fail:
It ["The Mills"] exhibits all the ambiguities
of meaning and nuances of symbolism that we
have seen in ’The Quaker Graveyard' [a shorter
poem] but to a much greater extent; the r e 
sources of Ovid's Metamorphoses are called
upon by Lowell; and the central ambivalence
lies in the character of Anne herself, co n t r a 
dictory in all things, even in alternate a t 
tachments to life and death, as is appropriate
to h e r origin in the myth.
Multiple allusions
are created, to other myths as well as to other
poets until the poem is clogged, not with j u d g e 
ments , but with r e f e r e n c e s . . . .
The real
difficulty with a poem such as this, which
carries to an extreme a tendency to reference
found almost everywhere in Lowell, lies not
in the appropriateness or inappropriateness
of particular references or Images but in the
structure of the work as a whole.
Cosgrave goes on to say that once the basic Persephone
motif is established "the symbolism and allusions do not
advance the argument:

they merely decorate the phenomenon."

Lowell's achievement through symbolism and allusion is
one of "Decoration," not "concentration."

This is because
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ma n y of his references are in excess of the poem's r a 
tional structure,

Its ability to digest them.

Thus they

are "pseudo" references, and "The result is rich, but
opaque and d e c a d e n t ."
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Aside from seconding observations made by Arrowsmith
and o t h e r s , Cosgrave adds a dimension that has been p r e 
viously overlooked,

and (as I have already mentioned)

that is Lowell's lack "of a complex system of value"
within which meaning can operate.

Lowell has been c e l e 

brated as a public poet, but his lack of a value system
goes to the heart of his failure as a public poet.

From

refusing the draft in protest over Allied bombing of
civilian targets in World W a r II to marching in W a s h i n g 
ton during the Vietnam war, Lowell has addressed himself
to contemporary,

public issues.

However,

the theology

within which Lowell originally grounded his values was
"very Puritanical

. . . inhuman."

According to Cosgrave,

Lowell's judgment was negative with no alternative, no
possibility for positive action.
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Thus, he has p e r 

formed only half of the task required of a public poet.
A related example of Lowell's failure as a public
poet, due to a confused "system of values," is his in
ability to see evil operating in Benito Cereno as
Melville certainly saw it; Lowell's reworking of the
story concentrates on Yankee Imperialism and completely
overlooks the real issue, evil existing in the heart of

both slave and master,

finally the evil inherent in power

As Phillip Cooper has said of the play,

"The world of

current events is translucently the subject of [Lowell's]
Benito C e r e n o , for all its setting in 1 8 0 3 . " ^

His

treatment of evil is restricted to the public traumas
of the 1960's,

even when the text from which he is o p e r 

ating contains something much more subtle.
To summarize for a m o m e n t , in terms of external
failures in "The Mills" Cosgrave would say that Yenser*s
"contraries" lack me aning without a larger,

static c o n 

text within which such oppositions can have reference.
While Yenser is willing to leave meaning suspended by
process in a series of infinite "distinctions," Cosgrave
is not.

For him poetry should finally synthesize order

by gauging the present against a permanent set of values.
When Lowell does make a value judgment he does so in a
confused manner.

As often with his father, any failure

receives "the ultimate condemnation."
Kavanaugh,

And w i t h Anne

the rightness or wrongness of her life is as

ambiguous as most of Lowell's allusions.
Though he disagrees with Yenser,
ly in agreement with Arrowsmith,

Cosgrave is basical

Jarrell,

Fitts, and

Staples as to the internal failures of "The Mills."

Ex

cessive use of allusions and symbols which are superim
posed on the narrative,

rather than evoked by it or

somehow allowed to surface through it, causes the poem's
internal confusion.
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A fter The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s , "Life Studies
was a m a j o r departure11 for Lowell.
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H o w e v e r ,the e x 

ternal dislocation that Cosgrave identifies did not go
away,

though a modified poetic mode sought to counteract

this internally.

Furthermore,

in addition to a confused

mode of understanding and a confused mode of writing,
Cosgrave suggests that "Lowell's own uncurbable personality" was a problem.
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But it was his mode of writing

that was the immediate cause for an altered poetic p e r 
ception and understanding.
Richard Fein covers familiar ground when he notes
that in The Mills of the Kavanaughs "Lowell makes his
first moves from religious faith to d o u b t .

A major

characteristic noted by Fein is "intensity of memory,"
something which "The Mills of the Kavanaughs shares with
Life S t u d i e s .”

Lowell's characters possess "The power

of recalled experience, or of dreamed experience," and
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they not only "remember well," but "too well."
Memory
constitutes a continuum which is necessary for their
self locating.

As Fein says of Anne Kavanaugh,

"She

herself is her only opponent, her only s a l v a t i o n .
Her memory poses and counterposes the meaning of her
existence,

and much of that existence centers around

Harry and the Kavanaugh line.

Thus in understanding

herself Anne is confronted with re-collecting the events
of the Kavanaugh history as well as those of her life
with Harry.
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Fein states that “The family In Lowell's poetry Is
a structured chaos within which a victim-member continues
his efforts at survival."
principle,
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Lacking a religious ordering

Lowell Is left with a natural order, the

family, whose significance Is bound up In Its lineage.
Memory is the appropriate tool.
Lowell's movement in The Mills of the Kavanaughs
"from religious faith to doubt" is,
at which he became a modern.

in a sense,

the point

The poetry that follows

appears to wrestle out of radical doubt and to do so with
only partial s u c c e s s .

It ceeks to locate a dislocated

self temporally In ways that are largely phenomenological.
What takes place In Anne's mind, her memory which poses
and counterposes,
Life S t u d i e s .

takes place in a series of lyrics in

Images from childhood operate as past

phases of an eidetic ego which transcends the groundless
present with a sort of Janus consciousness that looks to
the past and to the future in the same act of transcend
ing.

The present is groundless because, without the

historical fact of Christ,

time is mere process,

and it

passes too quickly for experience and cognition to take
place at once.

A phenomenological bracketing provides

a way to gauge such process,

and,

in large part, Life

Studies represents a n e w effort at bracketing.
Another aspect of Lowell's movement "from religious
faith to doubt" concerns his role as public poet.

In
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this role, he is fundamentally undermined because, as
Fein suggests and Cosgrave argues, he never found a c o n 
sistent system of value against which he could compare
particular events;

there was "no range of sin and error

in Lowell's catechism," to quote Cosgrave again.

After

h e left the Catholic Church, his judgments could be
equally black and white, but they were minus external
authority.

Ironically,

his reputation as the public

poet of his era rose as he rejected the public's t r a d i 
tional grounding for value Judgments,

religion.

This

fact may in some way mirror Lowell's age, but mere r e 
flection does not qualify him to judge in the manner of
a public poet.
Thus "doubt" alters Lowell's poetry,
his relationship to his audience.

and it alters

As previously quoted,

Fein states that an important characteristic in Lowell
is his "intensity of memory" which,
certainty,
Lowell,

constantly poses and counterposes.

or his personae,

survival.

in response to u n 
For

it is a tentative means for

Of this Fein s a y s :

The speaker of "Mother Marie Therese," like
Anne Kavanaugh, like the old m a n with the A e n e l d ,
like the woman of "Her Dead Brother," and like
Michael in "Thanksgiving's Over," must locate and
live with her turmoils and regrets but without too
much assistance, if any at all, from religious
views.
In The Mills of the Kavanaughs we listen
to secular sensibilities who can refer to Christian
motif (and, of course, to Classical ones), but who
are finally lost in their world with no sure footing
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except that of their ability to reminisce
painfully and dramatically.
Their honest
confessions or remembrances are all they
h a v e .'8
Finding himself in doubt

(or, as Fein says,

"with no

sure footing") yet aiming first for absolute knowledge
then later for relative knowledge,

Lowell nears the

position Husserl describes in the opening of his Cartesian
M e d i t a t i o n s .^
Before concluding,
for a moment.

I would like to summarize again

Robert Lowell is, first of all,

important

to us simply because of the serious attention he has r e 
ceived.

He has become a part of the tradition.

Second,

in many ways he is a public poet, but he is a private
poet first.

Therefore,

Lowell's religious shift, which

was private, has had a weakening influence upon what
Cosgrave calls his "system of value."
used in many of his poems,

Being publicly

the confusion or loss of such

a system in later poems has meant the confusion of j u d g 
ments necessary for poetic statements.

Nevertheless,

the direction Lowell has taken is of major significance
because it represents a serious response by an exceptional
poet to a dilemma that is increasingly before all of us.
If the response fails to reconcile the dllensna, it has
produced a handful of remarkable poems which carry some
interesting implications.
The critics covered in this chapter tend to agree,

87

with some e x c e p t i o n s , upon certain characteristics
Lowell's poetry.

In conclusion,

In

I would like simply to

suggest some of the implications that these characteris
tics raise because they point to the following two
chapters.
1 think that it is fair to say that the single
most important characteristic shared by The Mills of
the Kavanaughs and by Life Studies is "intensity of
memory."

Lowell's use of revery or simply his reliance

upon memory has often been noted.

If we look to Husserl

(who is first of all not concerned with a stream of o b 
jects,

as in memory,

object)

but in concentrating on only one

a psychological dimension appears in Lowell's

poetic revery.

In the Cartesian M e d i t a t i o n s , Husserl

describes the retentional and protentional functions of
a reduced ego

(the "horizon structure" of the ego's i n 

tent tonality) as being part of the process by which
that ego generates i n t e n t i o n a l l t y .
these functions require memory;

Before anything else,

then the intentionallty

which they make possible in turn makes experience i ntel
ligible.

Suppose you leave a w a r m glass of milk in a

dark room, and in your absence someone replaces the milk
with w a r m bourbon.

Upon returning to that dark room,

you drink the contents of the glass in one gulp, e x p e r i 
encing the usual sensations that go with w a r m bourbon.
For a m o m e n t , before you recognize that you have been
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tricked with a glass of bourbon, you have an experience
that is in no w a y preconstructed by intentionallty.

That

is, your intentionallty has been frustrated; you have
experienced raw matter,

something which cannot be i n t e 

grated into previous experience and which therefore cannot be understood.
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For the sake of understanding,

intentionallty gathers from the past and projects toward
the future;

it governs the possibility of new e x p e r i e n c e .^

The point of the above is that in Lowell memory r e 
tains past experience,

and the past limits what can be

understood of future experience.
understood past,

If a metaphysically

such as that provided by Congregational

ism or Catholicism,

is rejected,

standing to be possible,

then for future u n d e r 

as Husserl describes it, some

other past must be inserted in its place.

A more limited

retentional experience will generate a more limited protentional experience.

Or, by limiting Anne K a v a n a u g h 's

past, Lowell automatically limits the possibilities for
her future.
(and meaning)
narrowed,

In Husserllan terminology, human experience
deteriorates because intentionallty is

and this curbs possibilities for future

experience.
Heidegger offers a way out of this predicament, but
it is a way that requires a "singing"

(or, lyric) poetry,

not the causal reasoning necessary to elements in n a r r a 
tive.

(As Arrowsmith has said,

in "The Mills of the
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Kavanaughs" Lowell was still writing a compressed lyric,
though he was also writing narrative.)
ternative is related to why Oedipus,

Heidegger's a l 

in Oedipus the K i n g .

sings w h e n out of horror and grief he is beyond his
former discursive language and accustomed reason.

He

has realized Apollo's decree and, with that realization,
his own limitation.

Dramatically, he is at a point

w here his will has been broken.

Heidegger would say

that he is leaving "the will to power" and entering "the
will as venture.
In his "The Nature of Language," Heidegger discusses
Stefan George's poem,

"The Word."

place in George's poem,
the poem,

What he finds taking

and in the activity of writing

is something very similar to what happens with

Oedipus when he sings.

Realizing Apollo's decree

is experienced linguistically)
"experiences an authority,

(which

as he sings, Oedipus

a dignity of the word than

which nothing vaster and loftier can be thought."
Oedipus

is brought to this point by his defeat and grief

over this defeat.

Speaking of "sadness," rather than

grief, Heidegger makes the following remarks:
True sadness is in harmony with what is most
Joyful--but in this way, that the greatest joy
withdraws, halts in its withdrawal, and holds
Itself in reserve. B y learning that renu n c i a 
tion, the poet undergoes his experience with
the word's lofty sway. . . . The poet could
never go through the experience he undergoes
with the word if the experience were not

attuned to sadness, to the m o o d of r e l e a s e ment Into the nearness of what is withdrawn
but at the same time held in reserve for an
originary advent.
Allowing for Heidegger's own "lofty" diction,
point seems clear.

the

In refutation (to go back to the

glass of milk) or "renunciation" at a particular point,
we arrive at something "originary."
is the realization which he sings.

For Oedipus this
For Lowell,

it is

contained in the phrase "0 to break loose," with which
1 will deal in a moment.
Out of his being broken Oedipus gains a particular
knowledge.

The first instance of this knowledge, however

surfaces as song.

In his grief he is ecstatic,

being so, he stands outside himself,
Within himself,

and,

outside his own will

his cognition has been grounded in p a r 

ticular past experiences which contributed to his intentionality,

and his intentionality precluded perceptions

that were wide of i t .

What he has entered now Heidegger

would call "the balance" and Rilke would call "unshielded
ness,
that

and this is fundamental to a lyric mode such as

of Lowell's "Waking Early Sunday Morning" in which

he seys,
back,

"0 to break loose

. . . jumping and falling

/ nosing up to the impossible / stone and bone-

crushing waterfall."

The following remarks by Heidegger

explore this more fully:
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As v e n t u r e d , those who are not protected are
nevertheless not abandoned.
If they were,
they would be just as little ventured as If
they were protected.
Surrendered only to a n 
nihilation, they would no longer hang In the
balance. . . . What Is so ventured Is, of
course, unprotected; but because It hangs in
the balance, It is retained in the venture.
It is upheld.66
Though he shows no sign that he believes he is "retained,"
Lowell nevertheless wishes to venture himself.
cally,

Par a d o x i 

for Heidegger it is Just by risking the self that

the self is sustained.
impossible

Lowell's wish to nose "up to the

. . . waterfall" is just what Heidegger would

have him do, as he says in "What Are Poets For?," quoted
above.
Heidegger would say further that Apollo's will " b e 
falls" O e d i p u s .
not of

Oedipus undergoes "an experience

. . . [his] making,

much in the way Lowell

wakes involuntarily to the world he describes
Early Sunday Morning."

. . .

in "Waking

But the experience is a linguistic

one:
But when does language speak itself as language?
Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right
word for something that concerns u s , carries
us away, oppresses or encourages us.
Then we
leave unspoken what we have in mind and, w i t h 
out rightly giving it t h o u g h t , undergo moments
in which language itself has distantly and
gg
fleetingly touched us w i t h its essential being.
Heidegger goes on to say that "No thing is where the word
is lacking,

that word which names the given thing."

That
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is,

language presences things by naming them, not by

operating as a sign that merely points but by a naming
that invokes.

He uses the expressions "'in the name of

the King'" and " 'in the name of God'" to represent what
he m e a n s .
During "What Are Poets For?" Heidegger discusses
what poetry can do in a "destitute time," an "era" d e 
fined by the god's failure to arrive,

and this is the

situation out of which Lowell writes,

a world without

religion,

a world of doubt perhaps beyond Husserl's

expectations.

For Lowell,

death often seems to be so

magnified that it is not a venturing of the self but the
self's annihilation.

His basic dualism,

life and death,

remains a dualism so long as his poetry fails to "hang
in the balance."

By its nature, narrative does not lend

itself to what Heidegger means by balance,
the lyric does.

Thus,

but at moments

the imaginative free play which

Lowell used to write "Waking Early Sunday Morning" is an
instance of what Heidegger would mean were he to say "0
to break loose."

All of the poems discussed in "What

Are Poets For?" are lyric, just as Oedipus sings a lyric.
The ecstatic character of the lyric makes it a mode which
can bring about "unshieldedness" because it does treat
"the will as venture," the self as vacated.

What our

"destitute time" needs is "unshieldedness" similar to
that found in the lyric.
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Rather than the god's failure to arrive, which
typifies our era, Oedipus dramatizes the god's arrival.
As Apollo becomes evident, Oedipus must vacate his "will
to power" for his "will as venture," that of a blind
wanderer.
tellect,

In fact,

that which made him unique, his i n 

is in Apollo's hands the direct agent of his

downfall.

Because the lyric impulse to song is an in

stance of "the will as venture," Oedipus's singing is
Heidegger's "gathering release."
w ould say, is Being,
human existence,

Its center, Heidegger

as opposed to the mere being of

and it is a vacated center.

an imaginative free play with language,
occasion a greater Language.

Through

the lyric can

It symbolizes,

activity our mere being can occasion Being.

and by this
For Heidegger,

this means that lyric poetry Is a modality that presences,
as much as is possible,

something transcedent and meta-
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physical,

something outside discursive language and

in particular outside causality.

It does this in part

by perceiving absence, which is necessary for whatever
presencing follows.

Recognizing an object's absence, we

are already presencing it.
As with Oedipus, Lowell's shift in his thinking is
vitally concerned with the god's absence and the god's
arrival.
therefore,

The concurrent shift in his writing may be seen,
as one wh ich moved from a "will to power" to

the "will as venture."

The distinction is like that made

between mere force, which Is exhaustible,
which is not.

Again,

the god's arrival.

and power,

the god's absence as opposed to
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3
Allegory to Causality:

Reduced Signification

I

The most engaging aspect of Robert Lowell's career
is the dramatic change that took place in his poetry
between The Mills of the Kavanaughs and Life S t u d i e s ,
As I have said before, most readers of Lowell focus
their discussions of this shift upon Life S t u d i e s , where
the change is most easily recognized.

In fact, with its

publication in 1958, Lowell became a major force in p o 
etic development,

a force still felt today.

What has

been overlooked amidst the many discussions of this e v o 
lution, however,

is the fact that the basis for muc h of

his later development stems from what he was writing
just before Life Studies.
A consideration of Lowell's mode of writing prior
to this shift is useful because as much as the success
of Life S t u d i e s . the failure of "The Mills of the
Kavanaughs" marks the beginning of the major change
that occurred in poetry after World War II.

The r e v i 

sions Lowell made while rewriting "The Mills" reveal
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his realization that something very basic had altered.
Between the first and second versions of the p o e m he
began to exchange his early objectlvlst,

synchronic p o 

etry , which had reference to a fixed world order,

for

a diachronic poetry intended to gauge a world understood
as process.
Lowell's metamorphosis may be seen as twofold,
first in terms of reduced signification.

His movement

away from a Cathollc-Congregatlonallst myth restricted
the allegorical function of his narrative.
this,

As part of

three of the traditional four levels of meaning

(the literal, allegorical, moral,

and anagogical,

em

ployed from Aquinas to Fyre) no longer coincided with
his poetry because there was no cosmology to which such
levels of meaning could refer.
The complaint registered by Wil l i a m Arrowsmith upon
reviewing The Mills of the Kavanaughs for The Hudson
R e v i e w , that Lowell was trying to "expand" his "compressed
lyric--at the same c o m p r e s s i o n ,
problem.

is related to this

Lowell had not fully realized the n e w demands

he was placing upon his poetry.

It could no longer take

its significance from heaven downward;
significance from the ground up,

it must build

from experience.

Though

the practical result of this was that the "compression"
of Lowell's poetry lessened in Life Studies,
more fundamental was occurring.

something
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A change central to much that has happened to poetry
In the last thirty years concerns Its function as a mode
of thought,

and here Lowell has been more than a leader.

As it was first published in The Kenyon R e v i e w . 1951,
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" generally represented the
current objectivist virtues of irony, paradox and m y t h i 
cal allusion.

In fact some of the poem's key stanzas

were written in 1937 while Lowell was staying w i t h his
first mentor, Allen Tate.
version demonstrates,

And as the poem's permanent

Lowell stuck with much that was

typical of his earlier manner,
Lord W e a r y 1s C a s t l e .

that which characterized

Nevertheless,

Lowell's subsequent

departure from his early style took place while he was
working on "The Mills," and that change meant that his
poetry became more a means for perceiving than for r e p 
resenting, more diachronic than synchronic.

Rather

than achieve dramatic meaning by aesthetic closure,

the

Intentions of his later poetry were to perceive con t i n 
gencies always just under the surface of meaning.
As Steven Axelrod has recently pointed out, Lowell
was at a crossroads.

He recognized a "need to bring

humanity into his poetry" and to avoid "desiccated a b 
stractness."

In his attempt to grasp "'direct expe r i 

ence,"' Lowell "mistook his gift and obsession to be
fiction when in fact It was autobiography."

In fact,

Lowell's turn within narrative poetry, which ostensibly
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created a fictional world, was only a half step away from
an autobiographical poetry which he was later to write,
one that was Intended to gauge experience and, doing so,
locate the self.
In the light of his lost faith,
politics,

lost wife,

confused

and troubled mind,^ Lowell's poetry became an

activity of magnified significance.

It could generate

order in a world that was increasingly disorderly.

In

particular, Lowell's writing obliquely about the d i s i n 
tegration of his marriage was not merely a result of
that experience but a means for getting beyond I t .

The

pr oblem with this, however, was that his mode of writing
in " T h e

Hills" was not appropriate for the demands that

were developing.

Increasingly, Lowell experienced what

may be called a sense of dislocation,

and this had its

basis not only in his private life but on a public level
as well.
Though a catchall,

since World War II existentialism

has become a household word,

and with reason.

Without

seeking to rehash philosophical debate or even to codify
Lowell's thought,

it Is fair to say that his divorce

from Jean Stafford (who was C a t h o l i c ) , his departure
from the Church itself, and his marriage to Elizabeth
Hardwick ("who was politically on the left and not religlous")

. . . each of these contributed to Lowell's

movement away from a cosmology he might share w i t h his

mentor Tate

(or, w i t h Aquinas and Frye) and Into some

thing much m o r e t e n u o u s .

Axelrod suggests that it was

"almost against his will" to enter "the liberal agnostic
tradition" where Lowell in fact found himself.^
Certainly Life Studies represents a new and increas
ing reliance upon the self,
meaning.

saint or skunk,

to generate

There is an emphasis given to experiential

concreteness not present in Lowell's previous writing.
Out of this emphasis upon existence,
of experience,

and he does this,

he generates unity

in part, by giving s e 

quence to what appears otherwise as a confused,
absurd,

if not

outer world.

But this

is the much discussed and overly celebrated

later Lowell. There is a

vital point that is the fulcrum

to what his writing became during the second half of his
career which has been generally overlooked.

Indeed, most

students of Lowell appear embarrassed by what they c o n 
sider to be his foremost failure,

and, being so, they

say little if anything about "The Mills of the Kavanaughs.
If the reason is not embarrassment,
that, within its own terms,

then it is simply

the poem jLs a failure.

But

it is also a landmark in the m o v e away from objectivist
theories,

a transition that has led to a more expressiv-

istic poetry that contains its own failures.
Reaction

to failures internal to a poetry, as well

as n e w pressures

external to it, is a valid reason for
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change.

However,

the nature of reaction too easily can

be m e r e l y to assume the obverse,

the negative counter

part,

Thus, with Lowell o b 

to what previously stood.

j e c t ivism is overturned for a brand of subjectivism,
in Axelrod's terms,

"autobiography."

Similarly,

fixed cosmos of the Catholic tradition,
heaven downward,

or,

the

arranged from

is reversed for an existential process

in w hich the only meaning is that which is created by
human initiative.

Deduction from a traditional myth

such as Christianity is no longer valid, or authentic;
induction, however,

carries the dramatic persuasiveness

of either the participant or at least the eyewitness.
I think that what lies beneath the switch 1 have
described is that, more than anything else, poetry is
a mode of thought.
create meaning,

Its foremost responsibility is to

for reader as well as writer.

But,

as

w e are all too well aware, meaning Itself has become
problematical.

To borrow from Hans-Georg Gadamer,

"ar

tistic experience is a mode of knowledge,"^ but the
unique character of artistic knowledge is that "the
work's existence" is "the breaking-off of a formative
process which actually points beyond it. . . . [A) work
g
of art is not, in itself, c o m p l e t a b l e ."
There are
problems of text and context, w o r k and audience.
Art exists by a fluid p r o c e s s , "the medial nature
of the play process," such that the reader actually
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completes the poem.

Lowell's early phase was under

pressure to change because of forces external to It,
forces that are often first encountered in the reader
w h o stands between the poem and its s u r r o u n d i n g s .
sum,

In

text no longer seemed to fit context, or to answer

it.
Lowell's personal crises could only have been made
more difficult by their taking place in a world appar e n t 
ly outside traditional bases for meaning,
cess.

a world of p r o 

To borrow again from G a d a m e r , "Self-understanding

takes place in relation to something else that is u n d e r 
stood and includes the unity and sameness of the other.
What Lowell experienced was the lack of "the unity" of
this "other."

He not only "found his Christian m y t h 

making out of place" but,

specifically,

apocalypse he had prophesied
In this sense,

"that the global

. . . had failed to occur.

his earlier artistic mode of thought a p 

peared to have been invalidated.
In response to this, Lowell changed his mode of
writing and thus his mode of thought.
a means for self-locating.
which, as they were made,

His poetry became

By writing a series of lyrics
looked backwards and forwards,

Lowell sought to create a continuum of retentional m o d i f i 
cation that located the present for him.

In a world

understood as p r o c e s s , this could only be a mediating
activity carried out between the known past and an
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expected future.

Life Studies was an appropriate title

for such an activity.
Lowell's best Image for the groundless present In
a w o rld of process Is the train he rides from Rome to
Paris In "Beyond the Alps."

He Is leaving the failed

fixity of the Church and arriving at the activity of
art, Paris.

The rest of Life Studies follows.

Its

primary pattern is to telescope back and forth over
Lowell's personal and cultural past in range-finding
manner.
But that locating process was already operating in
"The Mills of the Kavanaughs" in the form of Anne
Kavanaugh's r e v e r y .

Indeed the major failure of "The

Mills" lies in the fact that it does not fully realize
its locating i n t e n t i o n s .

During the period between the

version published in The Kenyon Review and the one which
appeared as a title poem, Lowell removed most Catholic
allusions.

But the poem's thinly disguised autobiographi

cal elements remained.

Though the earlier version was

flawed and many of the changes Lowell made were for the
best,

the most significant one was the deletion of

Catholic references,

and this change worsened the poem's

major problem.
The original framework upon which the significance
of Harry's suicide depended for its dramatic meaning was
Catholic doctrine.

Read in its second version,

"The
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Mills" depicts a wor ld that lacks the meaning that such
a system bestows.

Harry's suicide loses significance,

though it is intended to be one of the major events in
the poem.

In addition,

the very absence of a Christian

framework depends up on our remembering it to make its
absence fully meaningful.

That is, Harry's is a family

with a long Catholic tradition that has outlived its
faith, but unless the context of that faith is somehow
kept before us we cannot fully understand the significance
of its loss.

As part of this problem, Lowell's all e g o r i 

cal level of meaning falls because its referent
external context provided by history,
and the Christian myth)

(the

classical mythology,

is reduced by one-third.

In the p o e m ’s second version,

Lowell does try to

be consistent in his move away from the Church.

If the

values by which the poem's action is judged have been
modified,

so the action itself has been modified.

Harry's

suicide was particularly condemnable within a Christian
understanding:
standing,

Parallel to the removal of that u n d e r 

Lowell removes the specificity of Harry's death.

In the poem's second version,
ly out of focus.

the camera is turned slight

The reader must assume that Harry died

either as a result of his earlier attempt or as a result
of a n e w attempt.

The manner of his death is suggested

rather than stated because there is no longer sufficient
context to give dramatic meaning to a more specific
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account.

Such specificity would be mere detail In the

poem's second version,

and the loss of meaning here Is

an Instance In the more general loss of an allegorical
level of signification in the poem.
In the second version,
as Persephone.

In fact,

Lowell retains Anne's role

the p o e m depends most heavily

upon the Persephone motif.

Harry Is Anne's Hades, b e c k o n 

ing her to the underworld.

And yet there is no sug g e s 

tion that she will return, which,
should do.

as Persephone,

she

Lowell makes Anne a combination of two r e l u c 

tant virgins,

Daphne and Persephone.

However,

only in

the first version is she contrasted with the Virgin Mary.
Part of her character,

as originally intended, must be

taken to stem from the presence of all three virgins.
Such

a combination would more fully contain all the

facets of Anne's character and of her predicament.
the poem stands upon revision, however,

As

removal of the

promise of life reduces the dramatic significance of
the loss of life.
In the poem as it appeared in The Kenyon R e v i e w ,
Persephone falls in half of her role,

the promise of

renewal in this world; however the presence of the Virgin
Mary fills that gap.
next world.

She provides the promise of the

Deletion of Mary,

tian references in general,

as the deletion of C h r i s 

is part of the leveling p r o 

cess that took place in Lowell's revision.

Paul Tillich

might say that part of the ''dimension of depth" has been
sacrificed for a more strictly "horizontal" understanding
Lowell's version of the four senses of interpretation
was in trouble.

This was particularly the case on the

level of allegory.

The umbrella*like system of thought,

under which his narrative could operate, was necessary
for allegorical meaning.

Nevertheless,

Lowell set this

system aside with nothing comparable to replace it.
To summarize for a m o m e n t , the removal of the Virgin
Mary and other Catholic allusions,
and Hallowmass,
ready existed;

such as Saint Patrick

does not clear up the confusion that a l 
such removal merely erases part of the

external framework intended to reconcile the poem's t e n 
sions.

Originally,

the final myth,

the Catholic myth was intended as

among many,

one which would provide

closure to the poem's action.
method of mythical allusion,
sions,

By such closure,

the poem'

including allegorical dimen

could be encompassed and forced into disclosure.

Lowell decided that the one myth did not adequately
reconcile the many: The dramatic meaning that his method
was meant to achieve did not come about.

However,

his

answer was merely to get rid of the Catholic allusions,
retaining the rest of his myth a p p a r a t u s .

The irony and

paradox that had gotten out of control in the earlier
version remained out of control, and excessive mythical
allusion remained a problem,
one m y t h .

despite the restriction of

1X0

Yec the strong narrative-autobiographical aspect
of the p o e m was intact.
sion remains,

That is, the poem's second v e r 

to a large extent, an oblique account of

part of Lowell's marriage to Jean Stafford.
the poem (in either version)

is not only a locating of

the poet by bracketing experience,
sion.

As such,

it is also an ex p r e s 

Harry's suicide is Lowell's articulation of his

own predicament.
roundings which,

But the expression has lost those s u r 
as with an earlier p o e m such as "After

the Surprising Conversions," would give it full meaning.
There is no Church opposing suicide, no Church to promise
redemption for the difficulties of the temporal world,
a nd no Church to formalize and sustain a relationship.
During the same year Lowell began the earliest s t a n 
zas in "The Mills," Alfred North Whitehead began the
first in a series of lectures later collected under the
title, Modes of T h o u g h t .

Much of Whitehead's attention

Is devoted to the problems inherent in a world of p r o 
cess.

In particular, he is concerned with Intelligibility

in our experience and with what he calls "Importance."

12

In a passage that sounds reminiscent of Kierkegaard's
discussion of the false knight of faith and the true
knight of faith,
"expression."

13

Whitehead contrasts "importance" and

He defines "Importance" as that which

"is derived from the immanence of infinitude in the finite."
But, he continues,

"expression is founded on the finite

Ill

occasion.

It Is the activity of flnltude Impressing

Itself on Its environment."^*
What this distinction means In terms of Lowell Is
that "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" falls on the level of
"Importance" because the myth by which Lowell grasped
"infinitude," Christianity, was discarded.
standing version,

In the poem's

the mediating function of myth between

finite and infinite world views is no longer considered
valid.

What is still possible, however,

is "expression."

Though A n n e ’s and Harry's relationship can be understood
in a religious framework now only ironically,

the poem's

more direct expression of despair is still possible.
fact,

In

concentrating on Kavanaugh as "environment" and

Anne's experience (actual events and her revery) as "the
finite occasion," the entire poem may be seen as Lowell's
expression of despair due to the apparent failure of a
system that made "importance" and a sense of awe possible.
In addition to expression, however,

L o w e l l ’s narrative-

autobiographical approach could also locate the self.
Anne Kavanaugh is able to bracket her experience (and
indirectly Lowell's),

and her revery appears to be the

means by which she does this.

A peculiar aspect of this

process is that, while it appears spatial because of
description and Imagery, it actually provides a temporal
fix for experience.

Anne has been displaced by events,

and re-presenting them sequentially places her in relation
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to these events.

Her narrative,

though lacking in al

legory, still gives sequence to raw experience.

Her

mental process, which largely constitutes the poem, is
less the New Critics' static,

synchronic artifact of

wit and irony and more a diachronic movement of the mind
of the persona through a series of re-presentations.
It is the means by which she carries out her selflocating process that I would like to discuss next.
closer look at Anne's

A

(or, Lowell's) method of r e 

presenting may give some indication as to why her revery
not only locates but is an isolated and isolating process.

II

At this point, Kant can be used to introduce objects
(that Husserl leaves out) which are part of the immanent
structure of consciousness.

For him,

the world makes

sense only if there's a fixed referent,
for example,

or object.

Thus,

in causality the world makes sense only if

there is a First Cause serving as an object to which we
can refer.

Causality without a First Cause, such as we

get in the narrative of the revised version of "The Mills
of the Kavanaughs," finally dissolves the self because
it runs infinitely into the past and Infinitely into the
future.

On the other hand, causality with a First Cause

gives us some hope of making sense of ourselves, though

we are thus understood as causal selves.

1 mention this

because the one way that the causal plane of Lowell's
narrative can be valid is by grounding itself in a First
Cause.

But, by setting his Christian cosmos aside

Lowell not only undercuts his allegory, he also invali
dates the self-locating process meant to replace allegory
By removing First Cause from causality, he removes the
fixed referent that keeps causality from dissolving the
self.
As I have already stated,

"The Mills" slips from

the more ambitious goals of allegory and Whitehead's
sense of "importance" but continues to operate on an
empirical level as a relatively long, narrative poem.
Indeed, much of Anne Kavanaugh's revery, and therefore
much of the poem's organization,

depends upon the charac

teristics of conventional narrative structure;
addition to sequence,
narrative.

thus,

in

there are assumptions basic to

The act of story telling always entails the

mind's order being brought to bear on a surrounding world
What I would like to consider now for a moment is the
nature of the mind's order,

in particular some of Kant's

"categories":
Just as perceptions arranged sensations around
objects in space and time, so conception a r 
ranges perceptions (objects and events) about
the idea of cause, unity, reciprocal relation,
necessity, contingency, etc.; these and other
"categories" are the structure into which
perceptions are received, and by which they
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are classified and moulded Into the ordered
concepts of thought.
These are the very essence and character of the mind; mind Ls the
coordination of experience
The forms of perception alluded to above are space and
time.

These and other modes of thought are a priori to

our grasp of experience:
There is [an exit from blind alleys of thought]
says Kant, if we remember that space, time and
cause are modes of perception and conception,
which must enter into all our experience, since
they are the web and structure of experience;
these dilemmas [of thought about a First Cause]
arise from supposing that space, time and cause
are external things independent of perception.
We shall never have any experience which we
shall not interpret in terms of space and time
and cause; but w e shall never have any philoso
phy if we forget that these are not things, but
modes of interpretation and understanding.
Because in dealing with process the function of n a r 
rative is to reproduce experience,

or to appear to do so,

narrative is a modality that assumes such Kantian cate
gories as time,

space, cause, unity, and necessity.

A

closer look at the operation of one of these, causality,
in "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" reveals why the poem
falls in certain ways, and it provides,

representatively,

one reason for the general shift in poetry following the
publication of Life S t u d i e s .

That is, Lowell's poetic

shift, which occurred after his most ambitious narrative,
represents an attempt to get away from some of the limits
that accompany this mode of thought, particularly once
it has lost its ability to function allegorically.
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Causality requires substance as well as concepts
of space and time.
sity as well.
tively.

It assumes unity and, usually, n e c e s 

We generally think of all these c o l l e c 

When we speak of them, we are likely to say

realism or to make an appeal to realism.
Lowell's use of classical mythology, of religion,
and of history in "The Mills of the Kavanaughs" assumes
causality in a sort of cultural realism.

He invokes

these for the dramatic meaning of events he n a r r a t e s ,
but the very nature of the events themselves is also
causal.

Those at Kavanaugh are believable to the extent

that we can ascribe reasons for their taking place;

they

are effects owing their existence to certain causes, and
we believe or disbelieve them to the extent that we can
identify satisfactory reasons for their taking place.
Yet Lowell's narrative orders a world at Kavanaugh
beyond traditional values,
cess.

By selection,

in many ways one of mere p r o 

it gives sequence to events,

and

it supplies causes for these In the guise of characteri
zation,

antecedent events, and setting.

We are prepared

for Harry's suicidal tendencies because we know something
of his character.

By our observation, via Anne, of his

behavior after he returns from the Navy, w e learn that
he is dangerously distracted.

Similarly, we know about

antecedent events in Harry's life because Anne's revery
recounts these.

He had hoped to restore life and order
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to Kavanaugh yet experienced some disgrace in the Navy
w h i c h required his resignation (despite the presence of
war) and which to a large extent cost h i m this h o p e .
Finally, Kavanaugh,
cratic family,

the homeslte of a bankrupt but aristo

sinks into a winter landscape that estab

lishes the primary setting for Harry's despair.
The detailed causes for Harry's failures and for his
suicide are more extensive than space allows me to in
dicate.

For example, Anne's psyche plays a major role

in Harry's disintegration, but to trace its machinations
w o u l d require almost a line-by-line rendering of the poem.
On the other hand,

there is one aspect to Harry that

should stand outside causalty.

It is his free will.

Though we rely upon causes to explain his actions, we
assume that Harry,
Yet,

as well as Anne,

enjoys free will.

as part of the poem's dramatic meaning,

Harry has

his own set of causes and effects by which he understands
his actions.

In particular,

the apparent evidence of

Anne's infidelity, what she says when she talks in her
sleep,

serves as the most active cause for Harry's d e c i 

sion to attempt suicide.
When we add to this a failed career, with acco m p a n y 
ing guilt, plus failure to restore Kavanaugh financially
and create heirs for it, Harry's actions became very
believable.

Lowell satisfies our sense of realism,

and,

due to a set of deterministic causes, Harry's suicide
achieves its m o m e n t .
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1 should add, that because the poem's determinism
heightens the significance of a dramatic event does not
m e a n that the poem is therefore a reliable me t h o d for
apprehending the world external to it (though it can
mean that the poem satisfies certain objectivist t h e o r i e s ) .
More often the opposite is the case: Rather than being
purely objective and cognitive,

the real purpose of a

fated or a determined event in a work lacking other
levels of signification (such as allegory)
in a restrictive sense.

is dramatic

If we are afforded free will,

then the emotional power of a poem such as "The Mills,"
w h i c h results from determinism being superimposed upon
events,

is in opposition to its function as a mode of

thought intended to accurately perceive the world e x 
ternal to it, a world which in Lowell's view at this
time was not at all deterministic but increasingly
indeterminate.
The context generated by "The Mills of the Kavanaughs"
governs actions and their significance by a series of
causes which, within the terms of the poem,
necessity.

Indeed,

generate

the unity of the poem depends upon

the presence of realistic reasons to substantiate events.
Thus details are marshaled in such a way as to reciprocate
convincingly.

The irony that Anne dreams of Harry as a

boy only heightens pressure surrounding the poem's outcome.
The net result is that while achieving dramatic meaning
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Lowell creates a deterministic world t h a t , due to Its
very effort to be realistic.

In sum becomes unrealistic-

ally fixed.
Put somewhat differently,
chieves sufficient cause.

internally the poem a-

Nothing is absent that is

necessary to create the desired effect, which is finally
a dramatic effect.
is lacking,
sense.

Externally, however,

sufficient cause

and this becomes a problem in a hermeneutic

The poem's gothic build up of causes for events

does not correspond with the way most of its readers
w o u l d understand those events.
the fluid or "medial

To return to Gadamer,

. . . play process" necessary b e 

tween work and reader is overshadowed by the dictates of
the poem.

The reader does not have a chance to complete

the poetic process because all conclusions have already
been overwhelmingly made,

and they have been made in a

way that does not fit the reader's experience.
At points the p o e m sinks into melodrama.
tioned earlier,

As m e n 

stanza twenty-eight is one of the best

examples of this:

Harry's,

or Lowell's, manic play on

the number twenty-eight within a stanza of the same
n u mber does not have sufficient meaning to satisfy the
attention it calls to Itself.

More generally, however,

we are taken step by step towards an unavoidable c o n c l u 
sion that loses its meaning by the very fact that it is
unavoidable.
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A substantial part of meaning Is derived from the
concurrence of mutually dependent o p p o s i t e s , something
which determinism largely denies.
therefore,

Harry's suicide,

can only have meaning to the extent that its

opposite is kept in view.

But by compounding causes

for the dramatic necessity of Harry's suicide, Lowell
loses sight of that which gives meaning to such an action,
Harry's freedom to choose life.
Apparently Harry never entertains hope even m o m e n 
tarily.

Related to this, Persephone is restricted almost

entirely to her underground role,

death, whereas half of

her significance stems from her return to the upper world.
The presence of the Virgin Mary would offset the eccentric
emphasis given Persephone and qualify it were she not
deleted from the poem's revised version.

Thus Lowell

stacks the deck for dramatic effect, but by doing this
he invalidates the poem's perception.
Narrative that is free of allegorical intentions e m 
ploys an empirical persuasiveness.

The realism generated

in the reader's mind results from accumulated details.
Similar to this, a series of lyrics such as most of those
comprising Lowell's later books can operate empirically.
In each case the convincingness of a work's argument is
based upon an inductive process.

Generality is arrived

at from a series of facts often gleaned by the poet at
first hand.
a major role,

Confessional poetry,

in which Lowell played

is a recent example of this.
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Such a process employs an implicit,
causality.

if not explicit,

Obviously no one mode of thought is universal

ly applicable, however.
narrative limited;

Thus not only is causality in

the lyrical and ecstatic poetry of

Holderlin and Rilke for which Martin Heidegger opts also
has its blind spots.

The essential point is that Lowell's

needs changed before his poetics.

By 1951 he could no

longer assume the constructs of a Christian myth.

In a

sense, he arrived at a truncated view of anything claiming
to be apodlctic.

Nevertheless, he continued to write a

poetry whose tendencies were to locate the self by a r 
ranging events and by exercising value judgments;

a po

etry which in its very activity sought certitude, what
philosophically would be called necessity.

Ill

Both Kant and Hume regard causality as incapable of
arriving at necessity.

Kant approaches causality in the

"Second Analogy" of his Critique of Pure Reason as an
idealist, while Hume deals with it on an empirical level.
For Kant,

causality exists because of our experience

through the apparent connexity of time,

and this apparent

connexlty exists only In the empirical world, not in the
world of pure reason.

Causality represents connection

between otherwise discrete events, but it exists "only
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In a p p e a r a n c e s .”

We can "apprehend" such a "continuity

In the connection of times," but only on the empirical
level:
I apprehend [erkenne] an object to which I
must ascribe a certain determinate position
in time--a position which, in view of the p;
ceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned.
In his treatment of the pure categories Kant does
not admit causality as a productive force

(a push-pull)

but does admit it as an ordering of events.

Similarly,

necessity is allowed in the empirical world but is not
among the pure categories of reason.

Causality and n e c e s 

sity are only a means by which we apprehend events by
perceiving one after another:
Every apprehension of an event is therefore a
perception that follows upon another p e r c e p 
tion. . . . [T]n an appearance which contains
a happening (The preceding state of the p e r 
ception we may entitle A, and the succeeding
B) B can be apprehended only as following
upon A. . . . The order in which the p e r c e p 
tions succeed one another in apprehension is
in this instance determined, and to this order
apprehension is bound down. . . . [I]n the p e r 
ception of an event there is always a rule
that makes the order in which the perceptions
(in the apprehension of this appearance) follow
upon one another a necessary o r d e r . 18
Kant has been contrasting the perceptions of a house
w i t h those of a ship moving down stream.

With the house,

which is spatially fixed and in that sense synchronic,
Kant could begin by perceiving the roof and moving down
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to the basement,

or he could b e g i n with the basement

a nd m o v e upward.

The house Is static,

several ways to apprehend It.
proaches,

and there are

Using any one of four a p 

he can move up or down, right or left.

How

ever, with an event such as the ship's movement the
perception Is diachronic and restricted by sequence:
For Instance, 1 see a ship move down stream.
My perception of its lower position follows
upon the perception of its position higher up
in the stream, and It is impossible that in
the apprehension of this appearance the ship
should first be perceived lower down in the
stream and afterwards higher u p .
Though here only analogous to what Kant is describ
ing, narrative too relates events.

One event necessarily

follows another and is perceived to do so with c a u s e .
We operate dally in the empirical world which for us must
be understood as a world of causality and necessity,
though we lack certainty by this.
are not apodictlc.

Setting,

In sum,

such modalities

characterization,

and p r e 

vious events exist in the same relation to each other as
positions through which Kant's ship was seen to move.
W i t h in Lowell's poetry such a thought process is literally
makeshift.

The apparent certainty resulting from a n a r 

rative has no basis for an absolute truth claim.
Much as the house
in several ways,

(in its fixity) can be approached

the four levels of meaning operate s e v 

erally within the cosmology of a fixed world.

Without
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that cosmology,

however, we are caught up In process and

can go no farther than empirical limits allow.

We must

view the ship sequentially because we are time locked.
In revised form, Lowell's narrative is time locked
as he begins to wrestle with a restricted understanding
of being.

Under an apparently Invalid cosmos, his n a r 

rative seeks to generate Its own meaning by sequence and
causality.

No longer skyward looking,

in Lowell's poetry,
and afterwards,

the consciousness

during his revision of "The Mills"

becomes a Janus.

It is a m i n d limited

by and balanced between a retentional past and a protentional future.
An empiricist such as David Hume approaches ca u s a l 
ity from the opposite direction, yet he arrives at the
same conclusion that Kant makes.

In addition to the i m 

possibility of achieving transcendence,
by empirical means,

"absolute time,"

as Kant argues, Hume states that even

empirically necessity does not follow causality.

One

problem with causality for Hume is that once w e begin
tracing causes we enter an infinite regress.
is the effect of a preceding cause.
infinitely in reverse.

20

Every cause

It is Kant's ship

Like Zeno's arrow, we never arrive.

The illusion of necessity in narration has to be
present for a narrative to exist, even if it is ultimately
the "subjective necessity" of which Kant accuses Hume.
The realism (that which is believable to the reader)

21
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ascribed to necessity cannot come about to convince a
reader if the causes,

such as character,

setting, and

previous events are not sufficient c a u s e s .
Because there is a n infinite regress of causes,

the

extensiveness of causality becomes its invalidation.
Alone,

the narrative mode lacks sufficient cause and

therefore the certitude for which Lowell's poetry c o n 
stantly drove.

However,

the most important point to be

made in this discussion is that Lowell fell into a p o 
etry subject to questions of causality in the first
place.

That is, without an enveloping myth within which

his narrative could operate on several levels of meaning,
Lowell's poetic locating process was reduced to a local
activity.
In particular, his early poetry generally sustains
an allegorical level of meaning,

among others.

However,

as I mentioned earlier, with the loss of his Christian
myth, Lowell lost the framework within which the al l e g o r i 
cal level could function.

For Lowell,

allegory now

lacked a referent and could no longer bridge the gap
between permanence and process.

On a practical level,

the removal of the Virgin Mary apparatus reduced
Persephone's significance.

More generally,

the removal

of Catholic references lessened the significance, both
dramatic and purely analytical, of Harry's suicide.
Meaning underwent a leveling process.

No longer capable
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of being ontology, as Maritain would have poetry,

21

Lowell's writing narrowed to a sort of phenomenology,
a bracketing of experience perhaps more suitable to the
many changes he found taking p l a c e .
Serious poetry always makes ambitious claims to
truth.

Different poetic modes m a y be taken to have made

different assumptions as to h o w the truth of a situation
can be apprehended,

as well as what that truth may be.

Because poetry always assumes certain modes of thought
and those modes are evident first in terms of style,
Lowell's stylistic shift cannot be separated from

a

cognitive shift the significance of which extends far
beyond matters of caste,

even psychology and politics.

The details of Lowell's new-found limits and needs,
wh i c h led to a major change in poetics,
in mind.

should be kept

They reveal an implicit reduction in the h o r i 

zon structure of a known past and an expected future
within which Lowell and many who follow him gauge
experience.
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4
Changing Modalities

I

In order to give context to the shift that took place
in Robert Lowell's poetry between 1951 and 1958,
like to appeal to Heidegger and Husserl.

I would

Heidegger p r o 

vides a discussion of the imaginative use of language that
applies to Lowell's cosmology and the changes it underwent.
Husserl's methodology,

as outlined in his Cartesian M e d i t a 

tions , is of importance because it parallels Lowell's l a t 
er poetic mode.

Husserl's method and Lowell's mode are

equally grounded in Cartesian doubt from the outset,
Lowell's is a radical doubt.

though

That is, Husserl sheds light

upon how L o w e l l ’s consciousness functions

(insofar as we

can understand such a thing) when he is writing in his
second poetic phase.

At the same time Heidegger provides

reasons for why this phase operates in a Husserlian manner
In the first place.
In the preceding chapter I sought to demonstrate
that Lowell's loss of a Christian myth meant his loss of
three of the four levels of meaning
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(the allegorical,
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m o r a l , and a n a g o g l c a l ) .

Without Christianity as a static

and enveloping referent,

the possible levels of interpre

tation in Lowell's poetry were reduced to one level, b e 
came horizontal;

the action in his work became strictly

lineal with one event following another in sequence and
explainable on a causal plane that precluded any notion
of a t r a n s c e n d e n t .
In spite of this, Lowell's most fundamental drive
continued to be toward certitude.
antagonisms,

The dialectic of his

as Staples calls them,

sprang from dissatis

faction with that very limitation on the causal plane
in w hich such antagonisms existed in the first place.
Lowell found himself with only a horizon to look forward
to, nothing transcendent;

yet the desire M to break loose"

continued to inform his poetry.

The fact that "Waking

Early Sunday Morning" is one of the best poems in his
second phase is not a coincidence.

It is so powerful a

poem because it returns to one of Lowell's basic drives,
to break free of or at least see beyond temporal li m i t a 
tion.

It is what Allen Tate,

once introducing his "The

Swimmers," called the p o e t ’s one poem which he writes
and rewrites throughout his career.
In summarizing Patrick Cosgrave's discussion,

I

pointed out that Lowell's loss of an ethical system,
such as that provided by Christianity,

cost h i m his

ability to make statements about the morality of events.
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Cosgrave has already touched upon the leveling process
that began to take place In Lowell's poetry as early
as "The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s ."

Implicit In his a r g u 

ment Is that Lowell has lost the moral level of meaning.
Because of early Lowell's strong Catholic interests,
I thought it was not an exaggeration to suggest that in
his first phase his poetry aspired to something like
Maritain's notion of poetry as ontology.

With the loss

of his Catholic religion, however, Lowell lost the myth
by which he could grasp a metaphysical understanding of
being.

Since he could no longer take an earthly event

to be emblematic of heavenly significance,

Lowell's a l 

legorical level of meaning was flattened.

Related to

this, his ethical system was no longer grounded,
moral

judgments

and his

lost their conclusiveness because they

lacked a system to which they could refer.

(The im p lica

tions of such a situation are explored by Gerald Graff
in his essays,

"The Myth of the postmodernist breakthrough,"

wh i c h appeared in T r i Q u a r t e r l y , and "The Politics of AntiRealism," which appeared in S a l m a g u n d i .
In sum, Lowell's poetry did move from ontology to
a sort of phenomenology.

Metaphysical questions were no

longer possible, but a strictly horizontal plane of
sequence and causality did allow a phenomenological
bracketing of experience.

The first real Instance of

this bracketing process may be seen in Anne Kavanaugh's
revery.
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Later, Lowell realized his Intentions more clearly
and no longer needed a persona to carry out this p r o c e s s .
His poetry became explicitly rather than implicitly
autobiographical.

But at the point of his writing "The

Mills of the Kavanaughs" Lowell was still In transition.
He had not fully realized the change that was taking
place with his departure from the Catholic belief.

In

deed, his use of a persona represents his halfway stance
with regard to allegory,

A persona could still represent

Robert Lowell's experience, but Robert Lowell's exp e r i 
ence could no longer represent anything other than itself.
Lowell was not only one of the most talented poets
of his generation, but he was also one of the better e d u 
cated and more Intelligent.

Thus his making the shift

that I have described above indicates that there were
substantial pressures for such a change.

He had the t a l 

ent to write much as he pleased yet found it necessary to
alter his style dramatically.

Similarly, he had the

m i n d and education necessary to locate his w o r k within
the tradition;

if he had not changed his poetry,

he would

have been able to marshal plenty of arguments for s t i c k 
ing with his earlier m o d e .
taking such a dramatic turn,

The external reasons for his
therefore, must be the r e 

sult of pressures of considerable magnitude.
What I w o u l d like to do n o w is to consider changes
external to Lowell's work which, however, ultimately
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affect It internally.

For the moment,

I would like to

auspend in suggestive mid-air various observations taken
primarily from Heidegger which,

allowed to remain in

suspension long enough, will provide the frame

(if not

the formula) necessary to understand Lowell's poetic
shift.

II

The first point that should be made is that Heidegger
argues we exist in a destitute time when the gods have
defaulted,

have failed "to arrive."

never stopped being an absolutist.

In many ways, Lowell
And the frustrations

for an absolutist in a world of process such as Heidegger
describes are self evident.
say,

At the beginning of his e s 

"What Are Poets For?," Heidegger makes the following

statement:
The default of God means that no god any longer
gathers m e n and things into himself, visibly
and unequivocally, and by such gathering d i s 
poses the world's history and man's sojourn in
it.
The default of God forebodes something
even grimmer, however.
Not only have the gods
and the god fled, but the divine radiance has
become extinguished in the world's history.
The time of the world's night is the destitute
time, because it becomes ever more destitute.
It has already grown so destitute, it can no
~
longer discern the default of God as a d e f a u l t .
Technology exemplifies "the world's night."
to hold the world over against the self,

Seeking

to dominate the
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world, w e obscure It.

We cannot see It for what it is

because of the way we have come to regard i t .

We can

not even see that we have obscured the world.

In order

to overcome this,

the world

(which we affect through art,

which we alter because of the way art makes us see and
think) must turn "about fundamentally," turn "away from
the abyss" that is created by the god's failure to arrive
which, were the god to arrive, would ground the world.
"But for this it is necessary that there be those who
reach into the abyss."

Such reaching,

imaginative use of language,

through the

is the poet's job.

In his "The Way to Language" Heidegger borrows from
Aristotle and Wil h e l m von Humbolt

to

develop a defini

tion of what he considers language to be.

For Aristotle,

spoken language represents what is the soul and writing
represents what is spoken.
a show in the first place,
passions of the soul."
tectonic structure."

Of these he says they "are
are among all

Aristotle's

(men) the same

is a "classical a r c h i 

Writing represents sounds;

represent "passions in the soul";

sounds

and such passions r e 

veal "the matters that arouse them."

Summarizing,

Heidegger says the following:
Showing [i.e., language] is what forms and u p 
holds the Intertwining braces of the architec
tonic structure.
Zn various ways, disclosing
or disguising. Showing makes something come to
light, lets what has come to light be perceived,
and lets the perception be examined.
The kinship
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of Showing with what it shows--a klndship
never developed purely in Its own terms and
those of Its origlns--later becomes trans
formed Into a conventional relation between
a sign and Its s i g n i f i c a t i o n .4
Heidegger goeB on to discuss the transformation from
showing to designation,

"by which man's mind Is reset and

directed from one object to another object."

Designation

does not show a thing In the sense of bringing It to
light but rather has a utilitarian purpose behind it.
The difference which Heidegger here puts in terms of d e s 
ignation and showing is that between a language which u n 
covers , and in that sense s h o w s , something for what it is
and a language

(such as technology) which designates

something for some purpose and,

in its focus upon purpose

rather than what is present, which covers over the real
nature of the thing or being.

5

For Wilhelm von Humbolt language is "persistent and
in every instant transitory":
In itself language is not work (ergon) but an
activity (energeia). Its true definition may
therefore only be genetic. . . . Essentially,
however, only the totality of this speaking
can be regarded as l a n g u a g e .6
Rather than architectonic,
for Humbolt is an activity.

as with Aristotle,

language

One is reminded of the d i s 

tinction between a synchronic and diachronic understanding
of poetry.

In light of Heidegger's notion that ours is

a destitute time,

language performs a special task in which
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It presences that which is otherwise absent.

Related to

this Heidegger makes the following remark:
Since the G r e e k s , beings are experienced to be
whatever is present.
Since language is, it-whatever speaking occurs at any time-^belongs
to what is pres e n t . 7
The implication is that language performs a presencing function when properly

(artistically) used,

this way It is both architectonic and genetic.

and in
As in

his "Letter on Humanism," published in 1947 when he was
released from house arrest,

Heidegger again argues that
Q

language is "the house of Being."

The capitalization

of being means that Heidegger is referring to the tran
scendent .

Man employs language in an imaginative way

that makes way, as he means by "wegen," for Being.
Used properly,

our language can occasion Language;

9
en

gaged in such an activity, man's being can occasion Being.
But to balance the above comparison between Humbolt
and Aristotle,

Heidegger says that "The essential being

of language is Saying as Showing"

(genetically saying

but at the same time architectonically s h o w i n g ) .

The

saying activity shows something systematically arranged.
Over and above Aristotle's and Humbolt's descriptions
of language, Heidegger finds it to be related to the
transcendent.

In a sense,

language speaks us,

though

it "remains unmistakably bound up with human speaking":
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Language needs human speaking, and yet it Is
not merely of the making or at the command of
our speech activity.
On what does the being
of language rest, that Is, where is It grounded?
Perhaps w e are missing the very nature of lan
guage when we ask for grounds?
Or could it even be that Saying Is itself the
abode or rest which grants the quiet of mutual
belonging to all that belongs wi t h i n the struc
ture of the being of language?11
Following this circular process or verbal linking
of our activity with language and the higher implications
of that activity,

Heidegger discusses what he means by

"Appropriation."

Of this he says:

All true language, because assigned, sent, des
tined to m a n by the [wegen] way-making movement
of Saying, is in the nature of dest i n y . 12
Language is an opening process that can grasp what is
true and therefore direct us to what may be regarded as
destiny simply because,

being true,

it is^ what ijs.

Being

led by a lie would not have "the nature of destiny" b e 
cause it would lead to nothing, whereas destiny implies
something present.

This should help to clarify what was

meant above by the statement that in a sense language
speaks us.

It pre-structures the world.

In a Husserlian

sense (that will be discussed shortly) it is a sort of
absolute I n t e n t l o n a l i t y .
The idea is related to the god's presencing in
Oedipus the K i n g , which I discussed at the end of the
second chapter.

As the oracle proves to have been right,
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Oedipus la taken beyond his own p o w e r , and yet It was
his power over discursive language that enabled what
the oracle said to come about.

Because Oedipus'

fate

was spoken by an o r a c l e , its "Saying" was "in the nature
of destiny."

And yet it needed the "human speaking"

that Heidegger discusses above.
ized not only by the oracle's
Oedipus'

fate;

Apollo's will is r e a l 

(who is human)

saying

it is also realized by Oedipus'

inter

pretation of this saying and by his attempt to avoid its
meaning.
Oedipus uses discursive language in his attempt to
avoid his fate and,

doing so, facilitates that fate.

However, his final use of language is lyrical; he sings.
And his singing reveals
discursive,

(or, shows) him, whereas his

goal-oriented language obscured the self.

His singing finalizes Apollo's will.
w h o challenged Apollo
and lost disastrously,
Apollo

(god of music)

Much as the faun
to a music contest

Oedipus tries his wits against

(also god of prophecy and sunlight)

only his future as king but his eyesight.

and loses not
He also loses

doubly in his attempt to circumnavigate the prophecy b e 
cause he is the instrument of his own downfall.
It is along these lines that Heidegger concludes
his chapter,
song:

"The Way to Language," with reference to
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Saying is the mode in which Appropriation
s p e a k s : mo de not so m u c h in the sense of modus
or fashion, but as the melodic mode, the song
which says something in its singing.
For a p 
propriating Saying brings to light all present
beings in terms of their properties— it lauds,
that is. allows them into their own, their
n a t u r e .13
If we think of Oedipus in this manner,

then his sing

ing represents the moment at which he relinquishes his
will to the god's will;

or, as I said earlier,

it r e p r e 

sents the moment at which he moves from a will to power
to a will as venture.

Such a revised willing bridges the

mortal and the divine to the extent that "it lauds" "all
present beings" and (following Heidegger)
being,

increases their

an activity quite different from the ratiocinations

of Oedipus as we encounter him earlier in the play, or
for that matter,

an activity quite different from technology.

The lyrical or poetic activity within language bridges
in the following sense:
our saying--always an answering--remains forever
r e l a t i o n a l . Relation is thought of here always
in terms of the appropriation, and no longer
conceived in the form of a mere r e f e r e n c e . Our
relation to language defines itself in terms of
the mode in which we, who are needed in the u s 
age of language, belong to the Appropriation.1^
Much as in o n e ’s singing a song what one will sing is p r e 
viously determined because

(though the song is experienced

each time it is heard as unfolding through time and the
activity of its being sung) to be a song it must already
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be and therefore be f i x e d •*•

much as this is the c a s e ,

our saying Is "relational" to something that precedes it.
We answer in our saying as the singer unfolds in his
singing.

Both are relational.

To repeat something said

earlier, without strictly determining,

Language p r e 

structures and makes the presence of things and beings
possible.

A w a y has already been made and is followed

by our saying or singing, yet our activity is necessary
to that way's being uncovered.

We are not only relational

to language but important to i t .
Heidegger says,

"All reflective thinking is poetic,

and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking."
"The two belong together,"

For him,

But what happens when for

some reason the two become separated?
With the loss of his c o s m o s , which informed his " r e 
flective thinking," this is what Robert Lowell experienced,
and his almost immediate attempts to adjust to a n e w s itua
tion may be seen in his writing and revising of "The Mills
of the K a v a n a u g h s ."

After the adjustment was completed,

the causes for it and the tracks that reveal it were much
less discernable.

That is, Life Studies tells us less

about Lowell's shift than "The Mills."
accompli,
it about.
ness,

and,

It is the fait

as such, covers over the steps that brought

But by its very imperfection,

its incomplete

"The Mills" exposes why Lowell initiated such a

major shift and in many ways h o w he did so.
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I have referred to Will i a m Arrowsmith's review
often because I think that he touches on the most r eveal
ing aspect in Lowell's shift, his use of compression.
Why did Lowell continue his method of doubly compressed
writing (by which he compacted the characteristics of
large poems into the limits of relatively short,
poems) when he finally turned to a large poem?

lyrical
There

are two possible answers.
The simplest answer is that if compression worked
for him before, why abandon it?
over the surface and,

I think,

standing of what he was doing.

However this only skims
slights Lowell's u n d e r 
A more satisfactory

answer is that Lowell was still interested in the p o s s i 
bilities of a cosmos.

As a student of Ransom and Tate

and as a very serious Roman Catholic,

Lowell's early

strength was his ability to fuse myth, history and r e l i 
gion in an objective network that appeared to be selfsustaining.

With the loss of one third of his external

framework (religion), m y t h and history were expanded to
complete the network,

though the myth apparatus o v e r 

lapped to the point that it too failed.

Aside from the

more direct autobiographical aspects of "The Mills,"
a large poem written at double compression might be e x 
pected to superimpose its order upon the poet's experience.
On the other hand, a long narrative poem would not
need to be dense and overlapping to the extent "The Mills"
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is If It had an external context upon which it and the
reader relied to complete it; for example,
w o u l d make allegory possible.

a context that

A poem about The Civil

W ar such as Davidson's "Lee in the Mountains" has refer*
ence to a small world of fact by which it achieves its
significance,

a significance that is limited by the small

number of suitable readers.
example.

Dante provides the ideal

The point is that whether history,

religion

or both, we believe in the existence of what is being
said in such a poem by its implicit reference to an e x 
ternal system.
Not being that of a king,
public figure,

general,

or some other

Lowell's life history was personal in a

restrictive sense.

Before, his religion gave his e xperi

ence a largeness that his world otherwise lacked.
out that religion,

With

or some other external referent equal

to it, what could give his personal experience the public
significance that published writing always claims?
are nearing the dilemma that,

We

1 believe, has dated the

recent confessional poets.
Unlike the Eliot of " A s h - W e d n e s d a y ," Lowell's ascent
was carried out by one who remained "separated."
operated secularly and aesthetically.

He

Hulme might say

that the overreaching intensity of "The Mills of the
Kavanaughs" is an attempt to shore up "spilt religion."
For the purposes of this discussion, however,

the striking
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fact Is that Lowell's doubly compressed long p o e m re p r e 
sents an ambitious effort to press aesthetics to the
point of becoming something larger.
of Arnold's

internalized dialogue,

"Dover Beach" suggests,

It is the descendant
as the epigraph from

and it is related to Pater's

"Aesthetic Poetry," in which he says:
Of religion it learns the art of directing
towards an unseen object sentiments whose
^
natural direction is towards objects of sense.
Lowell's extensive use of myth repeats Eliot's method,
w h i c h assumed that myth could make the modern experience
intelligible.***

The fact that Lowell failed with this

m ethod in "The Mills" explains why, when he resumed w r i t 
ing, he retreated from myth as he already had religion
and settled for the third stanchion mentioned above:

His

tory, both large and small, became his single referent.
By an aesthetic suspension of horizontal,

lineal events,

Lowell sought to render his experience more intelligible.
Yet while Lowell truncates earlier levels of meaning
and produces a lineal progression of events,

Heidegger,

in his "Origin of the Work of Art," stresses the al l e g o r i 
cal nature of art,

that is, that art always has other

levels of meaning:
The work makes public something other than it
self; it manifests something other; it la an
allegory.
In the w o r k of art something other
is brought together with the thing that is
made. '
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Related to this, Heidegger makes a remark later In the
same essay which applies to the situation In which Lowell
found himself after The Mills of the Kavanaughs appeared;
Just as a work cannot be without being created
but is essentially in need of creators, so what
is created cannot itself come into being w i t h 
out those who preserve it.l®
This is an observation similar to Gadamer's remark about
"the medial nature of the play process."

The leveling

of signification in Lowell's poetry that I have described
was,

as 1 have argued already, part of a larger cultural

shift.

Those who might "preserve" his poetry would not

do so if it were alien to their understanding.
In a quite different essay,

"What Was N e w Criticism?

Literary Interpretation and Scientific Objectivity,"
Gerald Graff compares the New Critics

(who informed early

Lowell's poetics) with phenomenological hermeneutics,
which has some interesting relations to later Lowell.
Graff argues that both schools contain a "drive toward
monistic transcendence."

But there is a basic difference

in the way each grounds this drive:
Unlike the hermeneutics . . . the New Critics
at least sought an objective basis for inter
pretation and also, some of the time, for the
referential truth of literature.
To this e x 
tent, and setting aside the fact that their
organlclst assumptions frustrated their a t 
tempts to establish this objective basis, the
alms of the New Critics were in my view a d m i r 
able.
These critics were willing to face up
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Co the feet that without objective criteria
for correctness In Interpretation, the reader's
experience of a literary work is subject to
triviallzatlon by an unchecked relativism in
w hich all readers, however distorted, are
equally " c o r r e c t ."19
After "The Mills," Lowell lacked "objective criteria
for correctness."

He was more likely to agree with

Heidegger's assessment of modern thought,
lessness."

20

of its "root-

Or, put differently, he was no longer c e r 

tain of those "who preserve" a work because there was no
"objective basis" upon which writer and reader could agree.
Related to the loss of a fixed culture and therefore
an audience that would share consistent values,
confronted stylistic difficulties.

Lowell

His poetry could no

longer build prismatically by reflecting several levels
of meaning at once.

Grounded now in experience,

sonal and public history,

in p e r 

it had to assume a lineal

character.
Summarizing some of his statements about language
made in "The W a y to Language," 1 said that,
language speaks us,
in his essay,

that it pre-structures.

for Heidegger,
Similarly,

"The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger

suggests that art pre-structures:
If art is the origin of the work, this means
that art lets those who naturally belong t o 
gether at work, the creator and the preserver,
originate, each in his own n a t u r e . 21
But how art can pre-structure depends upon how the artist
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and the preserver view the world.

If they no longer

agree upon a m y t h by which they might previously have
grasped the transcendent,
some other basis.

then they must agree upon

In Lowell's case,

this was the k n o w 

ledge contained in history and personal experience.

As

I will argue shortly,

the problem is one of intentional-

ity.

however,

For the moment,

Lowell's transition to a

lineal understanding of experience was coupled with his
transition to a lineal artistic mode,

and such a mode

pre-structures the way artist and preserver confront
each other.
Viewed from one angle, we have never left the o p p o s 
ing positions held by Aristotle and Humbolt.
language involves "Showing."
architectonic.

It is, if not prismatic,

All of these descriptions share in their

spatial character a tendency to be synchronic.
other hand,

For Aristotle,

On the

rather than "Showing" something which,

to be

able to be shown, must already be present somehow...
rather than this, Humbolt understands language to be an
"activity," to be "genetic."

His approach is more

diachronic.
Beyond their differences,

however,

these two descrip

tions apply to Lowell's poetic shift and are united by
his career.

Early Lowell understood the world to be

architectonic and prismatic.
be shown.

There were structures to

But later, Lowell relied upon recollection and

saying to carry h i m along a lineal progression of events
that by their arrangement helped h i m to locate himself.
Finding he was dislocated by the loss of a fixed point
of reference, which the Christian cosmology had provided,
Lowell made his poetry a self-locating process.
there was no certainty of the hereafter,

Though

he still could

bring into focus a before and after.
Not black and white,
emphasis.
shift.

the distinction is subject to

But it does exist and fits Lowell's poetic

In addition,

Heidegger's discussion of our r o m a n 

tic tendency to hold the world over against the self
(as in technology)

and of,

therefore,

the god's failure

to arrive is revealing as to why Lowell's personal and
poetic changes came about in the first place.
But there are also consequences to Lowell's poetic
shift.

Discussing the relatedness within which all art

must stand, Heidegger uses the example of a Greek temple
which encloses the figure of a god yet which in the act
of concealing allows the god to stand out into "a holy
precinct."

The god's extension and the temple's delimits

tion constitute the god's presence;
of space a place,
holy.

22

together they make

a precinct whose closure discloses the

The fluid relation between the man-made and

that which is greater than m a n is suggested by Heidegger*
balancing "extension and delimitation."
process,

art can occasion that which,

is greater than it can ever be.

As a delimiting

strictly speaking,
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The process Is something like the fusion that occurs
in a symbol.
a symbol."

(And earlier, Heidegger says,
)

"The wor k is

We usually think of a symbol as something

that derives its meaning and therefore its power from
its being purely natural.

This is the way I. A. Richards

24
understands a symbol in Speculative I n s t r u m e n t s .

Yet,

as Kant a r g u e s , the symbol is not only natural b u t ,
equally important,

it is anthropomorphic.

25

That is,

the symbol exists by a dual nature of extensiveness

(the

purely natural aspect that Richards cannot get over) yet
at the same time delimitation, man's limiting act of a s 
signing importance to one thing while passing over another.
One aspect of Lowell's later phase is a reluctance
toward "delimitation."

Rather than assign importance to

one event at the exclusion of another, Lowell seems to
be saying that hierarchies will never work.
seek to gauge,

to bracket,

His poems

the swatch that comprises his

experience as "extension" without assigning orders of
significance.

After such a leveling process,

carries as much meaning as a saint.
nature art d e l i m i t s .

But by its very

A poem frames an experience which

is therefore taken to be important.
thus,

a skunk

for Lowell is confusion.

The consequence,

The lineal relation b e 

tween events precludes an hierarchical understanding of
their significance.

They become equipollent.

But by

the framing process and selecting process of a poem,
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Lowell implies that some sort of hierarchy Is In use,
apparently a personal one.

Yet,

following Graff,

this not an instance "of a literary work

[being]

is
subject

to trivialization by an unchecked relativism'*?
Another aspect that should be noted is the distinction Heidegger makes between thrownness and projection
and the suggestive way this distinction applies to Lowell's
metamorphosis.

First,

here is Albert Hofstadter's c o m 

ment on Heidegger's distinction because It gives a better
summary than 1 am capable of g i v i n g :
Thrownness . . . is understood in Being and
Time as an existential characteristic of
D a s e i n , human being, its t h a t n e s s , its "that
it i s ," and it refers to the facticity of
human being's being handed over to itself, its
being on its own responsibility; as long as
human being is what it is, it is thrown,
cast. . . . Projection . . . on the other
hand, is a second existential character of
human being, referring to its driving forward
toward its own possibility of being.
It takes
the form of understanding, which the author
speaks of as the mode of being of human being
in which human being is in its possibilities
as possibilities.
It~Ts not the mere having
of a preconceived plan, but is the projecting
of possibility in human being that occurs
antecedently to all plans and makes planning
possible.
Human being is both thrown and
projected; it is thrown project, factleal
directedness toward possibilities of b e i n g . 26
As I will discuss later,

though this antecedent p o s 

sibility does not pre-structure as we normally think of
p r e - s t r u c t u r i n g , it does precede,

and 1 think that in

part it touches upon what Husserl means by I n t e n t i o n a l i t y .
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But for the moment,

In a different vein,

the above d i s 

tinction is reminiscent of Kierkegaard's remarks on
27
P hilistinism in The Sickness Unto D e a t h .
Kierkegaard contrasts probability
m o d e rn day thrownness)

That is,

(which is a kind of

and possibility (which parallels

Heidegger's notion of projection).

Perhaps the most

important thing to note is that probability is char a c 
teristic of Philistinism,

in Kierkegaard's view.

(Re

membering that Heidegger relates romanticism and technology,
what is more Philistine than technology?)

Making such a

parallel provides comment upon Lowell's own thrownness
plus his shift to a lineal poetic process,

a poetic view

that precludes the possibility of a transcendent

(which

is one type of p r o j e c t i o n ) .
In terms of his experience,
definitely finds himself thrown,

Lowell might say that he
and he might add that

his writing is an attempt at projection.
lives in a world that understands
ties as probability,

As thrown, he

itself by such m o d a l i 

a world that Heidegger finds to be

swept up in the equlpmental understanding of the technological approach.

28

As a writer who projects, he uses

his imagination in a non-utilitarian thought process,
one characterized by free p l a y , to explore

( o r , drive

"forward toward")

In both his

"possibility of being."

early and his late phases Lowell found himself thrown
yet at the same time found his poetry to be a means for
projection.
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A song's singing Is a pre-structured activity, much
as a poem's being read is pre-structured.

A song's being

w r i t ten Is similarly controlled once the me l o d y Is d i s 
covered.

But what do we say of a poem?

Heidegger says that all true language
poetry in particular)

(and this includes

is "the way-making movement of

Saying" that is somehow "sent."
ing" of "destiny."

As we have seen,

Of poetry,

True language is a "Say
it is a "way-making."

Though it is minus the music in a song,
less guided by a sort of melody,
the activity of writing,

it is n e v e r t h e 

a tone.

For Lowell in

it is all of these.

To repeat

Hofstadter:
It is . . . the projecting of possibility in
human being that occurs antecedently to all
plans and makes planning possible.
But if, as in Lowell's experience,
transcendent to be aimed for,

there no longer Is a

then poetic projection

toward possibility is seriously restricted.
In his chapter,

"What Are Poets For?"

(in P o e t r y .

L a n g u a g e , T h o u g h t ) , Heidegger stresses the verbal c h a r 
acter of being,

the fact that we are in process.

is not nominative,

Nature

as we usually think of the word, but

verbal:
Natura . . . is the Being of beings. . . .
This is the incipient power gathering e v e r y 
thing to itself, which in this manner releases
every being to its own self.29
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The poetic activity facilitates "the Being of beings,"
and in this way occasions
transcendent.

This,

in H e i d e g g e r ’s view,

"projection" for poetry,
trol what occurs,

(but does not control) what is

and,

is the ultimate

though poetry does not c o n 

it does uncover Being,

thereby making

it possible:
Poetry, however, is not an aimless imagining
of whimsicalities [in its projection toward
possibility] and not a flight of mere notions
and fancies Into the realm of the unreal.
What
poetry, as Illuminating projection, unfolds of
unconcealedness and projects ahead into the
design of the figure, is the Open which poetry
lets h a p p e n . 30
L o w e l l ’s more restricted versions of "the Open" o c 
cur in his poetry often at the conclusions of his poems,
probably for dramatic r e a s o n s .

I have in mind not only

Anne K a v a n a u g h 's giving "Whatever brought

. . . [her]

gladness to the grave" but the conclusions to "For the
Union Dead," "Waking Early Sunday Morning," "Near the
Ocean,"

"Beyond the Alps," and "For Sale," to name a few.

Each of

these poems ends by opening out into a distance

that

(similar to Heidegger's Greek temple)

definite and indefinite.

is at once

Aesthetically definite,

the

p o e m gives closure to a perception that, being perceived,
discloses the presence of something compellingly out of
reach.

Such an opening draws in the reader and by doing

so gives name to what otherwise w o u l d be missed.
Following the above description, Lowell's poetry
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not only makes us recognize the existence of what we
can never fully grasp but also reminds us of such limita
tion.

Lowell teaches us awe at the Inscrutlble amidst

our ordinary patterns and rhythms for living.
p o e m such as "For Sale" demonstrates this.

A brief

Lowell*s

description presents us with the everydayness of his
father's cottage and the efficient removal of all that
was his father's from it.

Owned for a year and then

sold at his f a t h e r ’s death,

it dramatizes transience b e 

cause it is a home and should represent fixity, yet,
being on the market twice in twelve months,
represents just the opposite.

it actually

The p o e m concludes:

Ready, afraid
of living alone till eighty,
Mother mo o n e d in a window,
as if she had stayed on a train
one stop past her destination.
The house is the train gone one station too far.
Both it and the train reflect Mrs.
their fusion.

Lowell's condition by

Yet they are natural opposites;

meant for movement,

the one

the other for staying in place.

Mrs.

Lowell has become a fusion of mutually dependent opposites
(Staples would remind us,

"life and death"), each a c hiev

ing significance by the existence of its counterpart.
the process of a major change in her life,

In

she n e v e r t h e 

less moons statically at a window, which frames and fixes
what she sees (or, more precisely, what she t h i n k s ) .
of course, her mooning contains fused opposites also.

And
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The point is that, because neither relents,
opposites open up a neutral ground,
Heidegger's terms.

a clearing,

such
In

As Lowell's mother has been, we are

forced to recognize the effect the life-death process
has on us.

As living beings who die, we anticipate and

experience the ultimate closure to our own perceptions.
In Its disclosure,

such closure teaches us awe at what

remains inscrutable in our coming and our going.

But

Lowell's naming the predicament objectifies it, localizes
it, and enables us to move ahead, beyond it.

His naming

opens the poetic projection toward possibility.
Noting the priviledged
poetry

(linguistic) position that

enjoys over the other arts, Heidegger adds:
Language, by naming beings for the first time,
first brings beings to word and to a p p e a r 
ance. , . . Such saying is a projecting of
the clearing, in which announcement is the
Open a s .31

The naming may be negative with Lowell.

He often names

what "beings come into the Open as" having failed to be.
Nevertheless,

the naming process does take place.

Nautilus Island is renamed,

and by such naming magnified,

as a result of Lowell's writing "Skunk Hour."
To s u m m a r i z e , for Heidegger the above uses of poetry
involve the assumption of a possible transcendent at all
times,

even when the transcendent is, in one w a y or a n 

other,

specifically shown to be missing.

Of Lowell he

154

might say such uses of poetry (though not the poetry It
self) remain the imaginings of a skyward looking man.
Husserl might add that they are made possible because
in his early phase Lowell believed there was something
transcendent

(due to his religion),

and,

later,

this

enlarged his inten t i o n a l i t y , even though he then saw
things very differently.

Regardless,

the first way we

meet Lowell's poetry in his second phase is by reco g n i z 
ing his thrown position (outside a religious framework,
his "being on

. . . Ibis] own responsibility") and the

lineal process within which he operates.
Though his later poetry also projected toward a
"clearing," Lowell abandoned his Christian myth and
thus lost the means by which he could project toward a
transcendent,

as we usually understand it.

able to poetize vertically,
lineal progression,

No longer

he turned to a poetry of

one that at first used mythology

and history but that soon leveled to personal experience,
on the one hand, and, on the other, history as public
experience.

At first, Lowell sought to overcome the

restrictions of a historical,

lineal v i e w by sheer a e s 

thetic force, as in "The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s ."
was as though by writing the long,

It

doubly compressed

p o e m that Arrowsmith describes he could generate internal
ly the four levels of meaning that, externally, were no
longer possible.
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By turning to a poetry of experience, many of the
possibilities that could exist in L o w e l l ’s first phase
were precluded.

To this extent, his poetic shift amounted

to a limiting of possibility within the Imaginative free
play of the poetic p r o c e s s .

The lineal v i e w of his second

phase uncovered new insights in its own,

specialized m a n 

ner, but at the same time it denied projection toward a
transcendent,

as such.

Stated in the extreme,

such a

poetic shift amounted to a move from ontology to p h e n o m e 
nology.

Heidegger might add that Insofar as Lowell's

second phase results in a poetry based solely on ex p e r i 
ence,

it represents a restricting approach to experience

by the very fact that it is based upon what it regards.
It is much like the figure of a Janus, privileged with
seeing what comes before and what comes after, but i n c a p 
able of seeing that which is Immediately present because
it is underfoot.

Though tangential here, Heidegger r e 

marks on the relation between art and experience,

saying

that "perhaps experience is the element in which art dies."
But artistic possibilities always project beyond
what we me an by experience.

To deny this is to restrict

a vital element in art that uncovers certain parts of the
future.

Yet an art whose intentionalltles

tive expectations)

(whose imagina

go no farther than what is empirically

known of this world (or an art reluctant to go farther)
uncovers less than an art whose horizons are wider to

32
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begin with.

The horizons in Lowell's early phase ran

past "the rainbow" of the Lord's "will" to infinity.
The horizons of his second phase, however,

tend to be

restricted to this w o r l d of "realistic," causal experience.
As will be discussed in the next section, Husserl o v e r 
comes this problem (though not artistically) by dividing
the self into an ego as experience and a transcendental
ego as the observer of the experiencing ego.

Within

the poetry of his second phase, Lowell employs a similar
division.

Ill

Lowell's poetic shift represents his movement into
a world of mere experience,
to empirical Judgment.
to art (Paris,

a world basically restricted

Having lost a cosmology,

he turns

in "Crossing the Alps"), not so m u c h c e r 

tain of what he knows as certain of what he does not know.
Where Lowell uses art to gauge experience,

Husserl

proposes a phenomenological methodology to accomplish
much the same thing.
ferent, however.

The two approaches are very d i f 

The former is imaginative and fort u i 

tous while the latter is thoroughly systematic.

Yet they

share basic characteristics.
What I would like to do is to suggest t h a t , b e g i n 
ning with "The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s ," Lowell's later
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sequences of poems bracket his experience much in the
manner that Husserl's method,

as outlined In his Cartesian

M e d i t a t i o n s . was intended to do.
of a transcendent,

Without the assumption

poetry (particularly a series of ly

rics in the manner of Life Studies) can perform the f u n c 
tion of a loosely structured phenomenology and, by doing
this,

locate the self.

The change is something like

shifting from celestial navigation to piloting one's way
from one local point to a n o t h e r .
First,

it is necessary to summarize Husserl's method,

allowing h i m to do some of the work though trying to be
as concise as possible.

At the same time,

1 would like

to suggest four analogies w h i c h relate Husserl's p r o p o s 
als to what Lowell in fact did by writing Life S t u d i e s .
The analogies distort some of Husserl's methodological
procedures, but they arrive at his conclusion.
Like later Lowell, Husserl starts from a position
of d o u b t :
I have . . . chosen to begin in absolute p o v e r 
ty, w i t h an absolute lack of knowledge.
Begin
ning thus, obviously one of the first things
I ought to do is reflect on how I might find a
method for going on, a method that promises to
lead to genuine know i n g . 33
Much as Husserl begins "in absolute poverty

...

of

knowledge," Lowell concludes The Mills of the Kavanaughs
with a farewell to the knowledge provided b y Catholic
theology.

The final p o e m in The Mills is "Thanksgiving's
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Over.*'

The conclusion to the first stanza states the

poem's overall direction:
Now Michael sleeps,
Thanksgiving's over, nothing is for keeps:
Ne w earth, n e w sky, new life: I hear the w o r d
Of Brother Francis, child and bird, descend.
Calling the war of Michael a pretend;
The Lord is Brother Parrot, and a friend.
A few years later, Lowell had completed his turn
from the Church,

He and Flannery O'Conner had become

friends in the late forties when they were both staying
q

at Yaddo in Saratoga Springs, New York,

i

and, judging

from her letters, Flannery O'Conner made an effort to
keep up with her friend and fellow Catholic; however,
in early 1954 she learned something of the changes he
had been undergoing.

In a letter to Sally and Robert

Fitzgerald she writes the following:
Cal Lowell [writes that he is not] "rejoining
the flock." He thought he "could do more good
outside, at least for myself."
And some other
claptrap about Henry Adams being a Catholic
anarchist and he was the same, only agnostic
too.
I wrote h i m that his not being in the
Church was a grief to me and I k n e w no more
to say about it.
1 said I severely doubted
he would do any good to anybody else outside
but that it was probably true he would do
good to himself Inasmuch as he would be the
only one in a position to.’*
O'Conner might have made the same assessment of anyone
seriously employing a phenomenological approach to his
experience.

At any rate,

anarchy was the political
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manifestation of Lowell's doubt, agnosticism the
religious.
The next stop in Lowell's development is "Beyond
the Alps," which 1 have cited before.
parture from the Church,
the city of art, Paris,
Studies.

from Rome,

Marking his d e 

and his arrival at

it is the opening poem to Life

From now on Lowell's poetic process will be

secular and, as "Studies" suggests,

tentative.

Operating out of Cartesian doubt, Husserl decides
to split the ego (what Lowell might call the conscious
self) and pursue a transcendental ego as the phenomenality of everything that is.

Such an ego is in many ways

analogous to Lowell's poetic imagination.
moment,

But for the

Husserl:
At this point, following Descartes, we make
the greatest reversal that, if made in the
right manner, leads to transcendental sub j e c 
tivity: the turn to the ego cogito as the u l 
timate and apodictil cally [sic] certain basis
for judgments. . . .
[T]he world is for us only something that
claims being. . . . [Njot just corporeal
Nature but the whole concrete surrounding lifeworld Is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon
of being, instead of something that is. . . .
[T]he being of the experienced world remains
unaccepted by me, still this abstaining is what
it is; and It exists, together w i t h the whole
stream of my experiencing life.
Moreover, this
life is continually there for me.
Continually,
in respect of a field of the present, it is
given to the consciousness perceptually, w i t h
the most originary originality, as it itself;
memorlally, n o w these and n o w those pasts
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thereof are "again" given to consciousness,
and that implies: as the "pasts-th e m s e l v e s " .
Reflecting, I can at any time look at this
original living and note particulars; I can
grasp what is present as present, what is
past as past, each as Itself, . . .
Meanwhile the world experienced in this
reflectively grasped life goes on being for
m e (In a certain manner) "experienced" as
before, and with just the content it has at
any particular time.
It goes on appearing,
as it appeared before; the only difference
is that I, as reflecting philosophically, no
longer keep in effect (no longer accept) the
natural believing in existence involved in
experiencing the worldl--though that b e l i e v 
ing too is still there and grasped by my
noticing r e g a r d . 2 The same is true of all
the processes of meaning that, in addition
to the world-experiencing^ ones, belong to
my lifestream . . . when I am in the natural and
non-reflective attitude. . . . [Tlhe p h i l o s o p h i 
cally reflective Ego's absention from positiontakings . . . does not signify their disappearance.
Husserl is describing his "transcendental epoche,"
w hich he calls a "transcendental-phenomenological reduction."

37

He is pursuing a more objective grasp of e x 

perience by, as he says,
subjectivity.

a "great reversal," a radical

His phenomenological reduction provides

a bracketing of the real world that helps him locate
himself within his ongoing experience.

As part of this

he divides his conscious self into an ego as experience
and a transcendental ego as the phenomenality of e v e r y 
thing that can b e .
Such a self-division is basic to Lowell's poetic
process.
process,

In the radical subjectivity of the Imaginative
Lowell turns his own existence into an object.
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It is a variation on the Cartesian split w i t h the subject
(rather than thinking about or doubting his existence)
Imagining variations upon that existence.

By allowing

his transcending and imagining ego to be the observing
and rearranging subject over his objectified ego as e x 
perience,

Lowell manages to bracket his experience on

the one hand and, on the other hand,

to explore p o s s i 

bilities for n e w experience.
In the above quotation, Husserl gives the first
hint of intentionality as he uses it w h e n he says that
the "life-world is for me

. . . only a phenomenon of

being."

it can be affected by his ln-

As a phenomenon,

t e n t l o n a l i t y , what he expects to see, which is molded
by what he has already seen.

He also provides for a

time sense by distinguishing between past and present,
to which he later adds a protentional positing of the
future.

Finally,

though (as he says) he abstains from

accepting the experienced world, he nevertheless recog
nizes that the world or its object is in some sense
apodictlcally given.
To summarize the correspondences between Husserl's
m ethod and Lowell's process,
analogies which,

I would like to use four

taken simultaneously,

approximate the

sort of consciousness that both poet and philosopher
intended.

The analogies are as follows: The consci o u s 

ness of space-time experience as a solitary skin diver;

Che process of recollection from Che past and projection
Co the future operating in the previous consciousness
m u c h as a column of slides in a slide projector in which
the present is the slide being shown at the moment;

in-

tentionality operating in a consciousness that contains
at once both the diver's process and that of the p r o j e c 
tor,

an intentionality which governs yet is capable of

being refuted

(as with the milk-bourbon analogy given

earlier) but one which can be varied to allow for d i s 
covery of what, not normally being Intended, might not
be experienced;

and,

finally,

the consciousness of time

as a retentional and protentional continuum,

a Janus

consciousness.
One way to think of the above four analogies is as
a group of transparencies which one overlays on a map
or chart.

That is, though I identify them as distinct

processes,

they actually occur in the consciousness

simultaneously.

Indeed,

though I name them separately,

they cannot be independent of each other and still exist
Because he will eventually be seen to be the most
inclusive of the four,
which to begin.

the diver is the best figure with

Having descended into a lake,

he does not know what to e x p e c t .

at first

He can see for approxi

mately forty feet in any direction through water that
has sediment but that is relatively clear.

Having d e 

scended to twenty feet above the bottom, he swims in a
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straight line, and the distance he covers cannot be
separated from the amount of time that passes.

Thus,

his swimming is a space-time continuum.
As he swims he remains twenty feet from the bottom.
Each Instance in the time he swims is coupled with a
different spot on the lake bottom over which he passes
spatially just as time passes in its manner.

In this

sense, his experience is synchronous and might lend it
self to a sort of calculus, were the diver outside his
experience.

At this point, however,

Husserl's ego as experience,
of this.

he is not; he is

though a modified version

The modification I have made is that, rather

than experiencing only one object through the eidetic
reduction as an eidetic horizon (as Husserl d o e s ) , this
ego experiences a whole series of objects appearing over
an ever-opening horizon.
and,

He has been put into process

to this extent, psychologized,

something Husserl

does not d o .
What he experiences is a lighted disk on a lake
b ottom that changes with his space-time swimming.
horizon of experience is,
forty feet away.

though 360 degrees,

His

always only

As he swims, he notices whatever fea

tures the lake offers coming into view over that horizon,
various fish, rocks on the bottom and so forth.

However,

gradually he begins to expect to experience certain fish
or certain sized rocks because of former fish and former
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rocks.

He is building up a bank of past images that in

form his receptiveness to what lies in the future.
The past images retained in the diver's conscious
ness are constantly pushed farther back by n e w images
which become part of the past as soon as they are e x 
perienced,

These past Images are like the slides column

fed through the projector.

Future images are yet to be

screened, but past images are retained and can be called
back to m i n d much as one might reverse a projector.
Eventually, however,

past Images become forgotten;

they

are covered over and lost unless something happens to
startle them back into memory.

They are covered or

sedimented in the diver's consciousness much as the h o r i 
zon behind him is obscured by sediment and distance as
he swims away from it.
Because what he sees informs his consciousness,
these past images constitute past phases of the ego,
what can b e called an eidetic ego because it is formed
by use of the e i d o s .

Because he is in part formed by

this past, what the diver encounters in the future is
modified by earlier encounters.

This is the basis for

intentionality; we are able to experience a thing b e 
cause our expectation has in some way pre-structured
its coming about.

The m a n who expected w a r m m i l k did

so because of his previous experience with putting the
milk in a glass and leaving it.

His consciousness is

actually startled into an original

(rather than expected)

experience by having his expectations or intentionality
refuted with w a r m bourbon.
So far 1 have mentioned the diver,

the slide p r o j e c 

tor and the m a n who Intends to drink milk.

What remains

is the Janus consciousness, which incorporates all of
the above analogies and adds its own particulars.
gathered experience,

Having

the diver's consciousness is like

a slide projector in that it retains the past while p r o 
ceeding ahead moment to moment, or slide to slide.
slide is the fleeting present.

Each

The Janus incorporates

this function and adds something to it.

The backward-

looking Janus retains the past, as does the slide column.
The forward-looking Janus, however,

adds the intentional-

ity of the man who expects milk plus the space-time m o v e 
ment of the swimmer that uncovers new e x p e r i e n c e .
The Janus may be seen as a combination of the other
three functions.

Yet there is one difference that sets

the Janus apart.

Just as the two-faced guardian of p o r 

tals is able to experience past and future (beginnings
and endings)

simultaneously, which the above three c a n 

not do, he is Incapable of seeing what is immediately
beneath him,

and that is the present, what John Bricuth

would call "the magic ground,

/ Lost or fled or sundered.*

The points over which the diver swims are instances of
discrete, punctual experience,

yet the full experience
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of the consciousness described by all four analogies Is
excluded from the present because It Is In constant
process.

Being time-locked,

It moves from one moment

to the next synthetically and by the very nature of such
movement Is Incapable of fixing on any one moment such
as the present, which is in itself also fleeting.
Furthermore,

our whole approach to this multi-faceted

diver has been from somewhere outside him.

I have d e 

scribed h i m in such a way that he is always before us
but separate from u s .

And yet 1 have been trying to

grasp the process of his consciousness.

This multi-faceted

diver represents the ego as e x p e r i e n c e , but there is that
other ego,

the transcendental ego.

What this means is that,

following Husserl's method

and Lowell's poetic process in terms of the above analogy,
the diver has a double who is swimming directly above him
watching h i m watch,

experiencing his experiencing only

removed so that there is greater room for variation.
is the transcendental ego (or, in Lowell,
imagination).

This

the poetic

It is the ego that has thrust itself o u t 

side the ordinary continuum of experience, never letting
that experience become lost, however.

Repeating a d i s 

tinction made between "adequacy" and "apodicticity" of
that evidence we gain as experience and maintaining t h a t ,
in this area,

"adequacy" will suffice,

Husserl continues:
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Perhaps this remark was made precisely with
the case of transcendental self-experience in
mind.
In such experience the ego is accessible
to himself originaliter.
But at any particular
time this experience offers only a core that is
experienced with strict a d e q u a c y " , namely the
e g o ’s living present (which the grammatical
sense of the sentence, ego c o g i t o . expresses);
while, beyond that, only an indeterminately
eneral presumptive horizon extends, coraprisng what is strictly non-experienced but n e c e s 
sarily also-meant.
To it belongs not only the
ego's past, most of which is completely obscure,
but also his transcendental abilities and his
habitual peculiarities at the time.
External
perception too (though not apodlctic) is an
experiencing of something itself, the physical
thing itself: "it itself is there".
But, in
being there itself, the physical thing has for
the experlencer an open, infinite, indetermi
nately general horizon, comprising what is it
self not strictly perceived--a horizon (this
is implicit as a presumption) that.can be
opened up by possible experiences.39

f

Two positions exist: The diver and his double.
Is thus a doubling,

eventually a multiplying,

There

of horizons.

The experiencing diver comes upon objects which also have
horizons, horizons other than his.
scendental ego

(or, diver)

But first,

the tran

can watch the experiencing ego

(or, diver)

from his horizon structure and gain a second

structure.

Next,

if the experiencing diver is enco unter

ing an object with its own,

third horizon structure,

then

the possibilities become multiple.
What this finally represents is the opening up of
possible experiences in an eidetic ego.
poet regarding his own experience,

The imagining

or the transcendental

ego as diver regarding his experiencing ego,

is able to

168

use that experiencing self as a second locus t and when
that experiencing ego encounters another object wit h its
implicit locus and horizon structure, a whole world struc
ture becomes possible for an otherwise time-locked and
isolated consciousness.

In fact the experiencing ego

encounters many other objects over a period of time,
and this greatly expands possible horizons, possible
worlds,

for an intentional self.

The important point

is that at first a triangulation of experience occurs,
and

(as in navigation and in piloting)

this is the most

basic method of s e l f • l o c a t i n g , the primary method.
But such a triangulation can only occur after a
"Pairing," such as that between ego and alter ego, has
taken place.

It is an "Appresentation" of an "Other,"

an "organism" which proves
change

in

behavior from

it is other by its "continuous
phase to phase." Much as the

transcendental diver w h o watches the experiencing diver
who has his own experience,
The character of . . .[an] existent "other"
has its basis in . . .[a] kind of verifiable
accessibility of what is not originally a c 
cessible. . . .
In other words, another monad
becomes constituted appresentatively in mine.^0
Husserl is describing a monadic consciousness which c o n 
tains within itself all that exists outside Itself.

It

is a microcosm.
One is reminded of Sidney's view of the poet "freely
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ranging only wit h i n the zodiac of his own w i t .
ever,

How

the present v i e w involves an Isolation of the c o n 

sciousness that would have been antithetical to Sidney's
understanding, particularly his belief in the allegorical
function of a poem standing between philosophy and history
as a "speaking picture .
Just as later Lowell's poetic consciousness

is one

that exists without a theology, Husserl's description of
consciousness involves one that exists without a p h i l o s o 
phy.

But both have history,

and (though not by p h i l o s o 

phy or theology) both also have means for exploration of
possibility.

In Husserlian terms, because there "is a

universe of c o m p o s s i b i l i t i e s ," as a result of the c o m m u 
nity of monads,

there is a rationality of time.

Working

systematically,

the ego is capable of a unified experience,

a history:
We can call it furthermore a formal regularity
pertaining to a universal g e n e s i s ^ which is
such t h a t p a s t , p r e s e n t , and f u t u r e , become
unltarily constituted over and over again, in
a certain . . . formal structure of flowing
modes of givenness.
But, wi t h i n this form, life goes on as a m o t i 
vated course of particular constitutive p e r 
formances w i t h a multiplicity of particular
motivations and motivational systems, which,
according to universal laws of g e n e s i s , produce
a unity of universal genesis of the ego.
The
ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to
speak, the unity of a " h i s t o r y . " ^
Somewhat like the past of the column of slides that
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has already been screened,

like Che retentional Janus

and like the intentionality of the man expecting w a r m
milk,
of

the "flowing modes of givenness" become "a unity

. . . genesis of the e g o ," a history.

One Is r e 

m i n d e d of Lowell's poems which are often almost a snapshotseries of past phases

(static images much like slides)

w i t h in his consciousness.

But as an eidetic ego that

transcends his time-locked "flowing

...

of givenness,"

or as a poetically imagining consciousness capable of
free play and projection,
past development,

Lowell can not only trace his

but by eidetic variation he can also

explore "an infinity of forms," including possibilities
held in the future.

His intentionality may direct which

"forms" he chooses, but "an infinity of a priori types
of actualities and potentialities of life" make choice
possible in the first place.

Husserl calls this ca p a 

bility the "universal Apriori," itself an "eidetic form"
in the transcendental ego but a form that contains "an
infinity of forms .
What we are approaching is an isolated consciousness
that works its way out of isolation by first positing a
"non-Ego," which "lj3 the other E g o ," and which ultimately
sees itself existing in a community of monads:
[T]he intrinsically first other (the first
"non-Ego") is the other Ego~! Xnd the other
Ego makes constitutionally possible a new
infinite domain of what is "other": an
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Objective Nature and a whole Objective world,
to which all other Egos and I myself belong. . .
[A]n Eb o -community, which includes me, becomes
constituted (in m y sphere of ownness, naturally)
as a community of Egos existing with each other
and for each other--ultimately a community of
m o n a d s . which, moreover, (in its communaTizeH
intentionality) constitutes the one identical
world.
Husserl is describing the world as a "transcendental intersubjectivity
constituted.

. . .

in w h i c h

. . . the Objective world" is

But "the constitution of

. . . [such a]

world essentially involves a ’h a r m o n y 1 of the m o n a d s ."
He argues that he has m o v e d from the realm "of the

'as

if,'" a realm of "phantasies," to "Objective experience"
dealt with by "scientific activity.
The preceding sentence makes a claim that cannot be
applied to Lowell's poetry, which remains in the realm
of the "as if."

I know of no actual "scientific activity"

taking place within Husserl's method;

however, his d e 

scription is illuminating as to the problems faced by the
secular subjectivity of the modern poetic imagination,
which remains the predominant poetic imagination today.
In addition, Husserl's overcoming what we generally call
the romantic subject-object split

(by using that very

split with a vengeance) parallels the most common m o d a l 
ity that we find in mo d e r n poetry.
In his The Situation of P o e t r y , Robert Pinsky touches
on John Berryman's use of a persona.

Henry allows

Berryman to get away with "Tennysonian" language.

Using
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Henry Is a strategy "for retaining or recovering the
elevation of Victorian d i c t i o n . B u t
basic takes place as well.

something more

At times, Henry can be an

appresentation of Berryman.

A b Husserl would have it,

Berryman (the imagining poet as transcendental ego) appresents Henry

(the experiencing e g o ) .

Such a method

gains the stylistic objectivity that Plnsky identifies,
but more importantly it also provides objectivity for
the poem as a mode of thought.

In terms of taste,

Berryman may get away with "Tennysonian" diction by p u t 
ting it in Henry's mouth;

but he also gets beyond the

m o d e rn predicament of radical subjectivity by doubling
that subjectivity.

Henry becomes another monad,

and

the horizon structure of his experiencing ego is incor
porated into the poet's horizon structure.

Each object

observed by Henry constitutes a third structure,

thus

(as mentioned earlier) we are able to build a selflocating system of triangulation within "an Objective
Nature

...

a community of m o n a d s ."

Pinsky's concern at this point is primarily a
stylistic one which he relates to the tradition;
his remarks about Lowell and Berryman,

however,

immediately after,

carry an assumption that is much the same as "the unity
of a

'history'" that Husserl discusses.

The tradition

that Plnsky is concerned with represents that history.
Language that Lowell or Berryman would like to use (such
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as that of James or Tennyson) represents the sensibility
(and the point of view) of a particular past phase in
the retentional consciousness of each poet, even though
learned second hand.

The problem is how to recognize

that past phase of the poet's
ego in the present.

(and reader's)

transcendental

It is part of the present in Husserllan

terms because as a past experience it modifies the inten
tionality by which we encounter the present;

in Plnsky's

terms, because it is part of the tradition, which might be
seen as a specialized instance of intentionality.

More

over, we may discuss this as a stylistic concern, but, as
I have tried to demonstrate,

style cannot be separated

from th ought.
Discussing Lowell's "Women, Children,

Babies, Cows,

Cats" (a poem that "is entirely enclosed between quotation
m a r k s ," which means that a second ego is speaking), Plnsky
notes that we are presented with the "contours of the
speaker's character" and with "the subject of r e m e m b e r i n g . " ^
The poem is a self-locating process for Lowell in Husserllan
terms of time and experience and,

though vaguely,

self-

locating in the broader terms of guilt and responsibility.
A monadic voice speaks, recollecting past phases of experi
ence which were violent encounters with others whose experi
ence was equally monadic and equally valuable,

therefore

the guilt.
Before leaving Plnsky,

1 would like to quote a paragraph
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In which he relates Lowell and Berryman In their use of
protagonists:
To assign part of the poem to a voice or
protagonist gives the attributed element a
kind of autonomy, however Illusory or con 
ventional.
Lowell has used that illusion of
autonomy as a way to approach elusive or a m 
bivalent judgments of outward matters, values
of a cultural or social kind [a strategy meant
to overcome the loss, that Cosgrave identifies,
of a system of value upon which to base j u d g 
ments] . In John Berryman's poems dramatic
devices often seem to work similarly in r e l a 
tion to more wholly inward judgments; the
quasi-autonomous element in the poem supplies
a way to have one's self-dramatization and
yet to Judge it--or at least to stand a little
apart from it.
(Ted Hughes' Crow seems to
carry this principle even f u r t h e r .)
Stylistic matters of persona,
in "Women,

Children,

protagonist,

Babies, Cows,

or voice (as

Cats" or as In Anne

Kavanaugh's revery) become even more important to the
discussion of poetry when they are recognized as also
being widely employed modes of thought.
thought,

As modes of

they are strikingly similar to Husserl's s e p a r a 

tion of the experiencing ego (here the persona)

from the

transcendental ego, here the poet.
Though it is different from Heidegger's example of
a Greek temple, poetry operating in a roughly Husserllan
m anner is a world-building activity.
is linguistic,

Largely because it

it can occasion more than in itself it

ever is, Heidegger's "Open" which makes the possibility
for the god's return.

Related to this, Husserl's method
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Is not a psychology of experience; nor is Lowell's.
Toward the end of the "Fifth Meditation," Husserl d i s 
cusses the "Metaphysical results of our explication of
experiencing someone else."

As already mentioned, he

has arrived at a plurality of monads that spatlalizes
and temporalizes the world.

It Is seen as a space-time

continuum much like the diver's swimming.

Wallace

Stevens understands such a world (particularly in its
protentional and projecting aspects) as being informed
by "supreme fictions":
There is, in fact, a world of poetry indistin
guishable from the world in which we live,
or, I ought to say, no doubt, from the world
in which we shall come to live, since what
makes the poet the potent figure that he is,
or w a s , or ought to b e , is that he creates the
world to which we turn incessantly and without
knowing it and that he gives to life the s u 
preme fictions without which we are unable to
conceive of it.
Without such fictions informing our intentionality, we
will fail to see what they protentionally provide for
the future.

Heidegger would say that such fictions can

project toward that transcendent which,
generally miss.

lacking them, we

Husserl would say they are the products

of eidetic variation carried out by the transcendental
ego which gives us "an Objective world."
Closer to Heidegger here than elsewhere, Husserl
w o u l d also say that such fictions are "Our monadological
results" and that they "are m e t a p h y s i c a l . if it be true

176

that ultimate cognitions of being should be called m e t a 
physical."

Having abandoned the objective world by a

m ethod of radical subjectivity that arrived first at one
then two monads,

then more, Husserl continues:

[T]he two [or more] worlds are then . . . mere
"surrounding w o r l d s " . . . mere aspects of a
single Objective world, which is common to
them. . . .
As imagined by me, each of them
is in necessary comnunlon with me (or with me
in respect of a possible variant of myself)
as the constitutive primal monad relative to
them.
Accordingly they belong in truth to a
single universal community, which includes
me and comprises unitarlly all the monads and
groups of monads that can be conceived as c o 
existent.
Actually, therefore, there can exist
only a single community of monads'! the co m m u n 
ity o f all co-existing m o n a d s . Hence there
can exist only one Objective w o r l d , only one
Objective t i m e , only one Objective space, only
one Objective Nature.51
This is quite a distance from the apparently relativistic

(if not nihilistic) beginnings of Husserl's

m ethod grounded in doubt.

Indeed the above is more the

articulation of an ideal than it is of a fact.

But it

leads directly to the possibility of eidetically varying
the self through imagination to cope with our time-locked
consciousness which has no other means to proceed but
synthetically:
Leibniz is right when he says that infinitely
many monads and groups of monads are conceiv
able but that it does not follow that all these
possibilities are c o m p o s s i b l e ; and, again, when
he says that infinitely many worlds might have
been
created", but not two or more at once,
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since they are Imcomposslble [sic]. It is to
be noted in this connexion that, in a free
variation, I can phantasy first of all m y s e l f ,
this apodictlc de facto ego, as otherwise and
can thus acquire the system of possible variants
of m y s e l f . each of w h i c h , h o w e v e r , is annuled
Tsic] b y e a c h of the others and by the ego who
I actually am. . . . If I phantasy myself as
different from what I actuala pure possibility diff
ly am, that possibility in turn prescribes what
monads exist' for h i m as o t h e r s . And proceeding
in this fashion, I recognize that each mo n a d . .
predellneates a compossible universe, a closed
''world of monads", and that two worlds of monads
are lncom p o s s i b l e , just as two possible variants
of my ego (or of any presupposedly phantasied
ego whatever) are i n c o m p o s s i b l e . "
We are not as far away from Lowell as might seem the
case.

Because of its imagery,

his poetry appears to r e p r e 

sent a spatially dislocated self.
possible variants of

But in fact,

. . . [the] ego

since "two

. . . are incompos-

sible," the dislocation is a temporal one.

This first b e 

comes clear in Anne K a v a n a u g h rs revery, by which she (as
transcendental ego) re-presents past phases of her e xperi
encing ego.

They are past and must be re-presented b e 

cause no two horizon structures are identical,

and because

her moving through such plateaus of past experience e x 
plains her present situation,

thus locates her.

In the poem's opening lines we Immediately have the
three horizon structures of possible experience necessary
for triangulation.

Anne's present,

reflective self r e p r e 

sents a transcendental ego, and her past self is an e x p e r i 
encing ego.

Lowell, as poet, provides a third monad,

one closest to us,

though obscured.

Harry provides a

the
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fourth h o r i z o n .

Harry and Anna as children provide

others, as do Harry's mother, Red Kavanaugh and,
ly, even Anne's drunken father.

Ultimately,

distant

all of these

are experiencing egos for Lowell's transcendental ego, or
poetic Imagination.

They all contain variations upon

Lowell's own experience, w h i c h has been dislocated because
time-locked in mere process.

As Husserl says, no "two

or more" worlds can be conceived at once "since they are
imcompossible

[sic]."

Because for Lowell time was no longer grounded in
the historical fact of Christ as, within a Christian
understanding,

it once had been, he found time to be a

dislocating process.

Lacking an adequately grounded sys

tem of value, his judgments were in danger of becoming
relative,

indeed situational to the point of mere opinion.

A n historical consciousness was intended to correct this;
however,

as with Lowell's dramatic version of Benito

C e r e n o . his j u d g m e n t s

often lacked perspective and in

stead were provincial in terms of the brief time frame
(the sixties)

that informed them.

Similarly,

lacking a transcendent that was fixed so

that the process of his allegory might reflect it prismatlcally, Lowell turned to the fixity of a personal and
a public past.
relocate

Dislocated by time, he employed time to

himself, m u c h as Husserl exploited subjectivity

to overcome subjectivity.
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IV

In a letter that Is part of her extensive corre
spondence with a person so far known only aB "A," Flannery
O'Conner summarizes her experience with Robert Lowell
around the time he was writing and revising "The Mills
of the Kavanaughs":
You ask about Cal Lowell.
I feel almost too
much about h i m to be able to get to the heart
of it.
He is a kind of grief to me.
I first
knew h i m at Y a d d o . We were both there one
fall and winter.
At that time he had left
his first wife, Jean Stafford, and the Church.
To make a long story short, I watched him that
winter come back into the Church.
I had n o t h 
ing to do with it but of course it was a great
joy to m e . I was only 23 and didn't have much
sense.
He was terribly excited about it and
got more and more excited and in about two
weeks had a complete mental breakdown.
That
second conversion went with it, and when he
came out, he was well for a time, married again a very nice girl named Elizabeth Hardwick,
and since then has been off and on, in and
out, of institutions.
N o w he is doing very
well on one of these drugs--but the Church is
out of it, though I don't believe he has been
able to convince himself that he doesn't b e 
lieve. . . . The last thing he wrote was
called The Mills of the K a v a n a u g h s . Right now
he is writing an autobiography.
This is part
of some kind of analytical ther a p y . *3
And then in a letter to the same person four years l a t e r :
Let me right now correct, stash & obliterate
this revolting story about Lowell introducing
me as a saint. . . .
At the time it was h a p 
pening, poor Cal was about three steps from
the asylum.
He had the delusion that he had
been called on some kind of mission of
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purification and he was canonizing everybody
that had anything to do with his situation
then.
1 was very close to him and so was
Robert [Fitzgerald]. 1 was too Inexperienced
to know he was mad, I just thought that was
the way poets acted.
Even Robert didn't know
It, or at least didn't know how near collapse
he w a s . In a couple of weeks he was safely
locked u p . It would be funny if it had not
been so terrible. . . . Robert and I both
made fun of him when he said such t h i n g s , but
there was no deterring him.
He mixed it all
in with his wild humor.
Things went faster
and faster and faster for him until I guess
the shock table took care of i t . It was a
grief for me as if he had died.
When he camee.
out of it, he was no longer a Catholic. . , .
Not only was Lowell's autobiographical writing a
"kind of analytical therapy" (or, self-locating), as the
first quotation maintains, but, as the second suggests,
his religious Interests, his poetry,
intertwined.
start.

and his illness are

In all three he was an absolutist from the

As O'Conner first knew him, he would have agreed

with Denis Donoghue' s recent remark (made in The Sover
eign Ghost) , "that imagination is the secular name we
apply to the soul" in our efforts "to live peacefully
with our neighbors."
"cannot believe

Donoghue goes on to say that he

. . . the imagination is other than divine

in its o r i g i n , a n d

he later adds,

"the poet believes

that the direction of his work is a kind of destiny."^®
These opinions would be perfectly agreeable to Lowell
as Flannery O'Conner knew him at Yaddo and shortly after.
But consider the difficulty involved in his intellectually
rejecting such notions (particularly deciding that his
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poetry Is, after all, not "a kind of destiny") yet r e 
maining an absolutist by temperament and beyond dissua
sion.

O'Conner's observations are interesting because,

though mentally healthy,

she too confronted illness,

was a writer, and was a serious Catholic.

Her position

on Lowell seems to have been that he never gave up a
religious desire but that because of his Instability he
stayed Intellectually and emotionally clear of tradi
tional Christian doctrine or formal practice as much as
possible.

In sum, Lowell continued to have the absolut

ist's drive for certitude,

as I believe that "Waking

Early Sunday Morning" and "Near the Ocean" demonstrate.
But because of his instability it was a drive without a
goal, a desire without an object or, to borrow again
from Pater (only something that sounds as though it could
be from He i d e g g e r ) , "a love defined by the absence of
the beloved."
Discussing what he calls "enterprises especially
congenial to the imagination," Donoghue lists the con
templative,

descriptive mode, Allen Tate's angelic mode,

and the negatlng-dlfferentiating mode.
tended toward the second of these,
he tended toward the third,

Early Lowell

the angelic, but later

the negating-differentlating

mode which is reminiscent of the "antagonisms" that
Staples identifies in Lowell and the "contraries" for
which Yenser opts.

But to return to Donoghue*s idea of
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the angelic mode of imagination, which fits m u c h of
early Lowell:
Sometimes the act of imagination Is felt as a
desperate necessity, like an act of faith in
the absence of evidence in its favour.
Natural
forms are not felt as sustenance, and the leap
of faith is made in the needy hope of aspiring
beyond nature to more complete satisfactions.
If nature is not enough, the imagination must
act upon its own a u t h o r i t y . Such an imagina
tion is often "angelic," to use Allen Tate's
description, and it results in a hypertrophy
of feeling, will, and intellect; of feeling,
since it exhibits "the Incapacity to represent
the human condition in the central tradition
of natural feeling"; of will, since it features
"the thrust of the will beyond the human scale
of action"; and of intellect, since it shows
"the intellect moving in isolation from both
love and the moral will, whereby It declares
itself independent of the human situation in
quest of essential k n o w l e d g e ."57
The above description fits Lowell's early phase only
in part,

as is also the case with the summary of the

negating-differentiating mode's application to his second
phase.

Nevertheless,

first phase,

the concentrated writing in Lowell's

that Arrowsmith picked out, has its own

"desperate necessity."

With very little violence done

to them, most of the poems in Lord W e a r y 's Castle and The
Mills of the Kavanaughs do read like acts "of faith in
the absence of evidence."

Also,

they are too strained

and uncomfortable to be representations of "the human
condition" in anything like a "tradition of natural feel
ing," and,

in their concern with an absolute that is often

more Calvlnistic than Catholic,

they are Instances of the
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writer's will thrusting "beyond the human scale of a c 
tion."

On the other hand, Donoghue's description of the

angelic imagination's "intellect" is less satisfactory
because at this time Lowell's Catholicism tended to in
tegrate his thought and "moral will."
Discussing the negatlng-differentiating mode,
Donoghue alludes to the Preface to Hegel's The P h e n o 
menology of M i n d , "where

[Hegel]

speaks of the mind e n 

gaged with distinctions and difference."
the self makes a difference evident,

By negating,

and making dis t i n c 

tions is fundamental to the mind's synthetic progress
toward knowledge.

However,

there also exists a gray

area in the negating-differentiating mode.

If you n e 

gate with a great deal of "vehemence you make the reader
aware of the vehemence necessary to banish" the object
in the first place.

This has the effect of increasing

the object's presence.

38

Whether the object is maintained by "faith in the
absence of evidence," as with the angelic mode,
gated,

is n e 

or is again made present by the vehemence of its

banishment,
tension.

there exists an absenting and presencing

Both modes confront this;

on opposite sides of the process.

they merely stand
"The Mills of the

Kavanaughs" stands between the two sides.

Lowell's r e 

visions amount to a banishment in themselves; however,
the dual nature of Anne Kavanaugh as Persephone amounts
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to a negating-differentiating mode in itself, but at
the same time she is emblematic of the renewal of life.
She can negate life in part,

and her doing so amidst the

Maine countryside amounts to a differentiation.
she also stands for the return of life,

However,

and in this

capacity she represents an instance of "faith in the
absence of evidence."

The latter significance applies

to Anne Kavanaugh particularly in the first version of
"The Mills" when the Catholic references were still
present to reinforce this half of her.
The negating-differentiating mode is summarized by
Donoghue, with even a reference to Pater that is close
to the one used earlier in this discussion.

Donoghue

begins with a positive use of negation that reminds one
of Husserl's first step w i t h Descartes:
Human language alone contains the principle
of negation.
Negation is therefore a linguis
tic marvel by which the m i n d repudiates its
dependence upon objects.
The objects exist,
they are there, [much as Husserl finally a c 
knowledges an objective world] but the
mind exerts itself by rejecting them [much
as Husserl follows Descartes by beginning
with d o u b t ] , I assume a direct relation
between the principle of negation and
Pater's account of those moments in which
the mind replaces the object in nature by a
wealth of sensations and Impressions [similar
to eidetic v a r i a t i o n s ] : these are the only
remaining traces of the object, and thereafter
their intensity is Independent of the object
[as they become mere phenomena which are part
of the horizon structure and intentionality
of a consciousness].59
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1 have Interrupted Donoghue with comparisons to
Husserl because the parallels between his third mode
and Lowell's second phaBe are even more striking than
those between his second mode and Lowell's first phase.
The overriding point to be emphasized is that in his
description of three ways the modern imagination has
come to operate,

two of D o n o g h u e 's modes do outline the

two phases of Lowell's poetic imagination that I have
described.

If Lowell were not a leader in the move from

the second imaginative mode to the third, his poetic
shift would still be a prime example of the distinction
that Donoghue makes.
I might add that, as previously suggested, Lowell's
early phase is not altogether religious.

He has all of

the Judgment that negates the world and little of the
grace that enlivens it.

This characteristic also fits

the angelic mode:
[T]he imagination proposes to set against the
natural world a rival fiction which owes as
little as possible to nature and nearly e v e r y 
thing to itself.60
That is,

the implicit system of value by which Lowell

makes judgments is "set against the natural world" in its
very negativity as "a rival fiction."
Not only in some ways negative in its Judgment,

an

early p o e m such as "The Drunken Fisherman" demonstrates
the three characteristics of the angelic Imagination
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given above.

The poem suggests that our mo d e r n life Is

a "dynamited brook" whose waters "peter out."

Acknow

ledging the recurrent failure that Peter r e p r e s e n t s , it
nevertheless appears to conclude positively.

Yet at

the same time it includes the angelic characteristics,
wh i c h are not positive:

First,

the poem's violent diction

("this bloody sty," "raging memory drools," "bloody
waters," "remorse,

/ Stinking," and so forth)

is part

of the eccentric and negative v i e w it represents of
(as Donoghue says)
Donoghue)

the "human condition," and

such diction does not "represent

central tradition of natural feeling."

(again

. . . the

Second,

in its

vision of the power of Christ over "the Prince of D a r k 
ness" who stalks us in our human limitation,

the poem

opts for "the thrust of the will beyond the human scale
of action," here in religious terms.
fisherman's Christian ruminating

Finally,

the

(or, "intellect")

is

so isolated from anyone else that it demonstrates neither
"love" nor "moral w i l l ” but instead seems intent upon
a "quest" for "essential knowledge"

(Donoghue*s terms),

w h i c h surpasses the " b l o o d s t r e a m [ 's ] , . . Stygian term";
in his drunken isolation,

if not solipsism,

the fisher

man's preoccupation is with an "essential knowledge"
that, going beyond his place in the world,
Other early poems,

is angelic.

such as "Mr. Edwards and the

Spider," "After the Surprising Conversions," "Her Dead
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Brother," "Mother Marie Therese," and "Thanksgiving's
Over" contain isolated consciousnesses similar to the
one I have described above.

In stmt, the dislocated

self, whose isolation is so evident in Lowell's second
phase, was already present in his first phase, only
needing certain modifications to then surface as his
main concern.
Before discussing the alternative to his early
phase,

Life S t u d i e s , I would like to recollect the basic

pressures for Lowell's abandonment of his earlier style.
Up to "The Mills of the Kavanaughs," the Christian
framework provided a transcendent order within which
human action took place.

Having a First Cause gave

adequate grounding to the causality in the narrative of
"The Mills."

Without a First Cause, however, one faced

an infinite regress through preceding causes and an a t 
tendant loss in the significance of any one instance of
cause and effect,

due to the multiplicity of causes and

effects in a groundless,

infinitely ongoing process.

The loss of such a transcendent also meant the loss of
three of the four levels of Interpretation.
Jerome Mazzaro has noted that the poems in The Mills
of the Kavanaughs "complete the disintegration of the
anagogical level in Lowell's p o e t r y . A s

far as he

goes, Mazzaro is correct, but he overlooks the changes
that made the anagogical level unworkable,

changes that
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first appeared In the two versions of "The Mills."

The

disruption of the moral level of meaning and that of
allegory came first.

And the key to the loss of all

three lies in allegory because, moving step by step with
the narrative,

it is the link between the temporal world

of human experience and the divine world of a-temporal
value.

An anagogical level of meaning cannot come about

until the literal, moral and allegorical levels are fully
in place.

Thus, moving one step farther back,

it was

the loss of his Christian myth that cost Lowell the
grounding for causality,

and it was the same loss that

undercut his allegorical level of meaning.
he needed a new modality,

Without these,

a new poetics.

By looking at the titles of the poems in Life S t u d i e s ,
one sees that Lowell begins operating with a narrower
w orld view.

The majority of the poems deal with his p e r 

sonal experience, which is informed by and reflective of
the secular world he has come to inhabit.

Neither Lowell

n or the world he perceives is capable of projection beyond
a horizontal plane.
"Waking in the Blue" contains a reference to the
Azure which seems to be an allusion to Baudelaire's "metaphysical disgust."

62

Lowell says,

agonized blue w i n d o w bleaker."
taken p l a c e .

"Azure day / makes my

A n important change has

The early Jonathan Edwards poems express

their own type of "metaphysical disgust," as do other
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poems of the first phase, but the disgust Lowell e x 
presses in "Waking in the Blue"

(unlike that of his

earlier poems and unlike that Baudelaire expresses)
restricted to this world.

is

Lowell says derisively of

himself that he is "Cock of the walk."

Rather than for

the metaphysical, his contempt is n o w for the thoroughly
pedestrian mental patient,

one who forestalls the a b 

solute and metaphysical question of death by using "a
locked razor."
As a series,

the poems begin with Lowell's revised

v i e w of the world in "Beyond the A l p s . ”
three variations upon the present,
"Inauguration Day:

Next there are

"The Banker's Daughter,"

January 1953," and "A M a d Negro Soldier

Confined at Munich."

The Intended condemnation is r e p r e 

sented in almost snapshot fashion.
Each of these poems provides a bracketing of Lowell's
postwar experience.

"The Banker's Daughter" and "A Mad

Negro Soldier Confined At Munich" are experiencing con
sciousnesses which Lowell explores variatlonally so that
he may take measure of the worlds they re-present.

The

former begins with an objective voice then moves into
Marie de Medici's consciousness, while the latter is in
the soldier's consciousness throughout.

The other two

poems in the first group are in Lowell's voice, but each
of the four provides an "other," an Husserllan appresentation which provisionally regards the "experience of s o m e 
one e l s e . " ^
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Such an other's experience operates reflexlvely
upon Lowell in two ways:

The condemnation of public v a l 

ues is the first thing one notes; however, more basic
than that,

and eventually more significant,

the poetic

mode by which Lowell is perceiving the world makes p o s 
sible much of the experience with which he is able to
work.

The figures whose consciousnesses he uses p r e 

clude some insights just as they make others possible.
In "The Banker's Daughter," Marie de Medici gives an
historical context for the political brutality that took
place during World War II, for example, M u s s o l i n i ’s Italy.
But by the nature of that context she is incapable of
making a statement like,

"The Lord survives the rainbow

of His will."
The second section of Life Studies is the prose
piece,

"91 Revere Street," which first appeared in The

Partisan R e v i e w , Fall,

1956,

as part of an autobiography

that was in progress.

The flat,

factual narration of

events is in marked contrast to the narrative in "The
Mills of the Kavanaughs," reflecting the abandonment of
allegory.

Moreover,

the assertiveness and compounding

allusions that were characteristic of the first phase
are noticeably absent.
part because,

And though this absence is in

here, Lowell is writing prose,

it is also

part of a more general lessening of concentration.

The

essential point is that here Lowell regards past phases
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of himself as an experiencing ego, which he (in the p r e 
sent as a transcendental ego) varies into an arrangement
that reveals his present position by the past's con trast
ing a p p r e s e n t a t i o n s .

No longer looking to heaven, he

can still locate himself, but it must be by looking b a c k 
w a r d and forward rather than upward.
The book's third section is made up of four portraits
of other mo d e r n literary figures:
Santayana,

Delmore Schwartz,

Ford Maddox Ford, George

and Hart Crane.

Each may be

taken as a variation upon some part of Lowell, who at
the same time regards his experience plus that of the
other four as at least five sides of the modern man of
letters.

Each represents an experiencing ego whose h o r i 

zons are identified so he might round out an objective
world for Lowell's imagining and transcending ego.

That

they are seen as isolated consciousnesses is consistent
with the fact they are all seen as alienated in some way.
As the observer, Lowell is alienated also, and his
eidetic variation of four others who are like him in that
regard means that he exploits a predicament in order to
overcome it.

As Husserl uses subjectivity to get past

subjectivity and into an objective world, Lowell uses his
alienation (which is a type of subjectivity) within mere
process to get beyond the dislocating effects of time and
process.

He locates himself in a world that is eidetical-

ly mapped by the four portraits which serve collectively
to locate him.
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The fourth and final section of Life Studies Is
broken Into two parts.
however,

All of the poems in both parts,

are autobiographical,

That Is in M a r r i a g e "

except '"To Speak of Woe

This poem is in the voice of a

w o m a n married to perhaps an exaggerated, manic version
of Robert Lowell.
Other than the above,

the poems in this section

are explicitly about Lowell.

They tend to be congl o m e r 

ates of past phases in the poet's eidetic ego.

In fact

most of the pieces in the book are monadic because their
images

(or, Lowell's past phases)

round out the horizon

structure of an other located elsewhere in a space-time
continuum.

They become microcosms of the world that

existed then and there,

and,

located variously around

the transcendental ego,

they constitute the reference

points by which the present can be located,

though only

relatively.
I have suggested a spatial disposition for these
poems of past, monadic consciousness, but if taken too
literally this could be misleading.
is first and foremost a temporal one.

Each disposition
Most of the poems

are made up of past phases in Lowell's experience.

They

contain past profiles of h i m and of the w o r l d he inhabited.
The simplest way to locate himself is for Lowell to place
what phases he recalls in sequence.
providing sequence,

But in addition to

the poems contain horizons.

Thus
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there Is a spatial quality In their relations to each
other.

In fact, placed In sequence,

they are in co n 

stant comparison with one another.
This comparison Is most visible In terms of the
various criticisms Lowell launches.

However,

ordering of his space-time experiencing ego

the mere

(which is

like the diver) Is what first gives the possibility
of arrangement to the later,

imagining Lowell.

near a conclusion Husserl makes,
(or, intersubjectivity)

We are

the mutual dependence

of the conscious self and the

"other" that it posits and c o n f r o n t s .

If order is found

to exist external to the subjective consciousness,

it

can only be found because there already was "an Obj e c tlve Nature,"

Of course even the tautological character

of this situation does not prevent the subjective c o n 
sciousness from eidetically varying into worlds that do
not exist, or do not yet exist.

Lowell's self-locating

is both retentional and p r o t e n t i o n a l .

He finds out where

he is by seeing where he has been, and he varies this
information to open up possibilities that lie in the future.
Before leaving Life S t u d i e s , 1 would like to take a
closer look at one p o e m that represents the building p r o 
cess that is possible for the transcendental ego that
operates throughout Lowell's second phase.
past experience is objectified,

First, one's

and the imagining self

operates without a history as it objectively turns upon
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its experiencing self.

As said above, the final effect

of this is not only to locate the present self but to
project into the future as well.
In "My Last Afternoon with Uncle Devereux Winslow"
w e are presented with the world of Lowell's childhood.
Lowell,

as an experiencing ego,

is also presented.

There

are several other experiencing egos within the poem,
each carrying his own horizon structure.
tively,

Taken collec

these help to round out Lowell's horizon, both

present and past.

The retentional consciousness of the

Janus and of the slides gathers the diver's past horizons.
Uncovered,
varied,

they trace h o w he got to the present;

freely

they project protentionally into the future of

possible experience, broadening his intentionality so
that the possibilities for experience in the future are
increased.

Indeed,

insofar as his expectations contribute

to the future, not only his experience of it but the
future itself is increased.

On the level of modality,

this process does something similar to Heidegger's notion
of the "Open," also the will as venture.

The difference

is that Heidegger sees the basic element in this process
not as phases of experience but as w o r d s .
There are four experiencing egos in the p o e m that
are substantial enough to count.
Lowell;

secondarily,

Foremost,

there is

there are his grandfather,

his aunt

Sarah, and his uncle Devereux Winslow, w h o is dying.
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The poem recollects the Initiation of a "five and a half"
year-old Robert Lowell Into his first knowledge of death.
The "earth and lime" with which he plays double in s i g 
nificance retrospectively,

as do other details, but these

are all within the experiencing ego of a child.
horizons

Other

(though not completely re-presented as is a t 

tempted with a rounded character in a novel) are implied
and partially revealed by the presence of the other three
experiencing e g o s .
Aunt Sarah represents an isolated,
defeated life.

eccentric,

She supposedly "jilted an Astor."

has a weakness for the social register.)

and
(Lowell

Then, a pianist,

she "failed to appear" for a recital which was to begin
her career.

She now practices on a dummy piano to avoid

disturbing Lowell's grandmother who is tone-deaf.

Uncle

D e v e r e a u x , knowing that he will be dead soon, n e v e r t h e 
less wants to go abroad.

Grandfather Winslow is r e s p o n 

sible for the world which these characters inhabit.

He

has made it possible w i t h "his Liberty Bell silver mine,"
though he also owns "fools'-gold nuggets."
an ironical one.

The point is

There is not wealth and freedom here,

in a human sense, but poverty of spirit and entrapment.
As Heidegger might say, we are given people who when
thrown (on their "own responsibility") have failed to
project "forward toward

. . . possibilities]

of being."

Their attempts to project are consistently thwarted
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because there seem to be no goals toward which they
can project.

Again,

the god's default.

Uncle Devereux would travel to broaden his exp e r i 
ence when he is dying; Aunt Sarah practices furiously
on a dummy piano and will never actually make music;
Grandfather Winslow Inhabits the world which he has
built but which has turned out to be "overbearing,

dis-

p r o p o r t i o n e d " ; and young Robert is in his most formative
process,

soon to confront mortality yet stereotyped

like a manikin in "Rogers Peet's boy's store."

Each of

these circles of experience is in some way short-circuited,
and each is seen to prefigure the truncated world of
Lowell's second phase.
The poem brackets a past phase in Lowell's exp e r i 
ence,

a past horizon in fact, and by adding the implicit

horizons of his aunt, his uncle, and his grandfather it
becomes monadic.

Its primary function is to give Lowell's

consciousness an other by which he can measure his present
location.

Much as Anne Kavanaugh's revery does elsewhere,

the poem helps to gauge the poet's experience;
ly, the r e a d e r ’s also.

As a series,

tangentlal-

all of the poems in

Life Studies operate cumulatively to this end.
On the level of experience approached methodically,
Lowell has made an artistic and therefore somewhat a r 
bitrary limiting of experience that delimits it and makes
m e a n ing possible.

Reminded of Kant's point as to the
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anthropomorphic aspect of an otherwise "natural" symbol,
we can see h o w the natural flow of one's experience must
be anthropomorphlcally
but arbitrarily)

(and to that extent not naturally

limited to ferret meaning from it.

The

process is one of closure to achieve disclosure.
And yet Heidegger says that the limiting process
creates an "Open," that what we close off is thereby
opened up in a way that uncovers the activities and p r o 
cesses that constitute us.

Much of this mystery stems

from the nature of language.
W i lhelm von Humbolt was wrong.

Neither Aristotle nor
We are presented with

mutually dependent o p p o s i t e s , reciprocal and in constant
process.
L o w e l l ’s Anne Kavanaugh is an early instance of
John Berryman's Henry, John Irwin's Bricuth (the Old
English,

to bridge a gap, and as used by Irwin,

ral gap), or Crow,

for Ted Hughes.

a tempo

Later Lowell uses

past phases of himself for himself (the split ego now
being less disguised)

in the same manner that Anne's

revery created a Janus-like space-time continuum from
her childhood forward for her bracketing.

Her retentlonal-

protentlonal range-finding gauged her experience and.
Indirectly,

Lowell's.

Robert Pinsky sees the use of a protagonist or p e r 
sona as a stylistic strategy to regain an expressivistic
language that we have become too self-conscious to use
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openly.
that,

What I would like to add to his argument Is

seen as a mode of t h o u g h t , the stylistic peculiari-

ties of a given period in the history of poetry

(even

w i t h i n only a decade) reveal h o w much of the world we
are able to accept at the time.
Finding large segments of a previous order impossible
to sustain

(as with the post World War II poets) writers

seem to set about reclaiming what has become lost.

In

this sense, many mo d e r n poets have sought to write beyond
the relativistic and secular world they Inhabit.
have entered the indeterminate,

They

forward moving "Open" of

the will as venture pretty much as Heidegger would have
them do, though they may have failed to look as closely
at the language by which they were doing this as he would
like.

In addition to this, because of the way the poetic

imagination operates in the first place and because p o s t 
war poets begin with an unusually strong sense of doubt,
the process of much recent poetry has been directed toward
a bracketing of the poet's experience that performs the
sort of phenomenological process that Husserl proposed.
Since we are time-locked, we must create strategies
to adequately grasp our world and locate ourselves.
Poetically,

there are two basic systems for this that

are currently operating jointly.

One is the appresenta-

tion of an experiencing ego by a transcendental,
ego.

By such a method we

(as subjects)

imagining

detach our e xperi

encing selves to be regarded objectively.
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Treated thus, our experience Is seen as the ac c u m u 
lation of horizons,

the past phases and past profiles of

an intending consciousness moving through a space-time
continuum.

In terms of poetry,

a series of images,

our past is retained by

and we operate both imaginatively

(varying that past) and as a J a n u s , gathering phenomena
retentionally and p r o t e n t i o n a l l y .
But that is only the synchronic side of the poem.
As a second system,

the poetic activity,

and the reading of a poem,

the writing

carries us d l a c h r o n l c a l l y .

In fact the formal poem's rhythm and phonetic patterns
constitute a melody which,

according to Schopenhauer,

orders our willing through time.
repeat a time experience.
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By melody, we can

Reading a poem which is formal

enough to be able to tell you how it is to be read causes
a repetition in experience.
You not only make a span of time repeat itself melodically, but by the eidos you also re-present past in
stances, moments of punctual experience which could not
be understood at the instant they were experienced and
which,

if not re-presented,

by process and lost.

are eventually sedimented

Such past phases increase our k n o w 

ing by building our i n t e n tionality, which modifies future
experience.

Thus regarded in this light, a melodic poem

fuses knowledge and experience,
emotional,

the analytical with the

somewhat like Schopenhauer's title, The World

200

as Will and R e p r e s e n t a t i o n .

Put another way, Aristotle's

and Humbolt's views of language are joined in such a
poetry.
A melody diachronically contains the will's willing
and orders the emotional aspects of our experience.

As

modern psychology has repeatedly told u s , many images
represent things we cannot grasp on the surface of our
normal discourse.

Within poems,

such images are the

synchronic moments of an eidetic consciousness.

Past

Instances are not only re-presented, but their signifi
cances are symbolized such that whole networks of r e l a 
tions between one thing and another are recalled.

And

such relations can be grasped even by those who did not
actually have the experience.
As Husserl says, a phenomenological method will
give adequate but not apodictic knowledge.

Within poetry

such an approach has been adequate not only for Lowell
but, judging by his critics,
readers as well.

for the vast majority of

And yet we should not forget that such

a poetics i^s a strategy that answers what Heidegger
calls "the default of God."
Flannery O'Conner's summary of his experience during
the early fifties indicates that certainly for Lowell
(both healthy and ill)

the god had defaulted in some ter

rible and tragic way.

However,

it is only fair to add

that for O'Conner and many others

(such as, the Fitzgeralds
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and the Tates)

the god had not defaulted.

For them,

the revised poetics 1 have been describing would merely
lack the power of allegory,

and therefore the moral and

anagoglcal levels of signification.
To those who retain a cosmology, Lowell's second
phase,

influential and acclaimed as it has been, r e p r e 

sents the inauguration of a minimal poetry whose language
signifies but cannot embody.
become local,
local.

Finding horizons to have

such a poetry's expectations are equally

A restricted intentionslity will produce an

equally restricted protentional experience.

Forgetting

the possibility of a transcendent precludes knowing it.
Poetry cannot do philosophy's job.
is not phenomenology.

Recent poetry

But the external pressures of a

given period are felt by both poets and philosophers,
and a comparison of the solutions that surface in their
very different disciplines can often tell us a great
deal about those pressures.

We also clarify the change

that has occurred within a discipline by comparing it
to that of another.

Husserl and Heidegger are useful

because they uncover some of the steps an absolutist
such as Robert Lowell took to find certainty amidst r e l a 
tive surroundings.

Previously,

it has been taken for

granted that Lowell's poetic shift came about in Life
Studies.

There the change was apparent.

However,

"The

Mills of the Kavanaughs" is actually where the shift
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took place, and It merits our attention because Its
artistic difficulties expose both the new and the old
modes of thought with which a representative Robert
Lowell was struggling.
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